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Ontogeny Recapitulates Savagery: The Evolution of G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescent 
 
In 1904 G. Stanley Hall published his seminal work Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its 
Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education. 
The dissertation has two primary concerns: first, it seeks to reexamine the scientific 
arguments found in Adolescence, locating their sources and demonstrating that the 
foundation of Hall’s arguments were deeply embedded in nineteenth-century thought; 
second, the dissertation suggests that Hall’s science, while faulty, offers a useful critique 
of pedagogical reform in the Progressive Era. 
 Chapters 1-3 investigate the scientific arguments of Adolescence, exploring Hall’s 
debt to a wide range of nineteenth-century disciplines, including biology, anthropometry, 
sociology, anthropology, criminology, psychology, and psychiatry. The focus throughout 
is on Hall’s use of the theories of recapitulation and evolution to ally adolescence with 
other groups thought to inhabit “lower” levels on the evolutionary scale: “primitives” and 
“savage,” as well as criminals, lunatics, and sexual deviants. Chapters 4-5 look at the 
influence that Hall’s ideas had on educational institutions, notably the child study 
movement and on the junior high school. In both cases, Hall’s ideas were influential, but 
to varying degrees. It is ironic that the first institution designed to educate adolescents 
largely forgot about the man who helped make their efforts possible. If Adolescence had 
only limited impact on junior high school reform, then it is important for historians to 
examine the rift between ideas about adolescents and the implementation of practical 
reforms that sought to educate them. That is the primary concern in the dissertation’s 
conclusion. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In 1904 G. Stanley Hall published Adolescence: Its Psychology And Its Relations to 
Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education. The book was 
the culmination of nearly two decades spent studying children, published twenty years 
after his seminal essay “The Contents of Children’s Minds Upon Entering School,” 
which launched the child study movement in America. Adolescence was a complex book 
and, as a result, historians have approached it in different ways. Hall’s biographer, 
Dorothy Ross, studied it from a psychological and biographical perspective, noting that it 
was a deeply personal book and that its contents were reflective of the numerous 
“personal conflicts” that the author experienced during his own adolescence.1 Joseph 
Kett, who acknowledged the role that personal struggles played in Hall’s ideas, preferred 
a contextual approach and regarded Hall’s work as a product of his social and intellectual 
environment: Adolescence was “a culmination of concepts that had flourished in less 
systematic form for much of the 19th century.”2 I have been more influenced by Kett’s 
contextual approach than by Ross’ biographical method, although Kett and I attack 
Adolescence from different directions. While Kett was interested in examining the book’s 
influence on educational and child-rearing practices, my primary interest has been on the 
ideas and institutions that influenced Adolescence—Kett moved forward from 
Adolescence, while I have traveled backwards. In both cases, however, the orientation is 
                                                
1 Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1972), 339. 
2 Joseph F. Kett, Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 
1977), 220. 
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contextual. Kett provided a social history, exploring Hall’s impact on twentieth-century 
institutions and practices, while I have written an intellectual history, tracing Adolescence 
back to the nineteenth-century ideas on which it was founded.3 
 Adolescence, as its subtitle suggests, was a masterpiece of interdisciplinary 
scholarship and, sadly, it was the last book of its kind, at least in educational circles. As 
Michael Katz has shown, educators in the latter part of the nineteenth century began to 
isolate themselves from the rest of the world, becoming submerged in a professionalized 
ideology that was “ever more divorced from reality.”4 Professional specialization gave 
educational reformers independence from other social reformers, ensuring that they 
would hold a monopoly on educational policy issues. At the same time, academics 
concerned with educational problems retreated in to departments with precisely defined 
boundaries and were separated from the rest of the college’s academic programs. 
Specialization was not unique to educational scholars, of course; it grew out of the new 
bureaucratic structure of the modern research university, which divided knowledge into 
manageable units and organized disciplines along departmental lines. Educationists, like 
all professional academics, became isolated, separated from academia at large and 
engaged in intellectual pursuits that ceased to be of relevance to their colleagues across 
campus. Laurence Veysey has shown that universities in the 1890s were carved into 
collections of autonomous departments and, as a result, a new kind of institution 
emerged: one that “throve on the patterned isolation of its component parts, and this 
isolation required that people continually talk past each other, failing to listen to what 
                                                
3 It should be noted that Kett’s treatment of adolescence begins in the 1790s, and G. Stanley Hall only 
appears at the end of the book. My treatment of adolescence focuses on Hall exclusively. 
4 Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century 
Massachusetts (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001), 160. 
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others were actually saying.”5 As one contemporary noted, the compartmentalization of 
the academic world had dangerous consequences for the intellectual health of its 
professors: “The most serious evil, associated with the present tendency in education to 
special departments, is that the immediate uses of knowledge are allowed to take the 
place of its widest spiritual ministrations. The mind is made microscopic in vision and 
minute in method, rather than truly comprehensive and penetrating.”6 
 Hall echoed the sentiments of this traditionalist, even though he presided over one 
of the most “modern” universities of the day and played an important role in the 
development of specialized programs of graduate-level studies. There was, of course, a 
place for the specialized academic, and at Clark University Hall sought to create an 
entirely new academic specialization in child study. But, at the same time, he clung 
firmly to the idea that undergraduates required a broad, liberal education, an idea that was 
slowly going out of fashion. College study, Hall thought, should be “extensive” rather 
than “intensive,” students should “know something of everything, not everything about 
something,” and the college was “not a place for specialization.”7 He was also critical of 
the “younger generation of professors [who] are experts inspired by ideals of a highly 
specialized culture.”8 Modern research universities were grooming future professors to be 
experts with narrow research interests, and the new departmental structure in higher 
education reinforced the trend. But the trend towards specialization endangered the kind 
of scholarship that Hall was committed to and, in the end, one of the consequences was 
                                                
5 Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), 338. 
6 John Bascon, quoted in Ibid., 198. 
7 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology And Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, 
Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, Vol. 2 (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969 [1904]), 
528. 
8 Ibid., 531. 
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that Adolescence would be one of the last comprehensive educational treatises ever 
written. 
  Specialization and breadth, however, were not mutually exclusive, and the 
modern research university could have incorporated both into is mission. Hall was 
committed to focused, academic study while embracing a broad and liberal curriculum—
and that dual commitment was in no way contradictory. Adolescence was a highly 
specialized treatise in that it focused on a very specific topic, but it was also a brilliant 
interdisciplinary undertaking informed by a sweeping command of nineteenth-century 
scholarship—interdisciplinary breadth was the method used by Hall in investigating 
clearly focused subjects. Hall researched the problem of adolescent development from 
every conceivable angle, and its scope was not limited by departmental or professional 
concerns. Hall’s allegiance to one particular discipline was never total, and he moved 
effortlessly from one subject to the next, covering biology, anthropology, sociology, 
psychiatry, psychology, history, and literature along the way. His scholarly vision was 
expansive and his level of academic mastery impressive.  
 A historical understanding of both adolescence and Adolescence is incomplete 
without considering the many fields that Hall drew from. Developmental biology and 
evolutionary anthropology, as well as criminal anthropology, sociology, and psychiatry, 
all contributed to the formation of Hall’s adolescent—the study of all of these subjects 
would improve our understanding of the history of childhood and education, but they 
have not yet found a place in educational historiography. One must also be sensitive to 
the global scale of the project—Adolescence relied on scholars from around the world, 
and built its case on the history and experiences of a number of nations and peoples. 
 5 
Thus, while the general trend in educational history has been towards focused case 
studies, the context for much of this study is global. Such breadth, however, is rare in the 
history of education, where scholars have been reluctant to expand their research agendas 
to include broad, multidisciplinary approaches. Historians of childhood and education 
have been far more comfortable limiting their research agendas to the specialized 
concerns of their disciplines and, as a result, have ignored many sources that could have 
informed their work. Thus, our understanding of G. Stanley Hall remains incomplete and 
anecdotal. Oftentimes historians dismiss him as an eccentric mystic who was committed 
to a theory that contained no scientific validity and, as a result, historians of childhood 
and education have not fully invested themselves in examining Adolescence in all its 
complexity. In dismissing Adolescence as a book founded on faulty premises, or in 
simplifying its message to quick catch phrases such as “storm and stress,” our historical 
understanding of the modern adolescent has been removed from the intellectual context 
that gave him his form. In place of that history is one that is largely “experiential,” 
focusing on the lived-experiences of adolescence while ignoring other contexts of equal 
value. In the essays that follow, I have attempted to improve upon this historiographical 
shortcoming. 
 The method employed here does not contain a critique of experiential history; 
rather, it simply opts for a different approach—I have explored adolescence as the history 
of an idea, not as a history of an experience. Thus, the work is informed by the work of 
Philippe Ariès, who, as John Demos has written, 
concentrated not so much on the actual life-experience of children in the past as 
on the prevalent attitudes toward and about these children. His work is founded 
on the important and incontrovertible assumption that much can be learned about 
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a culture by investigating the way it regards its young. In this sense, Centuries of 
Childhood is primarily about adults…9 
  
The method has considerable value: “Attitudes towards childhood become, then, a kind 
of yardstick for measuring historical trends of the most profound consequence.”10 
Barbara Finkelstein is somewhat critical of the “intellectualist” approach, which 
“emphasizes the power of the written and spoken work, rather than the force of material 
circumstances.” According to Finkelstein, “intellectualist” historians 
treat children instrumentally—as a concern of social philosophers, political 
theorists, and educators, a focus for philosophical debate, ideological 
controversy, and educational speculation. As passive recipients of ideas, 
sensibilities and skills, children in the hands of these historians, become mere 
reflections in the movement of ideas.11 
 
Finkelstein is critical of the method and considers it to be “limited.” And, in some senses, 
it is. As Harvey Graff has shown, adolescents in the early twentieth century were not 
always passive creatures, but were frequently the agents of their own destiny.  But, at the 
same time, young people, then and now, have been treated instrumentally, and not only 
by historians: young people have been subject to rules and guidelines set by adults; they 
have been housed in institutions invented by adults that serve adult interests; and their 
realities have been constructed by adults who control society’s discursive apparatuses and 
produce the very categories that define childhood in its different stages. Children always 
reflect the adult world, in some way or another—so, what is to be found in the 
adolescent’s reflection? 
 
                                                
9 John Demos, “Developmental Perspectives on the History of Childhood,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 2 (No. 2, 1971), 315. 
10 Ibid., 316. 
11 Barbara Finkelstein, “Literature Review: Incorporating Children into the History of Education,” The 
Journal of Educational Thought 18 (April 1984), 29. 
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Overview: 
Chapter One explores the scientific foundations on which Adolescence was built. Hall’s 
developmental theory was greatly influenced by nineteenth-century advances in the field 
of biology, and particularly important were the theories of recapitulation and evolution, 
worked out by Ernst Haeckel, Charles Darwin, and others. Other sciences proved 
instrumental to Hall’s work as well, including primatology, physical anthropology, 
comparative anatomy, and anthropometry. Combined, these disciplines provided scholars 
with the tools needed to construct a complete genealogical record of the human tribe, 
tracing the development of mankind from its meager beginnings to its present form. 
Hall’s unique contribution to the project lay in demonstrating the ways that 
adolescence—as a distinct stage of life—contributed to a historical understanding of 
human development. In doing so, however, he necessarily conceived of adolescents as 
representing man’s earliest ancestors, be they entirely theoretical recapitulations of 
“missing links,” or accurate physiological approximations of  “savage” forms. The 
problems that arise from allying adolescents with these other groups are explored 
throughout. 
 Chapter Two highlights the contributions made by recapitulatory thinking to the 
field of anthropology, examining Hall’s use of nineteenth-century anthropology in his 
theory of adolescent development. While biological recapitulation likened adolescents to 
savages by virtue of their perceived physiological similarities, social recapitulation found 
moral, intellectual, and social parallels. In effect, both children and primitives were 
converted to the other, a conclusion that had dramatic implications for both colonial 
policies and educational practices in the West. The creation of a linear developmental 
 8 
scheme based on the evolutionary history allowed recapitulationists to devise a normative 
developmental map for adolescents, where the period of puberty became the most critical 
stage of development because it marked the point at which civilization diverged from 
savagery. 
 Failure to properly transition from one recapitulatory epoch to the next is the 
theme of Chapter Three, which explores the fate of those who were thought to have 
remained trapped in earlier stages. Hall regarded abnormal development as an 
evolutionary problem, with abnormal types such as criminals, lunatics, and sexual 
deviants retaining adolescent characteristics into adulthood, thereby occupying a 
permanent stage of savagery, primitiveness, or childhood. The argument was a powerful 
one: if all abnormal behavior had historical antecedents rooted in primitive life, then 
members of those “lower” groups were necessarily deviant; at the same time, in allying 
young people with such notions of deviance, they too would be perceived of as 
essentially deviant. 
 Chapter Four examines how Hall’s ideas were spread throughout the entire 
educational community through the child study movement and its journal, The 
Pedagogical Seminary. Hall’s developmentalism and his particular strand of 
recapitulatory thinking became extremely popular in the late nineteenth century thanks to 
an effective institutional strategy that promoted and disseminated his ideas. Thus, the 
theories later found in Adolescence were by no means unfamiliar to teachers, teacher 
educators, and school administrators; in fact, they were commonly accepted among the 
day’s educators. At its height, the child study movement proved to be a powerful and 
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influential movement, with the ideas of recapitulation occupying a central role in its 
message. 
 The legacy was short-lived, however. Chapter Five explores the history of the first 
major educational reform movement directed toward adolescents: the junior high school. 
Gaining momentum a decade after Adolescence was published, the junior high school 
movement attempted to transform every aspect of the middle grades, providing 
adolescents with an educational experience that was tailored to their distinct 
developmental needs. At times the rhetoric of the reformers sounded very Hallian but, in 
fact, the substance of Hall’s work was lacking. Indeed, many of the reforms implemented 
in junior high schools ran counter to Hall’s recommendations. Both child study and 
recapitulation had ceased to appeal to educational reformers, leaving Hall’s ideas to 
posterity. The direct influence of G. Stanley Hall did not last into the twentieth century, a 
reason, I suspect, that historians of education have lately stopped studying his work. But 
that is not to say that the indirect influence of Adolescence was insignificant. A primary 
aim of this dissertation, and a suggestion for further research, is to attempt to excavate the 
lasting influence that Hall had on educational practices and on contemporary ideas about 
childhood.
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Chapter One 
Locating Adolescence on the Map of Humanity 
 
Every living creature commences its existence under a form 
different from, and simpler than, that which it eventually attains. 
Thomas H. Huxley (1863)1 
 
The bodily structure of man shows traces more or less plain, of 
his descent from some lower  form. 
Charles Darwin (1871)2 
 
We know that the innumerable varieties of animals and plants 
which during the course of millions of years have peopled our 
planet are all simply branches of one single genealogical tree; 
we know that the human race itself forms only one of the newest, 
highest, and most perfect offshoots from the race of the 
Vertebrates. 
Ernst Haeckel (1892)3 
 
 
 
I. The Rise of Developmentalism and the History of Man 
During G. Stanley’s Hall’s graduate studies in Leipzig he was given the assignment of 
conducting a detailed study of the muscles of a frog’s leg. Initially, he found the task an 
unappealing one, feeling “at first a strong sense of repugnance from so small and mean a 
theme,” and the scientific contributions resulting from his study were, admittedly, 
“infinitesimal.”4 But years later, reflecting upon this episode, he shared with his readers a 
great lesson he took from that frog’s leg: I learned, wrote Hall, “that any object, however 
unattractive, may be a key to the greatest themes.” After all, “the structure and laws of 
                                                
1 Thomas H. Huxley, Man’s Place in Nature (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961 [1863]), 74. 
2 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (New York: Penguin Books, 2004 
[1879]), 22. 
3 Ernst Haeckel, Monism as Connecting Religion and Science: The Confession of Faith of A Man of Science 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1895), 32. 
4 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology And Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, 
Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, Vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969 [1904]), 
130-131. 
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action and muscles were the same in frogs as in men, that such contractile tissue was the 
only organ of the will and had done all man’s work in the world, made civilization, 
character, history, states, books, and words.”5  The leap from frogs’ legs to modern 
history was not farfetched for a man whose view of the universe was precise and linear—
if evolutionary progress connected all things, as Hall believed, then the lineage of each 
could be traced backwards or forwards, from the dawn of time to the bustling 
complexities of modern civilization. The world, for Hall, was “lawful to the core,” and 
the law of evolution superseded all others. Those Leipzig meditations contributed to a 
realization that all things were interconnected and related, a belief that the cosmos was 
ordered and unified, and a conviction that great things grew out of simple ones. Later, 
Hall’s work on adolescence would seek verification of those postulates, but in a more 
systematic and thorough way—adolescence would be for Hall the greatest of all themes. 
 Important as frog legs proved to be, there was, of course, a more appropriate 
starting point for an exploration of the evolutionary history of humankind and 
Adolescence began with the very beginning: “the age of zero for all sexed animals…when 
the male cell penetrates the ovum.”6 It was not uncommon for nineteenth-century 
thinkers to build social or psychological theories from generalizations derived from 
biology, which commonly served as the foundation for many of the developmentalist 
disciplines.  Natural laws operating within the biological realm offered the human 
scientist formulae that helped to explain the growth, development, and evolution of 
human phenomena. Groundbreaking biological research, in cellular biology and 
embryology in particular, provided useful theories and methods for scholars who sought 
                                                
5 Ibid., 130. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
 12 
to order the stages of human development. Nineteenth-century scientific research was 
often devoted to the formation of developmental laws; as scholars worked to explain the 
evolution of humanity from the simplest states to those of greatest complexity, they 
turned to biology, the science that had made the most progress in that regard. Hall’s use 
of these “hard” sciences in the formation of his psychological treatment of adolescents, 
then, would hardly have been regarded as irregular. The precedent had certainly been set, 
by Herbert Spencer and others, who drew from biology a framework from which 
humanity could be studied.  
Embryology proved to be a particularly useful science for the developmentally 
minded scholar and by the time Hall reached Leipzig great strides had been made in the 
field. During the previous century “almost all students of biology and medicine” were 
preformationists, believing that embryos contained fully developed, though tiny, beings.7 
But in the face of scientific advancement, students of embryology in the nineteenth 
century had rid themselves of this fantastic claim and along with it visions of tiny 
homunculi curled up inside of eggs. Performationism had suited a world which thought 
the universe static, where life did not evolve but simply grew according to a foreordained 
plan of divine will. Growth had been the guiding problem of the eighteenth-century 
laboratory, central to the field of embryology, and the focus of all the biological 
sciences.8 The scientist who observed a microscopic stallion swirling about in a sample of 
horse semen was not thought crazy by his colleagues, but as successfully (and 
                                                
7 Joseph Needham, A History of Embryology (New York: Abelard-Schurman, 1959), 222; Wrote Albrecht 
von Haller: “It follows that the ovary of an ancestress will contain not only her daughter but also her 
granddaughter, her greatgrandaughter and her greatgreatgrandaughter, and if it is once proved that an ovary 
can contain many generations, there is no absurdity in saying that it contains them all.” Quoted in 
Needham, p. 222. 
8 Ibid., 207. 
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empirically) having illustrated the principle of growth-as-unfoldment to which most 
respectable scientists adhered. The developmental question, central to biological studies 
during Hall’s time, would have been alien to the preformationist, who wondered only 
how such a tiny horse grew into a life-sized one, not how a mass of unvariegated cells 
transformed into an animal. The term evolution itself, Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, was 
used during this period to denote “an unrolling of parts already existing in compact 
form.”9 Only in the nineteenth century would development replace growth as the force 
that most biologists thought drove all life and accompanying this change in thinking were 
radical shifts not only in embryology and the other biological sciences, but also in 
popular perceptions of self, society, and world. In the end, evolutionary thought left little 
untouched and men like Herbert Spencer and his American disciple John Fiske created 
complex meta-philosophies that positioned evolution as the universal force behind all 
things. From this tradition G. Stanley Hall’s conception of adolescence emerged. 
 These two antithetical biological positions—evolutionary development versus 
preformed unfolding—could not but influence the ways in which adults conceived of 
children. Present day controversies aside, the fertilized egg clearly marks the earliest 
stage of child-life and, arguably, embryological science should constitute the first chapter 
in the history of childhood. Scientific conceptions of embryonic life affect not just the 
science of prenatal life, but extend to the larger realm of child-life itself. A preformed 
person originally encased in an embryo merely grew in stature, but an undifferentiated 
collection of cells developed in structure into something entirely new. These different 
conceptions applied more generally to childhood itself. Educational methods, for 
                                                
9 Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 29; See also 
Peter J. Bowler, “The Changing Meaning of Evolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (January-March 
1975): 95-114. 
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instance, are dramatically altered when the philosophy of child-rearing shifts from 
growing an adult to developing a child. Thus the roots of Hall’s genetic science of 
adolescence extended all the way down to the undeveloped embryo because it was within 
in the embryo that the developmental thesis found its greatest strength; attempts to 
explain changing attitudes toward youth at the dawn of the twentieth century must take 
into consideration the full spectrum of nineteenth-century sciences that influenced Hall’s 
milieu, no matter how distant they may seem at first glance. 
Historian of childhood Philippe Ariès understood this point and was himself 
interested in how “ideas which were scientific at the time…corresponded to a popular 
and commonplace idea of life.” Of particular interest to Ariès were the points of 
correspondence between science and childhood, how the former shaped views of the 
latter.10 Though he did not investigate biological (or embryological) ideas of the medieval 
period, such an inquiry would likely have revealed congruities between the forces 
thought to fuel biological change and popular assumptions about the transition from 
childhood to adulthood. Ariès’ claim that the medieval mind did not recognize age as an 
important social determinant might be bolstered by a demonstration that preformationism 
was a commonly accepted belief; the preformationist would envision the child as a 
miniature adult and nothing more and age categories would not be particularly important. 
Likewise, the discovery of the human egg as a dynamic entity would generate discussion 
that extended beyond the laboratory and deep into the popular discourse, not only 
affecting conceptions about children (and assisting in creating new categories of children 
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altogether), but also having an impact on the most far reaching questions concerning 
humankind. 
 In the end, preformationism could not survive and advances in microscopic 
technology showed the idea to be wholly lacking in reality. Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s 
discovery in 1759 (though not widely publicized in the scientific community until 1812) 
of the developmental changes in the intestinal structure of chicken embryos delivered a 
“death blow” to the theory.11 Soon biologists began to examine species as they changed 
over time, eschewing the earlier belief that organisms simply unfolded. Important 
contributions included Karl Ernst von Baer’s important discovery that cellular layers 
developed specialized organic functions, such as respiration and digestion; Lamarck’s 
idea that practice and habit modified an animal’s hereditary legacy; and, later, Darwin’s 
work on natural selection: all signaled an unequivocal break from eighteenth-century 
thought and toward a new view of nature that was, above all else, dynamic. Of this broad 
shift, historian of science William Coleman writes: 
Bare reference to the timeless quality of God’s well-ordered, machinelike unity 
seemed increasingly an inadequate explanation of this dynamic entity, Nature. 
Rather, one must learn how change occurs and believe that phenomena present a 
constant affirmation of the essentiality of change in our world.12 
 
The discovery of a dynamic embryo not only reopened biological discussions, but also 
initiated new conversations among psychologists, social scientists, and even pedagogues. 
If the embryo, the basal unit of life, was not a static entity, but an object that changed 
radically in structure and form, then what consequences might this have for the other 
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sciences? The new findings of cellular development suggested the existence of new laws 
that might be applicable to the rest of the natural world and, consequently, quite often 
embryology would serve as the starting point for other sciences that sought to explain 
change through development. One such project, G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescence, employed 
developmental embryology to set the basic parameters for his own theory—and Hall’s 
method was fully in step with the thinkers who influenced him most, the German 
biologist Ernst Haeckel included.  
The cells of the embryo resembled for Haeckel a “social, civil community, the 
numerous single individuals of which are, indeed developed in various ways, but were 
originally only simple cells of one common structure.”13 Herbert Spencer found in those 
cells a developmental process analogous with the growth of modern society at large. For 
Haeckel and Spencer, biology and society operated on the same general principles and 
organic and evolutionary metaphors pepper their writings.  John Fiske, the great 
American disciple of Spencer, held evolution to be the first “generalization” of a cosmic 
philosophy in which the phenomena of organic life and society operated in unison: here 
the law of organic evolution was synonymous with the law of social evolution.14 
Nineteenth century evolutionary theories transitioned comfortably between biological 
development and social evolution—the emergence of specialized and differentiated 
structures from a simple cell seemed to model the growth of simple societies into 
complex ones. That biological and social evolution followed the same general principles 
of development was only natural in a universe governed by laws.  
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Developmentalism thus provided new explanations for biological and social 
change, importing into social science the biologist’s discovery that complex forms 
emerged from simple ones.  But it also was applied to explanations of individual change.  
Developmentalism reoriented the individual’s relationship with the social world in 
dramatic ways; sciences that sought to explain the development of individuals, such as 
psychology, appropriated the same laws thought to govern both the natural and social 
worlds—certainly individuals were not immune from the laws that governed the rest of 
the universe. Ontogeny and phylogeny, the individual and the whole, respectively, were 
thus seen to follow the same rules—in light of these discoveries, studies of individual 
growth and behavior were reoriented in relation to the whole. 
More dramatic still was the assertion that ontogeny and phylogeny shared not 
only the same laws, but the same history as well. The idea that ontogeny recapitulated 
phylogeny, that the history of the whole species determined the developmental course of 
its individual members, became in the latter part of the nineteenth century “the standard 
technique for the reconstruction of evolution.”15 Hall’s theory of social and cultural 
recapitulation, in which the individual’s life history corresponded to that of the race’s, is 
well known. But it is important to realize that Hall’s recapitulatory theory was derived 
from, and dependent on, Haeckel’s—indeed, Hall’s work can be seen as the continuation 
of Haeckel’s. Though most of Adolescence focuses on the social and psychological sides 
of recapitulation, Hall used Haeckel’s theory of biological recapitulation as the starting 
point for his own work: “In this process the individual in a general way repeats the 
history of its species, passing slowly from the protozoan to the metazoan stage, so that we 
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have all traversed in our own bodies ameboid, helminthoid, piscian, amphibian, 
anthropoid, ethnoid, and we know not how many intercalary stages of ascent.”16 In fine, 
the individual, from embryo on up, reenacted the evolutionary history of the entire animal 
kingdom. 
On this subject, Hall’s debt to Ernst Haeckel cannot be overestimated, for without 
Haeckel’s work on the biogenic law, the version of the theory of social recapitulation that 
appeared in Adolescence would have lacked much, if not all, of its scientific basis. Hall 
relied heavily on the man who credited himself as being the first to apply the 
recapitulatory theory to humans. As “early as 1866” in his influential work General 
Morphology, Haeckel discovered that the “intimate causal connection between ontogeny 
and phylogeny, between the development of the individual and the history of its 
ancestors, enables us to gain a safe and certain knowledge of our ancestral series.”17 
Haeckel’s work followed the organic analogy outlined by Spencer, but took it further. 
Spencer had reminded his readers in The Principles of Sociology that analogies between 
social experience and biological form were merely suggestive—a kind of “scaffolding” 
according to which sociological ideas were formulated, ideas that stood once the 
scaffolding was removed.18  Spencer might have made analogies between protoplasm and 
wandering bands of savages, but those were illustrative, demonstrating the general 
tendencies common to all forms of life.19 Comparisons of social life with biological 
phenomena were meant to underscore the commonly held belief that natural laws 
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governed life, and here Spencer’s comparisons were strictly metaphorical. But Haeckel 
did find an exact correspondence between biological form and the organization of 
species. As he moved backwards—to the pre-social—he arrived at a purely biological 
epoch where individual and whole were one, a point in organic history when the entire 
social and biological realm developed from as a simple unitary entity. 
Beginning with observations of embryonic cells, Haeckel noted that those 
belonging to animals and people could not be distinguished—initially all animal life was 
identical. From this he postulated the existence of a “foundational organism,” or primary 
ancestor. Best approximated by the amoeboid form, this primitive structure marked the 
genesis of human history, and for Haeckel it became the basis for knowing mankind.20 As 
he drew from the revolutionary work of German biologists Caspar Friedrich Wolff and 
Karl Ernst Baer, as well as Lamarck and Darwin, Haeckel laid waste to the notion that 
each species possessed separate and constant histories, an idea held onto stubbornly by 
Louis Aggasiz, the last important advocate of the doctrine of constancy of species, whose 
racist proclivities made the polygenetic theory seem absurd and offensive. The 
unification of man and animal through embryological investigation fused what had 
formerly been conceived as separately unfolding biological histories into one vast 
narrative—Haeckel sought nothing less than to construct a “monophyletic genealogy of 
the animal kingdom.”21 Charles Darwin, whose thoughts on man’s earliest genealogical 
periods were influenced by Haeckel, also worked from the findings of this brand of 
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embryology: “Man is developed from an ovule, about 125th of an inch in diameter, which 
differs in no respect from the ovules of other animals.”22   
As we shall see in Chapter Two, this trend in biological thought allowed those in 
the human sciences—particularly anthropologists—to create monophyletic genealogies 
of their own. The cultural histories of humanity written by Victorian anthropologists, and 
the genetic explanations of man’s psychological development created by Hall and others, 
can be understood only as a continuation of Haeckel’s monophyletic vision.  
 This alliance of the biological and human sciences gained prominence in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and was shaped by efforts to order the species in 
genealogical tables; biologists who began to unite primitive forms of life through the 
detection of shared ancestries helped pave the way for developmentalism’s controversial 
application to the anthropological realm. But what made Haeckel’s brand of biological 
thinking especially influential was that he saw his work as a historical undertaking as 
much as a scientific one: “I am one of those scientists who believe in a real ‘natural 
history,’ and who think as much of an historical knowledge of the past as of an exact 
investigation of the present.”23 Haeckel’s goal was to understand the history of human 
development by reading a biological record spanning millions of years. The embryos and 
fetuses he observed in the laboratory were treated like specimens uncovered in the 
geological record. But if the paleontologist and archaeologist caught glimpses of history 
captured by chance geological events, the recapitulationist had discovered that life’s 
historical formula was buried in the living record itself. The theory of recapitulation 
resuscitated all the actors of biological history, allowing recapitulationists to witness 
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history as it unfolded within current life forms. In these annals, mankind was placed at 
the center of all investigation: “The problem which underlies all others, is as to the place 
which man occupies in nature and his relations to the universe of things.”24  
Developmental thinking is necessarily historical, as its primary concern lies in 
tracing past forms/states to current ones and biological change when explained by gradual 
evolutionary transitions always contains a historical narrative. Whether the mechanism 
driving biological modification is Lamarckian habituation, Darwinian selection, or 
Haeckelian recapitulation, the transformation of the species is explained as modification 
occurring over vast periods of time. But while historicism is necessary, 
anthropomorphism may not be—it certainly reminds one of the Whiggishness that 
modern historians so frequently bemoan. But this element of presentism—seeing the 
seeds of man in all things—made Haeckel’s work particularly amenable to Hall’s genetic 
program, which saw in all primitive peoples the kernel of modern man. Many biologists, 
lamented Haeckel, were concerned only with ontogenetic development—the “history of 
the germ,” or type; but Haeckel was interested in phylogeny, the “history of the tribe” 
and, specifically, the human tribe.25 Hall would have held anthropologists and 
sociologists who studied small groups without fitting them somewhere upon the 
chronology of human progress in equal disfavor, though most nineteenth-century social 
scientists were unlikely to study specific populations without recognizing their 
significance in the larger story of human civilization. For both Haeckel and Hall, types 
were seen always in relation to the whole; in a narrative of historical development so 
oriented, everything was measured by its relation and proximity to the highest 
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manifestation of life or culture. For Haeckel the fish was of interest because humans 
inherited much from the piscine form: double nasal structure, jaws, lungs, and pairs of 
limbs.26 For Hall the frog’s leg was significant because it provided clues to human 
development. Nothing stood on its own and all sciences were united in an effort to 
answer the same question. 
In the laboratory Haeckel observed the “facts” of ontogeny and derived from 
those their “phylogenetic significance”—structural modifications in any given species 
were important in terms of their influence on future forms.27 It was not always a precise 
science and Haeckel noted that the phylogenetic hypothesis did not necessarily lead to 
scientific certitude.28 The study of ontogeny rested on definite and observable 
morphological structures of the individual, but phylogeny was far less positivistic; 
Haeckel himself defined it as “the developmental history of the abstract, genealogical 
individual.”29 Thus phylogeny was more theoretical position than empirical observation, 
at least as Haeckel saw it, and while many scientists were confident that the general 
theory of descent had been proven beyond reproach, it was far more difficult to establish 
with certainty the entire ancestral line of a species. Millennia of change, sometimes 
cataclysmic, other times gradual, had not been kind to many species and, as Darwin and 
Lyell well knew, much of the phylogenetic record had disappeared. Over time, the 
driving force of evolution had replaced inferior beings with superior ones; extinction was 
as much a part of evolution as development. As Darwin noted in Origin: “Natural 
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Selection almost inevitably causes much Extinction of the less improved forms of life.”30 
Explaining the process further, he noted:  
But we may go further than this; for as new forms are continually and slowly 
being produced, unless we believe that the number of specific forms goes on 
perpetually and almost indefinitely increasing, numbers inevitably must become 
extinct. That the number of specific forms has not indefinitely increased, geology 
shows us plainly; and indeed we can see reason why they should not have thus 
increased, for the number of places in the polity of nature is not indefinitely 
great…31 
 
Since the actual ancestors from past epochs were not still living, sometimes the best the 
biological recapitulationist could do was to locate approximations (living or dead) where 
direct evidence was not extant. The creation of theoretical ancestors was an attempt to 
piece together a line extending from simple cellular organisms all the way to humans—
deductions derived from actual observation of what the ancestors might have been like. 
The manufacturing of theoretical ancestors was an attempt to continue Darwin’s project, 
which had stopped at the limits of what evidence was available to him. “I am fully 
convinced that species are not immutable,” Darwin wrote, “but that those belonging to 
what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally 
extinct species.”32 
In order to fill in the gaps of his own laboratory work, Haeckel turned to 
comparative anatomy, the branch of morphological investigation that sought to uncover 
internal similarities shared by diverse members of the animal kingdom, once thought to 
be unrelated by virtue of their obvious external dissimilarities. Comparative anatomy 
turned inward, to the examination of internal structures, and Haeckel used the field to 
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find morphological similarities between primitive animals and human embryos. Wrote 
Haeckel, “it is important that we find a large number of lower animal forms to be still 
represented in the course of man’s embryonic development. In these cases we may draw 
our conclusions with the utmost security as to the nature of the ancestral form from the 
features of the form which the embryo momentarily assumes.”33 
When certain stages of human growth within the embryo were structurally 
analogous with other life forms, Haeckel assumed that the comparative sample was a 
distant relative of man. The earlier that a similarity was observed in the embryo’s 
development, the more ancient the relation, and through this method Haeckel began to 
piece together a complete genealogical table of humanity’s shared ancestry. Haeckel’s 
gastrula theory was comparative anatomy in action. Called his “most famous invention” 
by Stephen Jay Gould, the gastrula “was the hard salesman of recapitulation,” but, as 
Gould also reminds us, it was highly problematic.34 The gastrula was an imaginary 
creature, a theoretical animal cobbled together from the observations of scores of other 
animals. Basically a floating sac, the gastrula was a primitive intestinal animal with two 
layers and a cavity for intake—it represented for Haeckel the common progenitor shared 
by all complex animals, marking the evolutionary moment when the protozoa and 
metazoa diverged. From that divergence Haeckel’s evolutionary tree began to take shape 
and from the gastrula Haeckel painstakingly reconstructed the emergence of vertebrate 
forms, leading eventually to a “historical succession of the classes and orders of the 
Vertebrata in the course of untold millions of years,” which was “much more important 
for the foundation of our human pedigree than would be a complete series of all possible 
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skeletons of Primate.”35 The members of this genealogy, from the gastrula to the “skull-
less, brainless, and memberless” amphioxus, a kind of primitive worm, earned from 
Haeckel the kind of filial deference that might have been reserved for his most direct 
ancestors. Those creatures, he wrote, “deserve all respect as being of our own flesh and 
blood [and have] better right to be an object of profound admiration and of devoutest 
reverence, than any one in that worthless rabble of so-called ‘saints’ in whose honour we 
‘civilized and enlightened’ cultured nations erect temples and decree procession.”36 Later, 
anthropologists and genetic psychologists would wrap such garlands around the neck of 
other mythological beings that filled historical gaps in the procession of human history.  
Haeckel’s theoretical ancestral lineage, the “succession of unbroken forms” 
leading from the single-celled amoeba to the complex vertebrate, had evolved over 
“thousands of millions of years” and offered a much more accurate evolutionary record 
than paleontology could ever hope to provide.37 If the theory of recapitulation was 
correct, then the entire story of humanity’s organic development, from the gastrula on up, 
was preserved within the embryo’s internal record, thereby supplementing the lack of 
direct evidence in the geological record. It worked in theory, but posed another 
methodological problem for scientists who sought to chart this great span of organic 
history: this was a history compressed into forty weeks of embryonic growth in humans, 
a blink of an eye and the observer might miss a crucial evolutionary step. “The brief 
period in which the Ontogeny of the human individual takes place,” Haeckel wrote, 
“bears no proportion to the infinitely long period required for the phylogenesis of the 
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human tribe.”38 It was a history that progressed so rapidly that major shifts could be 
almost imperceptible. This was especially true for humans; G. Stanley Hall wrote that the 
“early stages of growth are telescoped into each other almost indistinguishably, so that 
phylogenetically the embryo lives a thousand years in a day, and the higher the species 
the more rapid relatively is the transit through the lower stages.”39 From fertilization to 
birth, the weight of the developing human increased 950,600,000 times; the embryo 
experienced an overwhelming amount of morphological change in utero. And more 
problematically, as species advanced in evolutionary complexity, previous stages in the 
species’ biological past became more and more abbreviated, if not entirely vitiated. The 
gestation period could not be expected to expand indefinitely in order to “fit” in the 
forever increasing number of evolutionary steps higher organisms inherited from lower 
ones.40 This problem of kenogensis—in which “new features are added to the end of 
ontogeny [and] condensation makes room for them by deleting earlier stages”41—
troubled both Hall and Haeckel, who had to mine other disciplines for data to support the 
idea that ontogeny did indeed recapitulate phylogeny. 
Investigations of the earliest stages of man’s biological history, then, were fraught 
with problems. Darwin hadn’t the stomach for such researches, noting with frustration 
that in “attempting to trace the genealogy of the Mammalia, and therefore of man, lower 
down in the series, we become involved in greater and greater obscurity.”42 Fortunately, 
for recapitulationists, the further scientists moved along in the annals of organic history, 
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the fewer ancestors humans actually had—as evolutionary lines became more distant 
from their common origins, humans and their closer relatives branched off into 
increasingly elite segments of the animal kingdom. Consequently, the “tribal record” 
grew more “trustworthy” with the aid of sciences that explored human history beyond the 
kinds of speculative embryological forms invented by Haeckel. Several disciplines 
contributed to this reconstruction of biological history, most importantly comparative 
anatomy, paleontology, and primatology. Taken individually, each science offered only 
pieces of historical evidence concerning the evolution of the human form, but combined 
they provided for a more a complete genealogy. This alliance of historically-oriented, 
developmental sciences helped evolutionists move beyond the limits of any particular 
body of evidence and toward a true monophyletic history of the human species.  
Phylogenic reconstruction as an interdisciplinary undertaking, pulling from a 
diverse range of sciences to delineate an ascending scale of organic life, would become 
the model for recapitulationists in the human sciences. Where biological recapitulation 
ended, with a complete explanation of man’s organic history, social recapitulation began; 
the latter followed the same method in its attempt to unravel man’s social, cultural, and 
intellectual heritage. G. Stanley Hall and others took their cue from biological 
recapitulation, gleaning from it both its method and purpose, and this application allowed 
them to continue the story of human progress where biology necessarily ended. 
Combined, the biological and human sciences would order life from its simple cellular 
beginnings all the way to the most advanced stages of civilization and culture. Never had 
a historical project been so ambitious. 
 28 
Herbert Spencer, whose influence on developmentally-minded scholars was 
immense, knew that such an ambitious project could not succeed without 
interdisciplinary cooperation. Through his own work, he hoped to inspire 
interdisciplinary alliances where questions concerning the origins of man could be 
answered collaboratively. According to Spencer, all sciences were, in essence, 
evolutionary and should assist one another in working toward the same end: 
Theoretically, all the concrete sciences are adjoining tracts of one science, which 
has for its subject-matter, the continuous transformation which the Universe 
undergoes. Practically, however, they are distinguishable as successively more 
specialized parts of the total science—parts further specialized by the 
introduction of additional factors.43 
 
While disciplinary specialization grappled with specific and sometimes esoteric questions 
that were sometimes of little relevance to the equally particularized inquiries of other 
fields, Spencer’s notion that separate fields shared common ground suggested the need 
for broad scholarship that took into consideration the findings of all sciences in an 
attempt to construct a complete history of humankind. For thinkers sympathetic to this 
project, as both Haeckel and Hall were, disciplinary integration won out over academic 
specialization. Important as the individual contributions of morphology, embryology, 
anatomy, paleontology, and primatology may have been, without synthesis their findings 
lacked the splendor that Spencer and others were searching for. Darwin understood this 
too—and the wide variety of disciplines he drew upon in his Descent of Man shows him 
to be in step with this kind of meta-theoretical thinking: referenced in Descent are Max 
Mueller’s linguistic theories, the anthropological work of Lubbock, McLellan, Tylor, and 
Quatrafages, essays on craniology and ethics, as well as an impressive variety of books 
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on embryology, primatology, and even abnormal psychology. Original and highly 
specialized research produced indispensable building blocks, but a Spencerian science of 
man required scholars who could assemble their work into complete metatheories. 
Haeckel summarized the point nicely in Monism: “The whole literature of modern 
biology, the whole of our present zoology and botany, morphology and physiology, 
anthropology and psychology, are pervaded and fertilised by the theory of descent.”44 
As the nineteenth century came to a close, Haeckel’s monophyletic vision was in 
jeopardy, at least it in the biological sciences where it was clearly losing ground. (At the 
same moment, however, it was gaining momentum in the human sciences.) Within 
Haeckel’s field there was 
a growing dissatisfaction, shared by many descriptive embryologists, with facile 
explanations of phylogenetic relatedness based on homologous structures…[and 
a] tendency of these same investigators to eschew the use of wholesale 
speculations to relate phyletic groups that characterized many earlier descriptive 
studies…[and] the result was a restriction of homological considerations to 
closely related forms.45 
 
This may have constituted an advance in science, but it clearly distanced the study of 
embryology from Spencer’s program. As embryologists in the 1890s became more 
specialized, they ceased to place a premium on contributing to human history as a whole 
and began to focus “primarily on ontogenetic events at the expense of phylogenetic 
issues.”46 In Gould’s words, research turned toward detailed inquiry on the specific and 
away from the once “spectacular persistence of complete and remote ancestors in the 
early ontogeny of higher forms.”47 The point here is not whether Haeckel’s theory was 
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correct, though time and the development of observational technologies showed it to be 
as ludicrous as preformationism; rather, the importance of Haeckel’s work is the impact it 
had on other sciences. Regardless of its diminishing influence in embryological and 
morphological circles, grand phylogenetic claims—complete with a fictive cast and 
audacious aims—gained ground elsewhere. Haeckel’s theory and method would continue 
to influence the writing of man’s history, even as his biological colleagues were rejecting 
them. But G. Stanley Hall never wavered in his faith, giving the impression in 
Adolescence that Haeckel was alive and well in 1904. 
 
 
II. Apes, Children, and Savages: Biological Recapitulation in Primatology and 
Physical Anthropology 
 
The problem of missing intermediary forms also pestered the paleontologist, another 
scientist whose findings contributed to a “totalitizing science.” Charles Lyell, the great 
geologist whose influence was widely felt in evolutionary circles, and of great import to 
the work of Darwin, recognized that the geological record was imperfect and worried that 
its gaps might betray his gradualist thesis. Some, complained the man who introduced 
gradualism to the world, interpreted breaks in the paleontological record as “proofs of 
original chasms and leaps in the course of nature,” but this was an incorrect conclusion. 
While Biblical literalists found in history cataclysmic events that altered the course of 
natural history with an immediate and dramatic intensity, Lyell saw history as a more 
slowly paced affair.48 So slowly and over such a long period of time, in fact, that it 
troubled the imagination. “These and similar facts,” commented John Lubbock on the 
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matter, “though they afford us no means of measurement, impress us with a vague and 
overpowering sense of antiquity. All geologists, indeed, are now prepared to admit that 
man has existed on our earth for a much longer period than was until recently supposed to 
have been the case.”49 The anthropologist Edward B. Tylor wrote: 
Thus geology establishes a principle which lies at the very foundation of the 
science of anthropology.  Until of late, while it use to be reckoned by 
chronologists that the earth and man were less than 6,000 years old, the science 
of geology could hardly exist, there being no room for its long processes of 
building up the strata containing the remains of its vast successions of plants and 
animals.  These are now accounted for on the theory that geological time extends 
over millions of years.  It is true that man reaches back comparatively little way 
into this immense lapse of time.50 
 
The geological researches of Charles Lyell helped to demonstrate just how long human 
history was, orienting it upon more precise temporal lines than Haeckel and other 
biologists were able to. The work, however, was controversial, as it privileged science 
over theology as the authority on human history. If, as Lyell thought, the Mississippi 
River was between 67,000 and 100,000 years old, or the ice age occurred roughly 
800,000 years before Christ, then the creationist belief that the earth was just 6,000 years 
old was seriously challenged. The rejection of the Bible’s “standard chronology” led to 
an entirely new concept: that of geological time, which spanned vast tracts of historical 
space. Just as the biological disciplines had done, fields such as geology, archaeology, 
and history began to issue calls for scholars to delve as deeply into the past as possible, to 
trace the existence of humankind to points theretofore uncharted on the map of history. 
The naturalist Thomas H. Huxley took his cue from these many disciplines, 
building upon the idea that man’s history was longer than previously believed. 
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Knowledge was in a state of flux in late nineteenth century was, a period when science 
was threatening to undo truths once thought immutable; such iconoclasm could make 
scientific research controversial, and Huxley’s work was as radical as it came.51 He was 
fully in step with the other thinkers examined thus far, making him a useful source for 
Hall, who turned frequently to Huxley in the pages Adolescence.  Huxley accepted the 
premise that man’s history was longer than formerly believed and incorporated into his 
work the basic tenets of Haeckel’s recapitulatory embryology—the evidence, he wrote, 
“appears to me sufficient to place beyond all doubt about the structural unity of man with 
the rest of the animal world.”52 But while Haeckel had explored remote periods of 
physiological history, Huxley was more interested in the relationship between humans 
and their closer mammalian ancestors, particularly the primates. Their methods, however, 
did not greatly differ: both constructed genealogies based upon the shared structural 
similarities revealed by comparative anatomy and then assembled taxonomies that allied 
humans with their ancestors from the animal kingdom. That man and ape—especially the 
chimpanzee and gorilla—bore an undeniable structural likeness suggested that the human 
form had been inherited from monkeys. Comparable limbs, pelvis, spinal column, teeth, 
and cranium forced two formerly distinct morphological histories into one, leading 
Huxley to claim that “for the skulls, no less than for the skeleton in general, the 
proposition holds good, that the difference between Men and the Gorilla are of smaller 
value than those between the Gorilla and some other Apes.”53 Darwin imported Huxley’s 
conclusions from Man’s Place in Nature directly into his Descent of Man: “Prof. Huxley, 
in the opinion of most competent judges, has conclusively shewn that in every visible 
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character man differs less from the higher apes, than these do from the lower members of 
the same order of Primates.”54 
Huxley’s comparisons of animals’ brains led to him to the same conclusions that 
his examinations of skeletons had: “As if to demonstrate, by a striking example, the 
impossibility of erecting any cerebral barrier between man and the apes, Nature has 
provided us, in the latter animals, with an almost complete series of gradations from 
brains little higher that that of a Rodent, to brains little lower than that of Man.”55 It had 
been a cruel discovery: 
from the crown and summit of the animal creation down to creatures, from which 
there is but a step, as it seems, to the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the 
placental Mammals [it] is as if nature herself has foreseen the arrogance of man, 
and with Roman severity had provided that his intellect, by its very triumphs, 
should call into prominence the slaves, admonishing the conqueror that he is but 
dust.56 
 
 
Huxley’s conclusion that the kingdom of man was so closely related to that of animals 
was humbling a one. But it was not the end of the story. The divergence of man and ape 
did not mark the end of the evolution of humanity, which was not itself a monolithic 
category, but a collection of widely diverging types. Man’s departure from the primate 
world and his journey to the gates of modern civilization had taken countless generations 
of evolutionary struggle. But Huxley and other evolutionists insisted that not all men had 
traversed the same evolutionary course, and not all shared in the spoils of evolutionary 
victories equally.  Indeed, just as the animal kingdom presented a series of evolutionary 
gradations, so did the family of man; from these gradations developmental scholars 
accounted for social, cultural, and intellectual differences between varying civilizations. 
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Racial and ethnic difference was explained in evolutionary terms, dividing groups into 
gradations and types such as modern and primitive, savage and civilized. Thus the 
transition from Simian man to intelligent being had not been a seamless leap, as 
evolutionary steps never were. Instead, a series of physiological, cultural, and intellectual 
permutations filled the many gaps that separated superior forms from inferior ones. 
 With the construction of a teleology of human development, with its genesis in 
simple organic forms and its termination in the establishment of complex social 
organizations, came a host of developmentally oriented disciplines that studied each 
stage. The focus of each of these fields was aimed at particular episode of man’s 
evolutionary history—embryology studied the cellular birth of humankind, comparative 
anatomy traced man’s early progenitive stock, and primatology concentrated on more 
recent episodes of mammalian evolution. Following these fields came physical 
anthropology, which compared and contrasted different groups of people according to 
physical characteristics. Other scholars, such as cultural anthropologists and genetic 
psychologists, ordered man according to his level of civilization or sophistication of 
cognitive thought, but the physical anthropologist was allied more closely with the 
biologist, gauging human progress not through social or cultural achievement, but against 
a series of physiological criteria. Physical anthropology differentiated human types 
according to corporeal characteristics, be they external differences in appearance, or 
internal differences of morphological structure. Using the simian type as its lowest 
reference point and the Western European as its highest, races were awarded rungs of 
varying height on the ladder of evolution based on their proximity to either of these 
extremes. This method of differentiation produced a seemingly objective empirical 
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formula for determining racial and ethnic difference, while at the same time providing the 
means to order and rank them. The result was the creation of a racial lineage that 
accounted for all the varieties of man, from those forms deemed inferior and simian, such 
as the Australasian, to those regarded as superior, such as the Aryan type.  
In Haeckel’s broad typology, humanity had been envisioned as a coherent entity, 
with all the world’s people in one distinctive group. But physical anthropologists and 
other race scientists divided humanity into a more fine-grained organization. Daniel 
Brinton, an ethnologist from the University of Pennsylvania, an authority familiar to Hall, 
catalogued humanity based on racial characteristics. In Brinton’s work race trumped 
individuality: “The traits of race thus overslaugh the variable characteristics of the 
family, the sex or the individual, and maintain themselves uniform and unalterable in the 
pure blood of the stock though all experience.”57 This science was not to be any less 
rigorous or esoteric than the evolutionary embryologist’s examination of microscopic 
phenomena. Certainly any ordinary observer could classify racial types based on the way 
people looked, but it took an expert to detect racial characteristics that remained 
unnoticed to the untrained eye; that races differed in “internal structures and organs” was 
known only to the “man of science.”58 Racial classification, then, was to be more than 
prejudice learned from experience or tradition, but a scientific practice based on 
empirical data resultant from supposedly objective criteria. Here human differences were 
not vaguely recognized, but precisely measured—physical anthropology constituted a 
new way of seeing (and organizing) people: difference determined by scientific rigor. 
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Consider the words of one Italian anthropologist, whose interest in racial differences 
focused on studying crania: 
The greatest variation in a series of human crania cannot be distinguished by an 
untrained eye...Little by little a useful habit and keen eye are acquired, by means 
of which the slightest variation are detected…59 
 
The examination of externalized racial traits like skin color, physiognomic attributes, or 
cranial shape and size provided for only the most rudimentary classifications. Thorough 
investigation required delving deeper into the human body, examining it in its totality: 
“All parts of the body,” noted Brinton, “have been minutely scanned, measured and 
weighed, in order to erect a science of the comparative anatomy of the races.”60 
Meticulous physical investigations allowed ethnologists and physical anthropologists to 
draw conclusions about the qualities and aptitudes any particular race, conclusions that 
the casual observer fueled by informal prejudicial evidence could not have drawn. Such 
science not only entrenched racist thinking, but it also helped to professionalize it: racism 
under scientific guise became privileged knowledge, housed institutionally under the care 
of experts.   
“Higher” and “lower” racial types were determined by the number and degree of 
simian characteristics that had been retained over the course of evolution—if man had 
evolved from the apes, the argument went, then races resembling apes were more closely 
related to the animal kingdom than those who did not; consequently, they were less 
evolved. The presence of simian characteristics suggested that some races were lower not 
just in the evolution of physical characteristics but intellectual ability as well: some 
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physical traits, wrote Brinton, “bear intimate relations to mental capacity, and where the 
body presents many points of arrested or retarded development, we may be sure that the 
mind will also.”61 This was a basic premise of comparative craniology, the study of skull 
and brain size, which held that “cranial capacity corresponded directly with the degree of 
civilization achieved.”62 Indeed, physical structure was thought to determine the less 
tangible qualities, such as intelligence and culture: within the lesser evolved brain existed 
a “visceral and organic structure that was physiologically juxtaposed to its intellectual 
capacity.”63 
That the symptoms of arrested development were signaled by the retention of 
simian characteristics provided scientists with a relatively simple measuring stick that 
could be applied to all the races of man, leading to the construction of an evolutionary 
table that ordered the races, just as evolutionary biologists had sought to order the 
species. Wrote one anthropologist, commenting on the physiological criteria he employed 
in positioning the lower races nearer to the animal kingdom, “These characters are 
simioid, and the races possessing them in largest number and development are lowest in 
the scale. Measured by these criteria the Caucasian stands at the head of the racial scale 
and the Negro at its bottom.”64 Commenting on these findings, Theodore Gill agreed that 
those of African decent possessed more ape-like characteristics than Caucasians:  
in color, the prognathous jaws, and the depressed nose, and those characteristics 
are doubtless the result of inheritance and retention from our common ancestral 
stock. To the extent of manifestation of such characteristics (and others 
coincident with them), the Negro is an example of retarded or arrested 
development.65  
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Similar remarks can be found in Hall’s work on adolescence, influenced as it was by the 
kind of thinking outlined above: “In apes and lower races of men the sutures of the skull 
unite first in the frontal, then in the parietal, and last in the occipital region, while in 
civilized man this order is reverse.”66 
Daniel Brinton’s litmus test for inferiority was exhaustive. Included among the 
many marks of physiological lowliness shared by primates and the “lower” races were 
simplicity and early union of the cranial sutures; presence of the frontal process of the 
temporal bone; wide nasal aperture; prominence of the jaws; recession of the chin; early 
appearance and retention of the wisdom teeth; unusual length and perforation of the 
humerus; continuation of the “heart” line across the hand; a narrow pelvis; deficiency of 
the calf muscle; flattening of the tibia; and elongation of the heel. Together, these 
physical traits constituted a kind of check list that distinguished the level of racial 
advancement along evolutionary lines—the more of these characteristics that were 
present, the “lower” the race, while “higher” races were thought to possess relatively few, 
if any, of them. By these criteria, of course, white Europeans were positioned atop the 
evolutionary scale of mankind, while the “Negro” was among the lowest.67 Darwin 
reached the same conclusion, though his thoughts on race were more tempered than some 
of his colleagues’: “It is an interesting fact that ancient races…more frequently present 
structures which resemble those of the lower animals than do the modern. One chief 
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cause seems to be that the ancient races stand somewhat nearer in the long line of descent 
to their remote animal-like progenitors.”68 Some authors were even more explicit: 
Old Sophia, then apparently over sixty years of age, had white hair, and the most 
monkey-like face I ever saw upon a human being. The projection of the lower 
jaw and the low cast of countenance denoted an inferior physique.69 
 
The physiological similarities shared by apes and “lower” races were also thought 
to be shared by children as well. In fact, Brinton described the inferior physical 
characteristics possessed by inferior races as “fetal, infantile, or simian,”70 thus creating 
in one fell swoop a category of inferiority that included man’s ape-like ancestors, races of 
African descent, and—significantly—children. Adult members of the so-called savage 
races were frequently compared to children of the civilized lands and comparisons are not 
hard to come by in the literature. (“The sternum of a Bushman is often not as much 
developed as that of a new-born infant with us.”71) Hall comfortably transitioned between 
these groups as well and rarely is any one group mentioned without reference to another. 
“Slowly and relatively late in the child and the race is the thumb opposed,” wrote Hall, 
suggesting links between infants and apes, and then stating that hand-strength (with the 
important etymological qualifier being “grasp”)72 advances as civilization increases: “It is 
now pretty well established,” he wrote, “that civilized man has greater strength of hand as 
tested thus than savages.” Time and time again, this unlucky trio—ape, child, and 
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savage—is made synonymous and their similarities are catalogued in Hall’s treatise, from 
the most prosaic examples to the most significant.73 
Brinton, an monogenetic evolutionist, helped create an evolutionary picture of the 
development of the human race that placed the “lower” races on the same developmental 
platform as children from the civilized lands—thus lower races in their adult form 
resembled other races in their puerile form, a conclusion that helped to build the 
recapitulationist’s argument that the child was a savage, and the savage a child. 
  
 
III. G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescent and the Theory of Biological Recapitulation 
In Adolescence everything is explained with reference to the theory of recapitulation and 
this is as true for the adolescent’s physiological development as it is for his intellectual 
and social growth. The stages of growth experienced by all youth, patterns which 
transcended racial particularities, were seen by recapitulationists as swift reenactments of 
evolutionary change that had transformed the human body at various times in the long 
history of man. Recapitulationists, following the Haeckelian model, thought that 
individual development was actually caused by the phylogenetic process—phylogeny 
was assumed to be the mechanical cause of ontogeny, a point Haeckel himself attempted 
to clarify in a rather murky passage: 
Phylogenesis…is a physiological process, which, like all other physiological 
functions of organisms, is determined with absolute necessity by mechanical 
causes. These causes are motions of the atoms and molecules that comprise 
organic material…Phylogenesis is therefore neither the foreordained, purposeful 
result of an intelligent creator, nor the product of any sort of unknown, mystical 
force of nature, but rather the simple and necessary operation of…physical-
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chemical processes.74 
 
Darwin wasn’t convinced, as Stephen Jay Gould tells us, and probably from no fault of 
his own. But others were, despite the lack of hard evidence. Haeckel might have 
struggled to explain the exact means that governed the process of recapitulation, but his 
point was clear enough: the force of phylogeny acted upon most basic building blocks of 
life, and whatever those “physical-chemical processes” may have been, exactly, they 
contained a historically determined map that guided growth and physical transformation. 
Hall paid little attention to the minute technicalities of recapitulation and was happy to 
explain the underlying force of phylogeny as a kind of magical process, seeing phylogeny 
as the historical soul that pervaded all life and determined the direction that it took. But 
for Hall, recapitulation also appealed to common sense. It was only logical that an 
organism, as it developed, had to march through the developmental stages of its 
predecessors. If the embryo recapitulated the earliest stages of biological history, why 
shouldn’t the mature human form retrace the steps of anthropoid history? Hall’s 
discussion of the growth during the early teens, then, was at the same time an 
examination of the growth periods of the race. The physical characteristics that so often 
defined the age of adolescence, such as the development of the sex organs or the rapid 
period of growth at puberty’s onset, were determined by phylogeny. Incorporating the 
spirit of Haeckel’s embryological studies into his own work on children, Hall linked 
periods of adolescent development with their historical concomitants—stages of physical 
evolution of the earliest races of man. Each aspect of adolescent growth corresponded to 
points in the history of the race.  
If the physiological patterns and rhythms that all contemporary children 
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experienced were determined by human history, and if their physical states corresponded 
with the physiological condition of early man, then the onus Hall placed on himself was 
to find historical antecedents that correlated individual growth with developmental 
changes experienced by the species at large. And in the initial pages of Adolescence Hall 
attempted to do just this. All of the adolescent’s physiological experiences were seen as 
nothing more than contemporary manifestations of age-old laws. Translating Haeckel’s 
theories into explanations of ontogenic and phylogenic development was a rather 
speculative game; finding antecedents in the history of man was as imprecise a search as 
the attempt to locate the simple organisms with the human embryo. Hall followed 
Haeckel’s method of creating speculative, if not wholly conjectural, historical 
antecedents; more often than not, the formulation of theoretical eras relied more on 
imagination than on empirical evidence.  
Prior to the pubertal outburst of physiological energy young people experienced a 
period of corporeal repose—a “lower plateau of growth”—when the prepubescent 
individual grew only slightly.75 Later, at the dawn of adolescence, this moment of calm 
gave way to a period of rapid and dramatic growth when the individual developed into a 
larger and stronger form. What explained this universal ebb and flow, shared by all 
adolescents? The stage of physiological quietude represented for Hall a period in 
evolutionary history when life was lived in relative ease, in a calm environment 
demanding little in the way of physical prowess. 
All this suggests on the recapitulation theory some long stationary period during 
which life had been pretty fully unfolded and could be led indefinitely with 
stability and security in some not too cold Lemuria, New Atlantis, Eden, or other 
possible cunabulum gentium. [The birthplace of one’s parentage] … This short 
pause would thus be the present echo of a long phyletic when for many 
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generations our prehuman forebears were pigmoid adults, leading short lives and 
dying at or before the pubic growth increment now occurs.76 
 
The implications of such thinking could be dramatic. In this illustrative passage, 
the theory of recapitulation literally removes the prepubescent child from the human 
realm and reassigns him to “prehuman” status. One of the most dangerous tendencies of 
recapitulatory thinking was the conflation of childhood with categories that carried within 
them negative connotations. “Prehuman” and “savage” were effectively pejorative terms, 
created by a biased science that held “noncivilized” peoples in low esteem. But 
recapitulation not only redefined the status of children, it also reinforced racial and 
cultural prejudices. Once recapitulation forged historical alliances between children, 
savages, and prehuman, ape-like ancestors, those categories became discursively 
interchangeable. Thus,  
the boy of ten or eleven is tolerably well adjusted to the environment of savage 
life in a warm country where he could readily live independently of his parents, 
discharging all the functions necessary to his personal life, but lacking only the 
reproductive function.77 
  
If children were, for all intents and purposes, savages, did it not follow that savages were 
merely children? 
At the onset of puberty all children experienced a period of dramatic growth. For 
Hall, this suggested a period in human history when environmental exigencies forced 
populations to migrate away from the relative ease of their Edenic homes and out into a 
dangerous world, where the rewards of survival were conferred upon those who exhibited 
traits of physical superiority. It was a time in evolutionary history when size and stature 
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helped one to adapt and flourish in inhospitable lands and climes, when natural selection 
favored larger members of a group: “the struggle with the saber-toothed tiger, the great 
cave bear, mastodon, Irish elks, gigantic sloths, and extinct vertebrates of the Quaternary 
age, may have been a factor in stimulating greater growth in man.”78 During these distant 
historical periods a premium was placed on physical prowess and aggressiveness, and 
hostile environments spurred man to evolve into a stronger and larger creature. It was a 
page taken directly from Origin of Species, where Darwin stated that as “the most 
favoured or improved varieties will be enabled to spread[,] there will be much extinction 
of the less improved forms, and the relative proportional numbers of the various 
inhabitants of the renewed continent will again be changed; and again there will be a fair 
field for natural selection to improve still further the inhabitants, and thus produce new 
species.”79 Moments of such development in humanity’s physical form corresponded 
with stages of individual growth—during adolescence the individual’s own development 
was seen as a transition from an inferior form to a more improved one, reenacting 
perfectly the changes that natural selection had effected in epochs long past. 
 Unfortunately, the forces of evolution and natural selection had rendered man’s 
ancient forbears extinct, making it impossible to study the “missing links” in the history 
of humankind. The problem was the same one Haeckel faced in his attempt to locate 
simple life forms and, true to his allegiance, Hall’s solution was the same one employed 
by Haeckel: the theory of recapitulation could fill in the gaps of evolutionary history by 
locating extinct forms within living ones. Remnants of the early history of anthropoid 
man were thought to be found in two places: first, within the bodies of growing children, 
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who necessarily recapitulated the physiological history of the species; and, second, in 
physiological makeup of those races who remained marooned in past historical periods.  
 Despite the current evolutionary position of any particular race, all originated 
from the same point. Natural scientists such as Darwin, Haeckel, and Huxley attempted to 
demonstrate the early origins of the human type through comparative studies between the 
kingdoms of man and animal, while scientists focusing on modern man sought 
physiological precedent through physical anthropology. One of Hall’s major 
contributions was to add another method to this project.  His studies of children also 
linked the races in a monophyletic bond, demonstrating with further certainty the unity of 
species theory. Comparative, cross-racial studies of infants, for example, showed that the 
newborns of all people, regardless of race or ethnicity, shared conspicuous similarities. 
Alexander F. Chamberlain, a close colleague of Hall’s, remarked: “The striking 
resemblance of children among all the races of man, seem to indicate the origin of all 
mankind from one primitive stock, while the remarkable physical similarities between the 
young human and the young simian appear likewise to demonstrate in the remoter past, a 
common origin of the human and the anthropoid groups.”80 The distance that any race 
gained from this original child-like and simian structure depended upon the amount of 
evolutionary variation that that race had experienced after the point where all shared 
equally in this original form. Thus, evolutionary progress was measured according to 
proximity or distance from this early standard, represented as a dark-skinned, ape-like 
ancestral archetype. “There is an ideal infant type,” wrote Chamberlain, “characterized by 
large head, long body, short limbs, etc., proportions common to the great majority of 
children of all races, the special features which distinguish the adult individuals 
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belonging to the various races of man being due to the retardation or to the advancement 
of these child-marks.” Racial attributes were thus equated with those of children, with 
“low” races seen as more child-like than those that had diverged from this original type. 
 For the ethnologist, the European races showed “signs of a secondary or derived 
origin,” meaning that they had evolved from “primary” racial types like Asians and 
Africans, the racial elders of European stock. Brinton extended his racial thinking deep 
into geological time, hypothesizing that the racial differences present in modern times 
developed 20,000 to 100,000 years prior to the present geological period. Indeed, racial 
differentiation had occurred before the “dawn of history,” when the planet’s main 
geographical regions were “peopled by nations resembling each other.” Brinton located 
the forebears of the European races in northern Africa, a finding which may have 
disturbed popular sentiment even more than Huxley’s work had. “This statement may 
astonish you,” Brinton wrote, “and I know no writer who has properly emphasized the 
fact that the white race is geographically and historically an African race.”81 If the “dark 
races” were the parents of Europeans, then it followed that African people were 
phyletically older than Caucasians. The introduction of darker peoples into the European, 
Asian, and eventually American continents dispersed what had once been a common 
stock, subjecting them to a variety of environmental challenges that eventually, and over 
millennia, altered their original appearances. That some characteristics remained could be 
explained historically: “We are strengthened in this assumption that the earliest 
Europeans were not only long-headed, but also dark-complexioned,” added one author, 
“by various points in our inquiry thus far. We have proved the prehistoric antiquity of the 
living Cro-Magnon type in southwestern France; and we saw that among these peasants 
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the prevalence of black hair and eyes is very striking.”82  
Man’s early “natural propensity to roam,” along with the environmental necessity 
to do so, dispersed relatively homogenous groups across the continents, forcing members 
of an original stock to adapt to different natural surroundings. Eventually, this led to a 
wide variety of racial types.83 As opposed to those who had remained in the stable 
African environment, the migrants who settled in the more demanding climes began to 
evolve into new racial types. Settlers on the European continent slowly separated 
themselves from the original human type, effectively leaving their southern ancestors 
behind. Asians and Europeans thus developed into new and improved races, taking their 
first steps out of the physiological childhood and into a new evolutionary epoch. As new 
racial characteristics emerged, previous ones were regarded as somewhat anachronistic, 
and certainly less advanced.  
 Man’s pre-pubertal existence on the African continent had been primarily 
animalistic, where the majority of life’s activities focused on meeting only the most basic 
of needs. But migration to new lands required greater intellectual effort as populations 
had to develop new strategies for survival. As man conquered the initial environmental 
challenges faced in new lands, evolutionary survival depended more and more upon 
mental acumen and the development of social and cultural institutions. The migrating 
groups who were faced with these demands evolved into something new, while those left 
behind failed to do so, remaining true to their animalistic tendencies and falling behind 
the developing races. Wrote Darwin, “Civilised races can certainly resist changes of all 
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kinds far better than savages; and in this respect they resemble domesticated animals.”84 
Anthropologists oriented racial distinctions upon temporal lines, rendering the 
“dark races” not only less advanced than the lighter ones, but older. For thinkers like 
Brinton and Hall, this evolutionary theory explained not only the history of human 
development, but also why some races could thrive in the modern world while others 
failed. Wrote Brinton: 
The tendency of the negro race in Africa is that which we observe among negro 
children in the public schools of the United States. Their powers develop quite as 
rapidly as those of white children up to a certain point, up to the age of thirteen or 
fourteen; but then there comes a diminution, often a cessation, of their mental 
development. The physical overslaughs the psychical, and they turn away from 
the pursuit of culture. They are unwilling to undertake, they are unequal to, the 
more arduous intellectual tasks.85 
  
Here the point is made clearly: all races might share in a common ancestry, but only 
some had evolved into more sophisticated forms, leaving the rest permanently in a state 
of arrested development. Upon the grand continuum of evolutionary progress, there were 
written a number of sub-teleologies, which determined just how far different races were 
capable of progressing. It was a sad truth, then, that African peoples, regardless of efforts 
to transplant and educate them, were stuck in an evolutionary period with no hopes of 
escape. As Brinton was clear to note, race trumped individuality, and effort was 
hampered by one’s racial legacy—try as they might, African peoples were children, with 
no hope of ever growing up. The children of the advanced races, however, were more 
fortunate in that they had the option of continuing along the upward path of evolutionary 
development; as members of the privileged races they contained within them untapped 
phyletic histories that the lower races had never experienced. Thus it became imperative 
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that young people were developed properly, as youth’s proximity to early phyletic history 
made that stage of life one “of ever-impending danger of mental or physical relapse.” 86  
At the same time, however, there was much to be hopeful for. Relapse and arrest were 
very real possibilities, but so was the “the promise…of a slow but ever higher 
development.” Indeed, that was the great lesson that the theory of recapitulation had 
taught Hall; after establishing the link between adolescence and the history of the race, he 
sought to develop a program for youth that would guarantee their progress up the 
evolutionary scale. “Hence there is need of the most careful study of consummate 
practical wisdom,” wrote Hall, “in providing the most favorable environment and 
eliminating every possible cause of arrest or aversion. This is indeed the practical 
problem of this book.”87 
  
 
IV. Anthropometry and the Enumeration of Adolescence 
Efforts to classify the races in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries had not been 
exceedingly scientific. “Studies” of foreign peoples were oftentimes no more than the 
published anecdotes of Western travelers, missionaries, or military personnel. As these 
“travelers penetrated the various nonwestern cultures of the world, their descriptive 
accounts of the variations among groups of men multiplied by the hundreds.”88 Racial 
taxonomies were, for the most part, based on outward physical appearance. Scientists in 
the nineteenth century, however, were far more meticulous—if not entirely obsessive—in 
their investigations, though the biases that accompanied them into the laboratory did not 
                                                
86 Hall, Adolescence Vol. 1, 49. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Haller, Outcasts from Evolution, 3. 
 50 
dramatically differ from the prejudicial thinking of their predecessors. Rather than 
focusing solely on externally visible characteristics, such as skin color, skull shape, or 
variations in the facial attributes, antropometrists looked deep within, seeing marks of 
inferiority that had gone unnoticed by casual observers of racial differences. Early 
attempts to study young people had been as equally primitive as early nineteenth-century 
race science and not until the latter half of the century, when the child study movement 
imported wholesale the methods of racial anthropometry, did rigorous and scientific 
treatises on children begin to appear.  
 The first American efforts to isolate and study young people as a population 
distinct from the adult world began in 1790 with the first national census. Its original 
intent was modest and gathered only three pieces of an individual’s information: race, 
sex, and age. Nor were age data gathered with great exactitude; children were registered 
only as being below or above sixteen years of age and the purpose of the age data in the 
years before public schooling was used only “for the purpose of ascertaining the military 
and industrial strength of the country.”89 The 1830 census measured the age of children 
with a bit more precision, when the following categories were noted: under ten years of 
age; over 10; between 16-26 and 26-45; and over 45 years old. No further changes 
concerning age were made until 1880, when the measurement was registered in five-year 
intervals. 
 The scope of the United States Census steadily increased with each taking, until 
1880-1900, when the amount of data collected by the Department of the Interior 
exploded. The census of 1880, for instance, greatly expanded the kind of information 
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taken, as is shown by this summary of personal information collected: 
Head of family, as with son, daughter, servant, boarder, or other; civil (or 
conjugal) condition, as single, married, widowed, or divorced; place of birth of 
parents, as State or Territory, or country, if of foreign birth; condition of health, 
as sick or temporarily disabled; physical disabilities, maimed, crippled, 
bedridden, or otherwise disabled; and number of months unemployed during the 
census year, in connection with the return of profession, trade, or occupation.90 
 
And this was by no means the extent of it; whereas previous censuses had collected data 
according to six general schedules (social, industrial, and agricultural statistics, for 
instance), the census of 1890 contained two-hundred schedules, “relating to very many 
subjects and comprehending several thousand inquiries and details.”91 As the following 
table illustrates, census taking became more rigorous over the course of the nineteenth 
century, providing an almost bewildering amount of data available to social reformers 
and governmental policy makers. 
Total Number of Inquiries Taken in the US Census, 1790-1890 
 
1790 4 
1800 4 
1810 7   
1820 20 
1830 7 
1840 82 
1850 138 
1860 142 
1870 156 
1880 13,010 
1890 13,161 
 
Source: Carroll D. Wright, The History and Growth of the United States Census, 
Prepared for the Senate Committee of the Census (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1900), 87. 
 
The expansion of the 1890 census was in step with a general trend in the development of 
statistical methods toward the close of the nineteenth century, a time when social 
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reformers began to rely heavily on statistical knowledge, believing that quantification 
was the necessary prerequisite for the solution of social problems. Statistics, when 
gathered in sufficient numbers, were thought to provide insights into the origins of social 
ills and suggested what paths ought to be taken in remedying them.92  
The censuses prior to the 1904 publication of Adolescence might have provided 
an exhaustive amount of statistical detail, but a quantitative description of America’s 
youth remained muddled. This posed problems for educational reformers who desired the 
same quantitative edge from which others were benefiting. Unfortunately for those 
interested in the study of children, however, census data enumerating young populations 
remained imprecise—the 1890 census stuck with the quinquennial precedent, giving 
scholars little idea of the exact age of the American population. Nor were these data 
entirely reliable. The Department of Interior, in its report on the 1890 census, noted that 
“No matter how specific the instructions to the enumerators on this point may be, the 
natural tendency is, and probably always will be, to give the nearest 5 or 10 year period, 
especially where definite information is not at hand.”93 Wrote one observer, commenting 
on the 1890 census, “Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to ascertain the 
true number of young children in any population.”94  
 Surprisingly, more precise tabulations of the young population were not provided 
by school districts. In 1871, the Commissioner of Education, frustrated with the levels of 
incompleteness and disorganization in the data he received from individual districts, 
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called for a standardization of data. The statistics his office received, he complained, 
were “all so diverse, have so few points in common, that any comparison which would be 
entirely safe and trustworthy between the results was manifestly impossible.”95 Data 
relating to ages was, like the national census, tabulated broadly, focusing only on the 
range of legal school ages in any given state or (at best) enumerating the total number of 
children enrolled in the elementary, grammar, and secondary levels of schooling. In light 
of this problem, the Commissioner’s advisory role was limited; without knowing the 
number of school children in the country, it was difficult to make even the most general 
recommendations. 
Unreliable and incomplete as they were, census reports and data shared by 
departments of education constituted the first attempts to study the youthful population 
quantitatively. But experts in the latter part of the nineteenth century were unsatisfied 
with those public efforts and sought to remedy the situation by entering the schools 
themselves, agreeing that “ever more data on the child needed to be gathered.”96 This led 
almost immediately to an outpouring of specialized literature, providing researchers for 
the first time with a detailed picture of America’s younger populations. 
G. Stanley Hall is generally credited with conducting the first significant scientific 
study of American school children, published as “The Contents of Children’s Minds” in 
1883. The essay, writes one educational historian, quickly became a “model” for 
scientific studies of children, “which identified a series of sharply differentiated 
developmental stages [that] isolated different norms—including norms about weight, 
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size, and cognitive development—that could be applied to children of particular ages.”97 
Studies focusing exclusively on young people soon came rolling off the presses, a great 
number of which were later incorporated into Adolescence. Included among them was a 
“literature of some threescore very valuable memoirs and tabulations of human 
growth…to say nothing of a far larger number of miscellaneous records kept in schools, 
gymnasia, homes, institutions for special classes, etc.”98   
 Many of the early scientific studies conducted on young people focused on the 
physiological side of development and employed the methods used in anthropometric 
studies of race and ethnicity. Just as anthropometry was uncovering the minute 
differences between the various races, anthropometry in the schools was helping to 
generate new ideas about young people by examining their many developmental 
differences. The new discipline of anthropometry was especially important to G. Stanley 
Hall, who was always sympathetic to scientific programs that contained developmental 
theories. Of particular interest to Hall was the idea that man’s whole, when divided into 
its constitutive parts, could provide a more detailed picture of the developmental history 
of the race. Drawing upon the anthropometric research of others, Hall was convinced that 
each organ in the body grew in concert with recapitulatory history—in essence, the 
body’s organs did not grow in proportion to one another, but developed at different rates. 
“Each organ,” Hall wrote, “has its youth, maturity, and old age, and that these do not 
coincide either with each other or with the stages of body growth as a whole.” 99 Thus the 
kidneys, for example, achieved their maximal form in life’s third decade, while the liver 
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did not reach full maturity until the fifth. With this view in mind, anthropometry offered 
Hall the plausible theory that some organs reached the moment of optimal development 
during puberty: “While pubertal growth reaches more or less simultaneously nearly every 
part of the body,” he wrote, “its energies focus upon certain organs more than others…To 
determine these periods…is one of the chief quests of genetic study, and where 
established, the result is fraught with most important practical results.”100 Studies of the 
adolescent brain, for instance, showed it to experience a period of slowed growth, while 
the “reproductive organs, hips, and muscles then grow at an augmented rate.”101 
Physiological changes occurring at puberty were thus correlated with the evolution of the 
species: “The rapidity of the growth of a part is directly as the degree of development 
acquired by the phyletic progress.”102 
Taken as a whole, adolescence was an important phase in the life of any young 
person, signaling the period at which one began the transition to maturity. But 
anthropometry did not approach adolescence as if was a complete state of being; instead, 
it divided the adolescent into a collection of developmental units, where parts were 
observed and measured separately. These efforts, wrote one educator, were “undoubtedly 
stimulated by the scientific spirit of the age, which seeks to measure all that is 
measurable, and to weigh all that is capable of being weighed.”103 And there was a lot to 
measure and weigh: the number of physical measurements taken could in fact be 
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staggering, subjecting young people to incredibly detailed examinations. The vast 
catalogue of measurements taken by this anthropometrist was representative: 
age; weight; height; height of knee; height sitting; height of pubes; height of 
crotch; height of naval; height of sternum; girth of head; girth of neck; girth of 
chest; girth of waist; girth of hips; girth of thighs; girth of knee; girth of calf; 
girth of instep; girth of upper arm; girth of elbow; girth of forearm; girth of wrist; 
breadth of head; breadth of neck; breadth of shoulders; breadth of waist; breadth 
of hips; breadth of nipples; depth of chest; depth of abdomen; length of shoulder 
to elbow; length from elbow to finger tip; length of foot; stretch of arms; 
horizontal length; capacity of lungs; expiratory strength; strength of back; 
strength of legs; strength of chest; strength of upper arms, triceps; strength of 
upper arms, biceps; strength of forearms; pilosity; color of hair; color of eyes104 
 
When the theory of recapitulation was combined with the anthropometrical method, 
certain parts of the young person’s body gained prominence over others, as being more 
central to adolescent development. The trick lay in isolating those important parts and 
then determining what their proper developmental course should be. It was a normative 
project, with the dual aims of anthropometry being “the study of the phenomena of 
growth, the making of physical standards for each age in the period of school life.”105 As 
evolutionary progress had followed certain lines of development, it was essential that 
youth not deviate from those paths, lest they suffer from arrested development, retaining 
the physiological makeup of the savage type. So in measuring the adolescent, all efforts 
were directed toward the creation of a formula that depicted the desired physical type; 
those who did not conform were regarded as “abnormal” and were to receive special 
corrective regimens that would get them back on the track of proper development.  
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By the 1880s and 1890s experts had turned the public schools into laboratories for 
studying children, finding within their walls an unlimited and untapped reserve of data. 
School officials welcomed them and were sympathetic to the normative tendencies 
contained within the anthropometric project, committed as they were to the “proper” 
development of young people. With late nineteenth-century school populations growing, 
and an increasing number of adolescents remaining in school for longer periods, scholars 
realized for the first time the possibility of studying the adolescent population. Their 
segregation from society at large followed the nineteenth-century trend of setting aside 
distinct institutional spaces for different categories of people, be they criminal, 
impoverished, or insane. Educational institutions, writes David Tyack, “followed similar 
patterns and performed somewhat comparable functions. A certain category of people—
the young—were taken away from the rest of society for a portion of their lives and 
separated into schools.”106 Institutional segregation allowed for specialized study and as 
increasing numbers of adolescents remained in school, the opportunities for studying 
them multiplied.   
Such studies, as noted, subjected children to the same kinds of detailed 
examinations that ethnologists had performed upon the various races since the middle of 
the nineteenth century—anthropometricists in the West subjected their own populations 
to a mode of study that had previously been reserved for the “inferior” races. As one 
member of the field noted, anthropometric studies of Westerners found their precedent in 
race science: 
Students of anthropology have confined their attention largely to uncivilized and 
prehistoric man, and consequently there is very little knowledge of modern 
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civilized man, as compared with his less-worthy predecessors or contemporaries. 
We know more about rocks and brutes than about modern man. We have made 
sciences of the two former, but a science of the latter hardly exists.107 
 
A scientific understanding of modern man, the author continued, required “a more 
thorough study of children, on whom the future of civilization depends.”108  
  One of the most important tendencies that the scientific study of children inherited 
from anthropometry was the propensity to categorize—just as the scientific study of race 
“discovered” various types and divided them from the whole, the anthropometric study of 
children parceled youngsters out into various groups. Anthropometry helped destroy 
broad, monolithic categories, preferring instead, small, homogenous groups or types. 
Wrote one member of the field: 
Subdivision, then, is to be the key to future progress in this study: the race within 
the nation, the sub-type within the type. And may we not add, as belonging to the 
same line of study, the individual within the type? Or even, the individual as 
representative of type?109 
 
Child-centered anthropometric studies produced average or ideal “types,” built from 
massive data sets, which were used to determine standards against which all growing 
children would be measured. In effect, the child was measured twice—first, individual 
measurements were taken; second, and after many individual measurements had been 
tabulated to create “types,” each person was remeasured against those tabulations and 
then diagnosed in terms of his relation to that average: Was he advanced or retarded in 
growth? Was he normal or abnormal? Did his bodily proportions conform to the averages 
of his age cohort, or did he diverge from them? Unfortunately, deviation from the 
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physiological norms set by anthropometrists was often interpreted as a sign that the child 
was developing improperly—a diagnosis that was all too often framed in the language of 
racial inferiority.  
 The primary identification of people as belonging to “broad types”—Homo 
Sapien, Caucasian, child—was seen by anthropometric thinkers as problematic and 
unenlightening. Expansive categories “blot out from sight the essential facts which 
narrower views reveal.”110 Child-centered anthropometry introduced into educational 
circles entirely new categories of children. One study published in the early 1890s, for 
instance, examined over 50,000 London school children and divided the whole into 
eighteen categories. Arthur McDonald, a member of the U.S. Bureau of Education, called 
it “the first scientific investigation and the most important contribution to the study of 
abnormal children in public schools,” and from such studies, he added, schools would be 
able to segregate children of all different stripes, providing special curricula tailored to 
their needs.111 Interestingly, many of the physiological abnormalities found in the report 
bore striking similarities to physical characteristics anthropometrists thought common 
among members of the “lower” races: asymmetrical heads, corrugation of the eyebrows, 
constant grinning, etc. Of special interest were abnormalities in the crania, which 
appeared “to be the most important defects in development; they are most numerous and 
have the highest pathological co-relations of any sign with ‘abnormal nerve signs,’ low 
nutrition, and mental dullness.” Size of the cranium, it was thought, was a “fair indication 
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of the size of the brain.”112 Defective or degenerate children presented anomalies that 
separated them from “normal” children and allied them with the lower races: “deformities 
in the head; asymmetries in the face and ears; unusually large jaws and ears; defective 
palates; asymmetrical arms.”113 Another study made mention of “one boy [with] a 
celaphic index of 73.33, which is negroid.”114 Characteristics thought to differentiate 
defective from normal children were similar to those racial marks of inferiority circulated 
by Daniel Brinton and other physical anthropologists. Recapitulatory thinkers, such as G. 
Stanley Hall, considered the exhibition of certain physiological characteristics to be a 
sign of arrested development, outward manifestations that demonstrated an individual’s 
failure to transition through the race’s physiological epochs.  
 
 
Conclusion 
One of the primary methods employed in the construction of recapitulatory theories was 
the manufacturing of theoretical ancestors—attempts to develop complete genealogies of 
human development were necessarily hindered by the fact that much of the race’s 
ancestry was composed of “missing links” that could not be examined by scientists. Ernst 
Haeckel’s contributions to this project, though inaccurate, were rather harmless—his 
theoretical worms and floating sacs were merely attempts to fill in the holes of an ancient 
organic history that had forever vanished. But the efforts of recapitulationists who 
attempted to account for missing links in man’s more recent past were not as benign, as 
they relied heavily on a science that was based on racist premises. Attempts to order 
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mankind on a developmental scheme placed the races upon a continuum, where they 
were ranked and ordered according to criteria set by Western scientists. In the end, all 
non-Western races were transformed from autonomous civilizations into theoretical 
ancestors, incomplete and underdeveloped versions of the Western type: Non-Western 
peoples were seen as children of the West. At the same time, Western children were 
thought to exhibit savage and primitive characteristics; within the theory of recapitulation 
both of these groups—savages and children—became interchangeable. A science so 
conceived, as we will see in the next chapter, had dramatic consequences for how 
Westerners treated each group: colonial powers received from recapitulation a scientific 
justification for treating their subjects as children, while those who supervised the 
activities of children gained a scientific justification for treating them as savages. 
 But biological recapitulation alone was not responsible for this formulation. It 
only provided for physiological “proof” that children and savages were akin. Further 
evidence was necessary, data that demonstrated the savage-child likeness in terms of 
psychological development, intellectual capacity, social abilities, and cultural 
accomplishments. Biological recapitulation offered a model to those interested in social 
behavior and a host of scientists, from anthropologists and criminologists, to 
psychologists and psychiatrists, capitalized upon the findings of recapitulatory science. 
As will be demonstrated in the next two chapters, recapitulatory theory in the human 
sciences began where biological recapitulation necessarily ended. Combined, the human 
and biological sciences offered a model that linked children and savages in innumerable 
ways, with far-reaching effects on colonial administrative policies in the East and on 
educational practices in the West.
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Chapter Two 
The Savage Adolescent 
Without knowing them and their ways, we can not understand 
our children, religion, or education, our own earlier history or 
that of our institutions. Man was no doubt far longer in their 
state than they have been in ours. 
G. Stanley Hall (1904)1 
 
 
I. Ontogeny Recapitulates Savagery: Anthropology and Man’s Primitive Legacy 
Prior to the American Civil War the major debate in the science of racial development 
was waged between monogenist and polygenist schools of thought, and the most 
important question concerned origins: had the races evolved from a single, Edenic 
ancestor, as the monogenists thought, or had they been birthed by separate, or 
polygenetic, creations? The question carried considerable political implications during 
the Civil War period, and polygenism found an especially sympathetic audience among 
proslavery Southerners. As Louis Menand has recently noted: “as the political 
temperature rose, polygenism was cited in support of the view that slavery did not violate 
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, on grounds that Jefferson’s term ‘all men’ 
did not, scientifically, mean blacks.”2 Proponents of slavery feared that a monogenetic 
reading of Genesis would undermine Southern society by expanding the family of “man” 
to include those of African decent. Polygenetic pro-slavers regarded monogenism as a 
fusion of politicized theology and faulty science, a hijacking of the Bible by radical 
abolitionists. But the Bible, wrote Josiah Nott, the well-known polygenist from Alabama, 
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was not an inclusive historical document—its pages detailed the history of only one race, 
and provided no evidence whatsoever that the “dark races” had been spawned from 
Adam and Eve. Nott’s primary goal was to disabuse his audience of the notion that the 
races had a common ancestor. He hoped to expose monogenetic thought as a dangerous 
and false dogma that revised Biblical history in wholly unscientific and unsupportable 
ways, capable of destroying the Southern way of life. “Scientific truth,” wrote Nott 
exemplified in the annals of Astronomy, Geology, Chronology, Geographical 
distribution of animals, &c., has literally fought its way inch by inch through 
false ideology. The last grand battle between science and dogmatism, on the 
primitive origin of races, has now begun. It requires no prophetic eye to foresee 
that science must again, and finally, triumph.3 
 
Polygenetic thought had been too tied up in the quest to legitimize slavery for it to 
survive and was largely discredited after Appomattox. Its fall was also effected by 
Darwinian thinking, which was rapidly gaining ground in the natural sciences—
polygenetic thinkers, in rejecting the theory of descent, were becaming more and more 
distanced from the scientific mainstream. But as one historian has noted, the diminishing 
influence of polygenetic science did not result in a tempering of racist thinking in 
postbellum America: “In America as in Europe concepts of race inferiority existed in 
both monogenist and polygenist schools… [and] the monogenists, despite their insistence 
on environmental change through time, were no more favorable to the Negro, except in 
their remote theoretical stance.”4 
Josiah Nott’s efforts to categorize the various races followed the work of Louis 
Agassiz, who had hoped to “map them off into those great groups of proximate races 
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appertaining to the zoological provinces into which the earth is naturally divided.”5 Nott 
and Agassiz mapped the races spatially, whereas monogenetic thinkers ordered the races 
along temporal-historic lines, with levels of inferiority and superiority corresponding to 
degrees of evolutionary progress made through time. But both positions iterated the view 
of the other, and neither credited the non-white races as having made any significant 
contribution to the annals human history. Africans in Nott’s science “have remained 
where history first found them,” and that in the “long duration of Negro life, not a single 
civilization, spontaneous or borrowed, has existed, to adorn its gloomy past.”6 But the 
belief that African peoples were locked forever in a kind of cultural and intellectual stasis 
was also common in monogenetic thought.7 The theory of unitary creation may have 
found a common parent in the ancestry of all the races, but that did not render the siblings 
equal.  
The primary difference between the two theories was the point at which racial 
variation was thought to occur. Polygenists envisioned racial difference as being included 
in the original constitution of distinct types of man, and racial inferiority was the result of 
separate and unequal creations. Monogenists, on the other hand, thought that racial 
difference became more and more pronounced over the course of time—all racial stocks 
had originated from the same family, but as members of this family were separated from 
one another each took their own evolutionary paths; some evolved into new and more 
advanced racial forms, while others remained lowly. Both positions regarded non-
European populations as unprogressive, existing in evolutionary moments that Europeans 
had long passed. The debate between monogenists and polygenists may have been of 
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scientific or theological interest, but the victory of one school over the other made little 
difference in terms of how races were actually treated—both theories contained within 
them ideologies that justified racist thinking and hegemonic practices. The shift from one 
school to the other, then, was more academic than political, and the racial program 
espoused by each theory was essentially the same: a scientific explanation of, and thus 
justification for, racial inequality. “There will not seem, in the end, to be very much to 
choose between monogenism and polygenism,” writes Menand. “Both assume the 
existence of deeply ingrained racial differences, and both are hierarchical.”8  
Writing long after the debate between single or multiple creations had been 
settled, monogenists such as Daniel Brinton still sounded very much like their old 
polygenist foes. Brinton extolled the West’s imperial program of global conquest and 
thought that it had been the West’s particular evolutionary destiny to gain supremacy 
over all other races, which explained why Europe had extended control over one-third of 
the world’s population: “No nation and no race of other lineage dare withstand an attack 
or disobey an order from a leading European power. Africa and Asia are dismembered 
and parceled out at London, Berlin and St. Petersburg, and no one dreams of asking the 
consent of the inhabitants of those continents.” For Brinton, this was “astonishing 
progress.”9 Perhaps the finer points of scientific doctrine made little difference in the end: 
how different in consequence was Brinton’s monogenetic thinking from Nott’s 
polygenism? Nott’s read on imperial destiny was essentially the same as Brinton’s—
conquest was the destiny of the Western races who “have been assigned, in all ages, the 
largest brains and the most powerful intellect; theirs is the mission of extending and 
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perfecting civilization—they are by nature ambitious, daring, domineering, and reckless 
of danger—impelled by an irresistible instinct, they visit all climes, regardless of 
difficulties.”10 With regards to European colonization, Brinton and Nott, though 
representing two very distinct schools of science, justified the colonial project as an 
inevitable chapter in the evolution of the races.  
Some modern scholars contend that Western science has traditionally been built 
upon racist premises that permeate its very core. “As a matter of fact,” writes one, “far 
from being an objective, ideology-free domain, modern Western science was deeply 
implicated in the construction of racist ways of thinking about human beings and the 
differences between them.”11 Consequently, scientific studies of race conducted by 
Westerners were necessarily tainted—ideological racism resulted in empirical racism, 
which tarnished attempts to understand racial difference. In a context so thick with 
prejudices and predispositions, the displacement of one brand of race science over 
another may have altered the foundation on which racial difference was justified, but did 
not radically affect previously held prejudices. 
Polygenetic racism faded in the age of Darwin, but monogenetic racism 
flourished. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the number of institutions built on 
racist thinking multiplied. The sanctioned enslavement of African peoples in America 
had ended, but across the globe the oppression of non-Europeans continued and expanded 
under the colonial project. Monogenetic thinking brought theories of racial inequality up 
to speed with the political and scientific developments of the day, and ensured that 
hegemonic institutions would retain rationales that remained empirically sound in the 
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wake of scientific change and politically viable under new institutional arrangements. 
Traditional justifications for racially exploitative practices had become dated in light of 
Darwinian science and colonial expansion, requiring the reformulation of old prejudices 
to meet new criteria.  
Of all of the nineteenth-century disciplines that answered this challenge, none was 
more important than anthropology, which imported the major scientific advancements of 
the day, including the theories of monogenetic development and natural selection, to 
build a scientifically sound basis for racial exploitation in the colonies. Anthropology 
fused the biological and human sciences, and used advancements in the natural sciences 
to formulate theories of social, cultural, and intellectual evolution. It was becoming 
increasingly common in nineteenth-century academia to consolidate “biological and 
social evolutionary thinking,” a development particularly significant in the history of 
anthropology because “biological evolutionism attributed the principle of human progress 
to physiological and natural laws rather than metaphysical, economic, or socio-cultural 
phenomena per se.”12 As was seen in Chapter One, the nineteenth-century disciplines 
explained change through and dynamic and progressive development; in the 
anthropological context, racial development was no longer regarded as the unfolding of a 
preordained plan of racial destiny, but as the result of natural forces acting upon 
populations in different ways, effecting changes not only in physical structure, but in 
social and intellectual life as well. 
Anthropology became an established professional discipline during the period of 
colonial expansion, replete with institutional apparatuses required for the collection and 
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dissemination of knowledge, such as learned societies, scholarly publications, and 
academic chairs. As Edward Said notes, colonial ethnography “carved out a field of study 
and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, 
traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for 
general prestige.”13 European infiltration of the “dark continents” provided Westerners 
with total access to “savage peoples,” allowing for the comprehensive study of much of 
the world’s population. But the very circumstances under which the Western 
anthropologist and imperial subject met rendered the encounter problematic. As one 
historian of anthropology has written:  
But anthropology is also rooted in an unequal power encounter between the West 
and Third World…It is this encounter that gives the West access to cultural and 
historical information about the societies it has progressively dominated, and thus 
not only generates a certain kind of universal understanding, but also re-enforces 
the inequalities in capacity between the European and the non-European 
worlds.14 
 
That the examination and study of racial difference occurred in a repressive context 
hindered the development of an objective understanding of racial difference, and did 
nothing whatsoever to dispel racial prejudices that Westerners had brought from home. 
 Few anthropologists thought that methodological objectivity required an 
acceptance of racial equality. And the business of measuring racial difference had far-
reaching consequences for the colonial project, and many anthropologists were conscious 
of the fact that their discipline was necessarily politicized by the moment’s exigencies. 
The British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor, an eminent member of the field, was himself 
aware of the anthropological enterprise’s political nature: 
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It is only within modern times that the distinctions among races have been 
worked out by scientific methods.  Yet since early ages, race has attracted notice 
from its connexion with the political questions of countryman or foreigner, 
conqueror or conquered, freeman or slave, and in consequence its marks have 
been watched with jealous accuracy.15 
 
Studies of racial difference, then, occurred in an environment where the investigator had 
to continually justify his position of dominance—proof of racial inferiority, gained 
through systematic observation, reinforced the original colonial position: that Westerners 
were superior and justified in their conquest of peoples who required outside agents to 
govern them. Though a civilian, the anthropologist was an agent of colonial power and 
held a prominent rank in the colonizing forces. As historians of anthropology Peter Pels 
and Oscar Salemink have demonstrated, the anthropologist’s work played an integral role 
in the execution of colonial power: 
Both anthropologists and (former) administrators thought the institutionalization 
of anthropology should take place within the triangle of academic anthropology, 
colonial administration, and ‘subject peoples’: anthropologists were to teach 
administrators, and administrators were to do research among ‘subject peoples’ 
on the basis of this training.16  
 
 In framing a new system of anthropological thought that would meet the needs of 
the colonial project, while at the same time incorporating advancements in the natural 
sciences, colonial anthropologists came to rely heavily on the work of Darwin and other 
evolutionary thinkers. Historian of anthropology George W. Stocking noted that the 
discipline was “part of the nineteenth-century positivist incarnation of the progressivist 
tradition.”17 In The Descent of Man, Darwin applied the theory of descent to the human 
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sphere and hoped that it would allow future scholars to “trace a perfect gradation from 
the mind of an utter idiot, lower than that of an animal low in the scale, to the mind of a 
Newton.”18 Darwin’s own position on the colonial project was influenced by his studies 
in biology, and he regarded the process of imperial conquest as a manifestation of the 
theory of natural selection: dominant races conquered those possessing lower levels of 
intellectual and cultural development. “The grade of their civilisation seems to be a most 
important element in the success of competing nations,” he wrote.19 The process worked 
much the same way in the natural world, where animals better suited to meet 
environmental challenges won out over animals that had not sufficiently adapted. In this 
respect, animals and people operated in accordance with the same laws—man, noted 
Darwin, had no immunity from the forces of natural selection, and had “he not been 
subjected during primeval times to natural selection, assuredly he would never have 
attained to his present rank.”20 While watching the struggles occurring in the colonial 
world between Europeans and their subjects, Darwin assumed that he was witnessing the 
latest chapter in the history of evolution: 
At the present day civilised nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous 
nations, excepting where the climate opposes a deadly barrier; and they succeed 
mainly, though not exclusively, through their arts, which are the products of the 
intellect. It is, therefore, highly probable that with mankind the intellectual 
faculties have been mainly and gradually perfected through natural selection…21 
 
The evolutionary strides made by one race, Darwin continued, could exact a heavy toll on 
the less advanced races across the globe: “At some future period, not very distant as 
measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and 
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replace, the savage races throughout the world.”22 The study of mankind, when coupled 
with the theory of natural selection, could become an immensely powerful and dangerous 
tool, for it justified racial conquest and the extinction of whole populations.23 
Evolutionary thinking provided the sense that world affairs were taking their inevitable 
course, determined as they were by natural laws. The advancement of the European 
colonial project depended on the continued collapse of non-European societies, and the 
theory of natural selection explained both advancement and collapse as natural 
processes—the idea that both were the natural and ineluctable products of evolution 
provided a revised moral justification for the institutionalization of racist practices. Racial 
destiny was explained scientifically, with the position of any given race in the colonial 
equation determined by its place on an evolutionary scale formulated by anthropologists.  
 Edward B. Tylor imported the theory of natural selection into his anthropological 
hypothesis, and found it to be a useful tool in his attempt to track the development of 
human civilization throughout the course of history.  Together, monogenetic thought and 
the theory of natural selection comprised a methodology that anthropologists thought 
capable of producing a linear map of human history. Monogenism linked the races into a 
single family, and Darwinism ordered those races along evolutionary lines. It should be 
noted that the point of anthropological study in the nineteenth century lay not in 
understanding cultures per se, as twentieth-century studies would, but in understanding 
how distinct cultures formed a relational whole. The study of races yielded valuable 
results only when the anthropologist’s research data could be collated into a relational 
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scheme that ordered groups according to evolutionary advancement, the goal being to 
assemble a complete historical map of humankind. Accordingly, the anthropologist’s 
subjects were not regarded as independently existing entities with unique cultural 
practices deserving respect and appreciation, but as pieces of a larger evolutionary 
puzzle.  
 The process of mapping humanity occurred from the top down; as George W. 
Stocking has written, anthropologists “reason[ed] downward from the civilized European 
to the savage.”24 Primitive cultures were seen as literal representations of the early stages 
of civilized cultures—snapshots of civilization’s childhood, so to speak, preserved among 
living cultures. “In judging how mankind may have once lived,” wrote Tylor, “it is also a 
great help to observe how they are actually found living.  Human life may be roughly 
classed into three great stages, Savage, Barbaric, Civilized.”25 He continued: 
So far as the evidence goes, it seems that civilization has actually grown up in the 
world through these three stages, so that to look at a savage of the Brazilian 
forests, a barbarous New Zealander or Dahoman, and a civilized European, may 
be the student’s best guide to understanding the progress of civilization…26 
 
Looked at in this way, the black, brown, yellow, and white men whom we have 
supposed ourselves examining on the quays, are living records of the remote 
past, every Chinese and Negro bearing in his face evidence of the antiquity of 
man.27 
 
For Tylor primitives represented “the starting point of progressive development, the 
stages of which could be reconstructed by comparing the various forms of culture 
coexisting in the present world or preserved in the historical or archeological record.”28 
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Accordingly, Tylor’s writings, in Stocking’s words, “can be seen as an effort to 
complement the Darwinian argument by providing a developmental cultural chain that 
would take the place of otherwise ‘missing links’ in the evolutionary argument.”29  
 Genetic anthropology, or the practice of sorting civilizations and races according 
to evolutionary standing, constituted a kind of “evolutionary discrimination” in which 
conquered races were necessarily seen as incomplete or less-than.30 In all aspects of 
human existence, indigenous peoples were seen to lag behind Europeans. Primitives 
inhabited evolutionary moments that Europeans had passed long ago, the argument went, 
and that meant that non-European races lacked all the characteristics possessed by an 
evolved and civilized people. Primitive culture, so understood, was deficient, and the 
races regarded by anthropologists as “lower” had experienced only partial 
development—evolution, for such groups, had been curtailed. Thus the notion of racial or 
cultural progress was linked to the accomplishments of Western civilization, the highest 
manifestation of man’s evolutionary potential. The West became a universalized standard 
upon which the progress and advancement of all others was gauged; degrees of proximity 
to and from this standard determined evolutionary standing and enabled anthropologists 
to sort groups of people into Tylor’s categories of primitive, barbaric, and civilized. As 
Tylor himself wrote: 
The educated world of Europe and America practically settles a standard by 
simply placing its own nations at one end of the social series and savage tribes at 
the other, arranging the rest of mankind between these limits according as they 
correspond more closely to savage or to cultured life.31 
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 Tylor’s method for determining racial or cultural progress relied on the detection 
of the “absence or presence.” In essence, Tylor was interested in measuring what wasn’t 
there more than in studying the actual accomplishments or practices of a racial or cultural 
group. He sought to determine which Western behaviors, customs, and social practices 
were lacking in primitive societies—a more negative methodology can scarcely be 
imagined. To begin, Tylor compiled an inventory of characteristics commonly found 
among civilized peoples and organized them into general categories such as “metal-
working, manufacture of implements and vessels, agriculture, architecture, &c., the 
extent of scientific knowledge, the definiteness of moral principles, the condition of 
religious belief and ceremony, the degree of social and political organization, and so 
forth.”32 He then determined which of these were lacking and which, if any, were present. 
The outcome of Tylor’s evaluation of any one group depended on how that group 
measured up against his yardstick of civilized traits. The behaviors and customs of a 
people were seldom understood as constitutive parts of a social whole that provided 
meaning and a sense of belonging for its members. Rather, they were understood as 
imperfect and underdeveloped practices that could be explained by a group’s low 
evolutionary standing. Tylor’s method was little more than a logic of deficiency, a logic 
that rendered non-European peoples just that, non-European, incomplete, and backwards. 
 Tylor’s method provided a new angle from which primitive practices could be 
analyzed. Customs, such as the belief that magical forces caused natural phenomena, 
were not understood in terms of the value that groups derived from them, but as 
evolutionary imperfections. The belief in magic, prevalent among the “lower” races, was 
not a practice to be studied, but an affliction to be diagnosed: susceptibility to magical 
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explanations was a symptom of one’s failure to understand the principles of causation. 
The application of such cold logic to the examination of supernatural belief reduced the 
spiritual systems of entire cultures to nothing more than epistemological flaws. 
Unevolved thinking manifested itself in superstitions, most of which Western science had 
long since dispensed with.33 This logic of deficiency was common among anthropologists 
of Tylor’s day, who often considered a culture’s most notable characteristics to be those 
that were absent. Commenting on Australian aborigines, John Lubbock remarked that, 
“No single fact, perhaps, gives us a more vivid idea of the mental condition of these 
miserable savages, than the observation that they cannot count their own fingers.”34 
Another noticed that, “Amongst the Tshi-speaking tribes [of Africa], as amongst most 
uncivilised peoples, love, as understood by the people of Europe, has no existence. There 
is here no romantic sentiment, and the relation between the sexes is ordinarily quite 
passionless.”35 Examples of this kind abound in the anthropological literature of the day, 
and it constituted the dominant method for analyzing cultural and racial progress. 
 Non-European races fell below the standards that Western anthropologists had 
themselves set and, consequently, were seen as inferior and incomplete. Evolutionary 
thinking added a scientific basis to the argument, and positioned those races in closer 
proximity to the beginnings of human history, where thought, culture, and social 
organization were expressed in only the most rudimentary ways. As noted in the last 
chapter, these ideas oftentimes led anthropologists to regard primitives as “childlike”—
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both groups were considered to be undeveloped and incomplete. In Herbert Spencer’s 
evolutionary treatment of human civilization, differences between savage and civilized 
races were synonymous with “the contrast between the child and the adult” in Western 
lands.36 Spencer found countless similarities between children and savages: not only did 
the two groups share important physiological similarities (a point explored in Chapter 
One), but both were impulsive, extremely emotional, mirthful, mimetic, superstitious, 
inarticulate in speech, and unable grasp difficult concepts. John Lubbock noted that, 
“Savages have often been likened to children, and the comparison is not only correct but 
also highly instructive.”37 Like children, Lubbock found savages to lack steadiness of 
purpose, to have intense and unpredictable emotional outbursts, and to possess a general 
level of “thoughtlessness and impulsiveness”; those and other observations led him to 
conclude “savages have the character of children with the passions and strength of 
men.”38 And Tylor concluded from his studies, “Savage moral standards are real enough, 
but they are far looser and weaker than ours. We may, I think, apply the often-repeated 
comparison of savages to children as fairly to their moral as to their intellectual 
condition.”39 In some cases, the title of one’s work could say it all, as was the case with 
Leo Frobenius’ The Childhood of Man: A Popular Account of the Lives, Customs and 
Thoughts of the Primitive Races.40  
 The conflation of savagery and childhood had a dramatic impact on the attitudes 
that Westerners had toward their own children, a point to be explored later in this chapter. 
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But it also influenced Western perceptions of non-Western people. The idea that non-
Westerners were childlike not only reinforced racist thinking but justified the 
paternalistic control of colonized peoples. Anthropological research, with its 
proclamation that savages and children were in many ways the same, was used by 
members of colonial administrations as proof that their subjects were incapable of 
expressing their own interests or satisfying their own needs—self-determination for such 
people made as little sense as granting full autonomy to children.  
Are not the Aborigines of this colony the children of our Government?  Are we 
not all happy but they?  And are they not miserable?  Can they raise themselves 
from this sad condition?  Or do they not claim our assistance?  And shall that 
assistance be denied? … The Aborigines demand our protection.  They are the 
most helpless members, and being such have a peculiar claim upon us all, to 
extend every aid in our power, as well in relation to their necessities as to those 
enlightening means which shall at last introduce them from the chilling rigours of 
the forest into the same delightful temperature which we enjoy.41 
 
Such pronouncements from respected academic men who relied on trusted scientific 
methodologies transformed casual prejudice into scientific fact; the consequence of such 
“discoveries” was the entrenchment of colonial power and the systematic oppression of 
entire populations who were regarded as mere children, unable to govern themselves and 
thus requiring complete oversight.  
 The institutional manifestations of this kind of thinking varied. Nicholas Thomas, 
in his study of missionary work in Fiji, discovered that religious workers regarded natives 
as “infants” caught in a “protosocial condition from which Christian manhood and 
womanhood are imagined to emerge.” 42 With natives perceived in this light, “missionary 
work employed and enacted the notions of infantilization and quasi-familial hierarchy in 
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a far more thorough way than any other colonial project…for the missionaries it was as if 
children were being brought up and socialized for the first time.”43 Matters were less 
compassionate in British India, especially after the mutiny of 1857, as historian Bernard 
S. Cohn has discovered: 
One of the results of the Mutiny was to rigidify the already considerable 
differences between Indians and British. The Indians, seen by the British in the 
first half of the nineteenth century as misguided children, had been revealed by 
their actions in 1857-1859 to be treacherous and unchangeable. Outwardly they 
might conform to the sahib’s expectations, but they could never be trusted. At 
any time their deep-seated, irrational superstitions could break forth in violence 
and overturn all the painful efforts of the conquerors to lead them in proper 
directions…Henceforth, the British should rule in an “oriental manner,” with 
strength and with the expectation of instant obedience.44 
  
Within the savage-as-child paradigm, the treatment of colonized peoples could take 
different forms, depending on circumstance. If the natives proved docile and good-
natured, as Thomas’ missionaries thought, then a benign paternalism could be used to 
govern them; if they proved recalcitrant and unyielding, as Cohn’s research indicated, 
then colonial power would demand from its subjects discipline and obedience. Often 
colonial rationales were expressed in pedagogical terms, a sure signal that colonized 
peoples were regarded as children, while the colonizers regarded themselves as 
benevolent teachers. As one contemporary noted: Europe “has sent thither a high-minded 
army of men, acting nearly always from noble and unselfish motives, to raise the African 
from his brutish ignorance to a glimpse of better things.”45 
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 Edward Said linked anthropological knowledge with power, noting that to have 
“knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it.”46 And the 
authority that colonizers exercised over their subjects bore striking resemblance to the 
kind employed by Western parents and teachers. Child-rearing and pedagogical practices 
in the West and the policies of colonial administration shared a similar premise: each 
regarded their charges as being incapable of looking after themselves; like children, 
“subject races did not have it in them to know what was good for them.”47 
 The savage-as-child metaphor provides insight into the kinds of strategies 
employed by European powers when governing their colonial settlements. But it is also 
instructive in examining Western attitudes toward their own young—the flow of 
anthropological knowledge was not unidirectional, leading only from metropolis to 
colony. Indeed, ideas about race and childhood, while manufactured and employed to 
great effect to the colonial realm proper, were also imported into the non-colonized lands 
of Europe and America, where their influence carried great weight. “Hence, what is 
required is a historiography of primitiveness in various fields of knowledge,” writes one 
scholar, “a tracing of its contingent and variable representations as well as of the roles 
which they have played in Western modernity’s self-conception.”48 For the purposes of 
this study, that requires demonstrating the ways in which ideas of primitiveness and 
savagery influenced the development of ideas about childhood and education.  
 On the one hand, as has been demonstrated, anthropological studies justified and 
gave scientific credence to “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority” over the indigenous people of colonized lands. At the same time, however, 
                                                
46 Said, Orientalism, 32. 
47 Ibid., 37. 
48 Kurasawa, “A Requiem for the Primitive,” 4. 
 80 
anthropological authority extended beyond the colonial realm, influencing not only 
attitudes toward other races, but affecting the ways in which Westerners understood their 
own race. Envisioning the primitive condition as the historical antecedent for Western 
civilization transformed certain cultures into tools for Western self-understanding. The 
point is made by Said, who claimed that ethnographic research always included a 
“process of conversion,” an act that transformed the strange into the familiar: 
It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated 
strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete 
transformations on other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are 
but as, for the benefit if the receiver, they ought to be. To the Westerner, 
however, the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West…the Orientalist 
makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into 
something else…49 
 
The theory of monogenetic evolution allowed anthropologists to convert savages and 
primitives into reflections of the Westerner’s historical past and, in doing so, each 
became something entirely new. The study of races, cultures, and civilizations had little 
value independently, for, as Said mentions, such endeavors would have led to a mere 
chronicling of strangeness. But when strangeness was converted into familiarity, 
comparative studies proved valuable—they taught Westerners about themselves, which, 
in the end, was the primary goal of anthropology. As one contemporary noted: “It is a 
mere commonplace that savages are children, and must be treated as such.  Perhaps it is 
less generally recognized that children are savages, and can only by training be brought 
up to the level of contemporary civilization.”50 Non-European races, therefore, were 
always studied in relation to the West, and none ever stood on its own.  
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 Anthropologists of Tylor’s persuasion considered the study of cultures 
meaningful only insofar as those cultures offered insight into the evolutionary history of 
Western man. Savages, primitives, or barbarians did not exist as independent beings who 
crafted their own historical destiny, but as artifacts representing what Western man once 
was. Evolutionary thinking, when applied to races, civilizations, and cultures, 
transformed the study of non-European peoples into the study of pre-European peoples. 
For Said, anthropological study does not contribute to the development of a more 
sophisticated or compassionate understanding of non-European peoples, but serves 
instead as a kind of looking glass that Westerners used to view themselves, offering a 
glimpse into one’s own racial childhood. In essence, anthropology transformed its 
subjects into “empty canvases onto which to project the fantasies and nightmares of the 
modern West.”51 
 Of all the fantasies projected onto non-European peoples, one of the most 
powerful was the notion that they were the developmental equivalents of children. The 
idea was of especial import to G. Stanley Hall, who wrote that “what we call low races 
are not weeds in the human garden, but are essentially children and adolescents in soul, 
with the same good and bad qualities and needing the same kind of study and 
adjustment.”52 
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II. “Elsewhere”: Locating the Child/Savage in Space and Time 
During the first half of the nineteenth century the idea that children resembled savages 
was largely metaphorical and was applied to only certain segments of the young 
population; it was primarily a rhetorical strategy employed by urban reformers who 
considered “idle” street children to be dangerous elements of civilized society. As 
historian of childhood Hugh Cunningham writes, during the 1830s “children of the street, 
their numbers ever swelling, seemed to have forms of group behavior which both gave 
them solidarity and cut them off from the norms of civilization; they were savages.”53 
The conflation of children and savages was not a scientific position, as it would become 
later in the century, but a literary device, an analogy used to excite emotion and to 
catalyze public action.  
 The shift from metaphor and hyperbole to scientific “fact” occurred when those 
interested in child development merged monogenetic thinking with the theories of 
evolution and recapitulation, creating an argument for child development that rested on 
three premises: (1) humankind, though racially heterogeneous, had descended from the 
same ancestral stock; (2) the development of racial difference was a linear process, where 
ever-higher racial variations emerged from lower ones; (3) the evolutionary development 
of the race must necessarily be repeated in the development of the individual.  
 The third premise—expressed in the theory of recapitulation—was of the utmost 
importance in G. Stanley Hall’s theory of adolescent development, and he considered the 
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history of racial development to be indispensable in understanding individual 
development. As he wrote in Adolescence, “facts in both the history of development of 
the race and in that of the individual have their chief value as those of one series shed 
light on those of the others.”54 Hall’s theory of adolescent recapitulation provides a clear 
example of Edward Said’s “process of conversion” at work: the history, characteristics, 
and experiences of racial groups were taken from their original contexts and transformed 
into something else. As Western scientists converted primitives and savages into 
children, they transformed the exotic and unfamiliar into something that was 
exceptionally common. Few people had any direct experience with primitive cultures, but 
most people had interacted with children. By endorsing this analogy, anthropologists 
provided the masses with an image of savagery that was simple and accessible, while, at 
the same time, indirectly advocating a new conception of childhood itself. 
 As the leader of a movement that sought to promote this new view of childhood, 
G. Stanley Hall was its most important and influential champion. As president of Clark 
University, Hall gathered a number of like-minded scholars who supported the 
application of the recapitulatory theory to educational and developmental problems; as 
editor of the Pedagogical Seminary he developed an academic journal that was based on 
the theory; as the leader of the child study movement he helped to disseminate the ideas 
to the rest of the educational world; and as the author of Adolescence he lent scientific 
credence to an understanding of young people that was based on anthropological 
generalizations. Through his work, Hall reassigned the attributes and characteristics of 
race to the realm of individual development, and to the sphere of adolescent development 
in particular. As a result, racial thinking increasingly played a more vital role in how 
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Westerners conceived of their own children: The “child and the race are each keys to the 
other,” wrote Hall.55  In Adolescence, then, Hall employed the findings of anthropological 
studies to provide Westerners with “a precious kind of self-knowledge.” Indeed, the very 
raison d’être of anthropological studies was utilitarian; their “purpose” was to contribute 
to a deeper Western self-understanding. Consequently, primitives and savages were 
“useful” only insofar as they served this end: “If primitive races become extinct, they will 
take out of the world with them so much power of sympathetic appreciation of youth in 
its early stages that we may well be appalled for the future of the young.”56 
 The theory of recapitulation maintained that all individuals passed through the 
stages of primitiveness and savagery on the path to maturation, a premise that led 
recapitulatory scholars to rely heavily on the findings of evolutionary anthropology. Just 
as biological recapitulationists believed that the developing embryo had to follow the 
established course of physiological history, social recapitulationists thought that the 
emerging social creature had to pass through each of the major stages of man’s social 
development. Herbert Spencer made the point prior to the publication of Hall’s 
Adolescence: 
For on the hypothesis of evolution, the civilised man, passing through phases 
representing the phases passed through by the race, will, early in life, betray this 
impulsiveness which the early race had. The saying that the savage has the mind 
of a child with the passions of a man (or, rather, has adult passions which act in a 
childish manner) possesses a deeper meaning than appears. There is a 
relationship between the two natures such that, allowing for differences of kind 
and degree in emotions, we may regard the co-ordination of them in the child as 
analogous to the co-ordination of the primitive man.57 
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Hall took Spencer’s idea of coordination very seriously and used it to make the stages of 
child development synonymous with past epochs of human history: 
The years from about eight to twelve constitute an unique period of human 
life…Reason, true morality, religion, sympathy, love, and esthetic enjoyment are 
but very slightly developed. Everything, in short, suggests the culmination of one 
stage of life as if it thus represented what was once, and for a very protracted and 
relatively stationary period, the age of maturity in some remote, perhaps pigmoid, 
stage of human evolution, when in a warm climate the young of our species once 
shifted for themselves independently of further parental aid.58 
 
Adolescence is a new birth, for the higher and more completely human traits are 
now born. The qualities of body and soul that now emerge are far newer. The 
child comes from and harks back to a remoter past; the adolescent is neo-
atavistic, and in him the later acquisitions of the race slowly become prepotent.59  
 
These ideas were not borrowed from Spencer alone, and Hall had access to a variety of 
sympathetic sources that lent support to his evolutionary argument. The theory of 
recapitulation frequently appeared in the anthropological treatises from which he drew. In 
John Lubbock, for example, Hall found an amenable ally: “the life of each individual is 
an epitome of the history of the race, and the gradual development of the child illustrates 
that of the species. Hence the importance of the similarity between savages and 
children.”60   
 Evolutionary anthropologists regarded primitive and savage groups as living 
fossils, and recapitulatory scientists saw children in the same light—both were 
representative of human history in its early stages. Combined, these theories provided 
historically minded scholars with access to two different “living records,” to use Tylor’s 
terminology. In effect, the theory of recapitulation introduced an entirely new “temporal 
perspective” into the study of children by positioning them in a historico-developmental 
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scheme that divested them of their relationship with the present—primitives did not exist 
in the “now,” but in the past.61 Likewise, this perspective envisioned children not as 
creatures in harmony with the Western present, but as representations of epochs past. 
Thus, within Hall’s theory of development, Said’s “process of conversion” worked upon 
two distinct groups simultaneously, and each was converted into something else: savages 
became children and children, savages. Each epitomized the other, and both were 
representative of early man. The process altered the temporal status of both child and 
primitive—through this conversion, both were excluded from the present and relegated to 
the past.  Children and primitives, then, were converted not only into different forms but 
were transferred to different places as well. Evolutionary and recapitulatory sciences 
were powerfully transformative and altered popular perceptions of childhood and 
primitiveness by conflating them into a single category.  
According to historian of anthropology Johannes Fabian, anthropology’s 
“exercise of knowledge was projected as the filling of spaces or slots in a table, or the 
marking of points in a system of coordinates in which all possible knowledge could be 
placed.”62 For Fabian, one of the most crucial aspects of this process was the creation of a 
temporal framework that ordered and sorted peoples based on their perceived 
evolutionary standing in relation to the whole of human history. Here, anthropology was 
complicit: 
It promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living 
societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some 
upstream, others downstream…A discourse employing such terms as primitive, 
savage…does not think, or observe, or critically study, the “primitive”; it thinks, 
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observes, studies in terms of the primitive. Primitive being essentially a temporal 
concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought.63 
 
The passage of time accounted for the differences between primitive and civilized 
groups—whereas one group remained stuck in a particular historical period, the other had 
moved forward, becoming temporally distanced from the primitive or savage type. “What 
makes the savage significant to the evolutionist’s Time is that he lives in another Time,” 
leading to what Fabian calls the “denial of coevalness”: the “persistent and systematic 
tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the 
producer of anthropological discourse.”64 
 The practice of positioning non-European groups within historical stages in the 
evolutionary history of mankind not only detached those groups from the present, but it 
rendered them ahistorical. Primitives and savages were regarded as mere snapshots, static 
and unchanging historical representations, preserved through time by the limits of their 
own evolutionary potential. Indeed, those unfortunate groups were thought to have 
reached the terminal point of evolution, and were generally considered incapable of 
evolving into higher forms. Anthropologists thought that primitive and savage 
civilizations lacked forward momentum, which meant that they had no histories of their 
own—without progress there was no history, as history was thought to be the record of 
progressive change experienced by a people. 
E.B. Tylor’s study on the aboriginal Tasmanians illustrates the point: “It seems 
more likely to consider that in their remote corner of the globe they may have gone on 
little changed from early ages, so as to have remained to our day living representatives of 
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the early Stone Age, left behind in industrial development even by the ancient tribes of 
the Somme and the Ouse.”65 Rather than studying the Tasmanian people in and of 
themselves, for the benefit of understanding another culture, Tylor studied them in 
relation to Western civilization. The value of the study was that it illustrated for 
Westerners what they would have looked like during the Stone Age—the Tasmanians had 
been preserved, a static race with no real future and no real past, merely a living fossil. 
Anthropologists who operated in the colonial realm frequently regarded their 
subjects as ahistorical beings—not only were primitives thought to inhabit ancient 
epochs, but they were also thought to experience only the present moment, lacking a 
historical consciousness altogether. Western anthropologists determined whether or not 
any given culture possessed a history by applying the criteria of progress and change, and 
since primitive cultures appeared to be stagnant, they were thought to have no history. 
But other criteria existed as well, namely the ability to reflect upon one’s past. And 
primitive peoples were frequently thought to lack any historical sense of time 
whatsoever. R.H. Codrington noted in his study of the Melanesian people that they were 
a people unaware of any connection with the past, and when observing the Melanesians 
the enquirer seeks in vain for antiquity; the memory of the past perishes quickly 
where all things soon pass away, where every building soon decays, where life is 
short, and no marked change of seasons makes people count by longer measures 
of time than months.  While any one lives who remembers some famous man of 
the past his fame lingers, but it dies with the personal remembrance; a man’s 
ancestry goes back so far as living memory extends; historical tradition can 
hardly be said to exist.66 
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H. Hesketh Prichard, who studied the aboriginal peoples of the Patagonian region, wrote: 
“It may well be judged that this race have no history.”67 Guy Burrows, in his study of 
tribes in the Congo, noted that the “low state of [the natives’] mental development is 
shown by the following facts: they have no regard for time nor have they any records of 
the past, traditional or otherwise…They live simply in the present and for the present. 
What has happened is speedily forgotten.”68 Another anthropologist shared a similar 
opinion on the historical consciousness of the Congolese people: 
Among the native tribes of the Congo basin there exists no form of history. There 
is no written language; no tradition of the past; and no indication of an attempt, 
on the part of the natives, to perpetuate any epoch in their lives by means of 
monumental erections.69 
 
Primitives “do not seem to calculate long periods of time at all,” wrote one anthropologist 
in his study of the Solomon Islanders, “one full moon to another is as far as they usually 
go; and crops come so often and irregularly, that it is impossible to reckon by that 
standard.”70 Another noted that the natives of New Guinea did “not recognize a lunar 
year or months. There are no ceremonies for the old and new year, nor are there any time-
keepers.”71 Primitives thought of time only in the simplest terms, short and natural 
periods connected to observable phenomenon, such as lunar cycles or the passing of 
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seasons—only were short cycles of time “recognizable in the childhood of individuals 
and the races,” whose concepts of time were not historical, but immediate.72 
All these cosmic cycles were observed by primitive peoples (though the 
precession of the equinox was perceived only as a linear movement). The rudest 
savage regulates his activities and reckons his journeys by suns; all pastoral 
nomads reckon time by moons, and some develop lunar calendars; the fruit-eater 
and the forerunner of the farmer reckoned by the march of the seasons, and 
various groups in different parts of the world developed solar calendars.73 
 
Such cases studies provided grist for broad and sweeping generalizations about the 
relationship that primitive peoples had with history. The American Spencerian John Fiske 
wrote, “Of all these barbarian races, we commonly say that they have no history; and by 
this we mean that throughout long ages they have made no appreciable progress. In a 
similar sense we should say of a race of monkeys or elephants, that it has no history.”74  
 To understand how the historic sense developed, recapitulatory scholars suggested 
turning to its earliest manifestations—“How shall we discover its dim psychologic 
origins; its overgrown path? We must look in two ways—to primitive peoples and to 
children.”75 Neither children nor savages, many thought, possessed the ability to 
comprehend complex temporal relations. “Childhood cares little for what is 
remote…unless associated with some personal object,” wrote Hall, adding that young 
people live “chiefly in the present.”76 John Fiske noted that both Australian aborigines 
and Western children were unable to understand the connection between one’s actions 
and the effects that those actions might have over long periods of time—indeed, both 
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groups struggled to “represent” anything that was not immediately available to sensory 
experiences.77 The intellectual ability of both groups was limited by the fact that each 
was “bound up with the concrete world,” unable to think beyond the immediate moment. 
Such shortsightedness was a serious cognitive limitation, as described by Hall in 
Adolescence: 
If [children’s] psychic operations can be called thought it is of that elementary 
and half animal kind that consists in imagery. Their talk with each other is of 
things of present and immediate interest. They lack even the elements of 
imagination which makes new combinations and is creative because they are 
dominated by mental pictures of the sensory. Large views that take them afield 
from the persons and things and acts they know do not appeal to them. Attempts 
to think rigorously are too hard.78 
 
Hall’s project was influenced by studies that demonstrated the lack of a historical 
consciousness among children, convincing him that young people did not develop a more 
sophisticated temporal understanding until late-adolescence; prior to this point “the sense 
of historical time is altogether lacking.”79 And only in the latter phases of development 
was an adolescent thought able to “reason much beyond their experience and 
environment.”80 
 G. Stanley Hall’s adolescent, like the savages studied by Western anthropologists, 
existed in an evolutionary moment that was distant from the present, and neither were 
concerned with matters that did not speak with immediacy.81 But adolescents were 
thought to have a major advantage over savages: puberty was only a temporary state of 
being, whereas primitiveness or savagery was a permanent condition. And while the 
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“lower” races had no chance of raising themselves out of the historical periods in which 
they were doomed to remain, it was possible for Western youth to emerge and progress to 
the next stage of civilization. Unfortunately, this logic relegated certain races to an 
existence of permanent childhood. “Lower” races, studies showed, kept apace with 
Western children in their development, but only to a point. At late-adolescence, 
development 
stops, and, instead of advancing, it is doubtful whether he will fully maintain 
through middle age what he learnt in youth. In most respects it is clear that the 
savage cannot be raised to the level of our civilisation in a single generation…82 
 
Adolescence constituted a critical phase in one’s development because it marked the 
point at which civilization diverged from savagery. Ensuring that adolescents received 
the proper guidance so they could successfully navigate from savage childhood to 
civilized adulthood was the problem that most concerned Hall. As we shall see in later 
chapters, much of his pedagogical philosophy focused on this issue. Western youth 
possessed a potential that lower races lacked, namely the ability to change, progress, and 
develop into something “better”—in short, children could be educated. This potential 
separated Western children from their primitive counterparts, if properly nurtured it 
guaranteed that adolescents would transcend the limits that permanently restrained 
savages and primitives.83 
 The “lower” races could develop only so far, thought anthropologists and colonial 
educators, and though education could prove beneficial in some areas, it was powerless in 
overcoming the constitutional limits thought to inhere in primitive peoples. Commenting 
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on efforts to educate American Negroes who had been transported to Sierra Leone, one 
anthropologist reported that despite 
the expenditure large sums of money by various philanthropic societies, and the 
exertions of missionaries and teachers of all denominations, [efforts] have failed 
to do more than impose a mere veneer of civilisation upon the inhabitants of 
Sierra Leone, and then only upon a small minority, and this after a century of 
labour.84 
 
Another considered efforts to educate Tasmanians:  
Bound by the chain of custom, and swayed by the practice of forefathers, it is no 
less difficult for us to engraft our manners upon the naked savage, than upon the 
cultivated Hindoo.  How could we expect to change the course of thought in such 
barbarians, when we have succeeded so ill in our teaching elsewhere?85 
 
Racial evolution was limited by ancestral legacy, and races regarded as primitive, such as 
the aborigines of Australia, were destined to remain forever in the child-like state that 
explorers and anthropologists had originally found them.  
 Various thinkers offered explanations as to why primitive and savage groups had 
not evolved, attempting to explain why some groups were unable to change over time 
while others had met the evolutionary challenges presented throughout history. Most 
attributed the savage’s low evolutionary standing to environmental factors that impeded 
development and to limits inherent to their internal makeup. Herbert Spencer thought that 
a variety of factors accounted for the primitive’s resistance to change, a number of which 
were environmental: hot, tropical climates led to indolence and hindered progress; air that 
was either too dry or too moist sapped one’s “vital processes,” impeded activity, and 
rendered a people lazy and stupid; and few natural resources ensured that a people would 
excel neither agriculturally nor technologically. A number of internal factors contributed 
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to the primitive’s lack of progressive change as well, including an inferior physiological 
makeup and a smaller brain, the inability to reflect upon past experiences, an inherent 
laziness, and a naturalistic and animistic worldview that left no room for the development 
of logical explanation or scientific understanding.86 Those limits—both external and 
internal—prevented primitives from evolving into something higher, and explained why 
they would forever remain mired in low, child-like evolutionary states. 
 These evolutionary states were, in reality, rather artificial—did these “lower” 
groups really exist in distant historical epochs, or did Western scientists simply impose 
temporal categories upon the people they studied? What is clear, however, was that non-
European groups, regardless of their historical condition, did live in areas geographically 
removed from European scientists—thus, anthropologists and their subjects inhabited 
different temporal and spatial realms. Regardless of Fabian’s critique of the temporal 
constraints that anthropologists imposed on their subjects, a very real spatial divide 
existed between the two groups. That colonized peoples lived far from the colonial 
metropolis was a source of constant frustration for anthropologists. And few understood 
the difficulties presented by this divide more than did the Western anthropologist, whose 
work necessitated confronting harsh environments and insalubrious conditions. Indeed, 
just as the anthropological project required its members to transport themselves 
psychologically to different historical epochs, they were also obligated to relocate to 
distant places—the discipline called on its practitioners to explore, travel, and, 
sometimes, encounter dangerous elements. The study of adolescents compelled its 
practitioners to do the same: child studiers not only traveled to the historical past, but 
they also entered environments and territories that had generally eluded adult eyes. 
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Children often hid in “natural habitats,” haunts and hideouts separated from the adult 
world, which provided them with their own unsupervised spaces in the midst of adult 
civilization. Charting this territory would be a necessary step in the study of adolescence: 
[The observer] may frequent the haunts of the street urchin, and note how one lad 
succeeds in conveying an idea to another; note the way in which a motive impels 
an action; the effort spent to achieve a purpose...in brief, he may discover the 
way which a live, natural boy perceives, reproduces, apperceives, cognizes, 
recognizes, interprets, creates.87 
 
Anthropologists thought in the same way, and traveled to distant, uncharted regions in 
order to observe “live” and “natural” primitives uninfluenced by the forces of 
civilization. G.M. Gooden’s study of the tribe of Northeast India spoke to the difficulties 
that inhered in anthropological exploration: 
The wild hill tracts which till recent years formed the North-Eastern frontier of 
the Indian Empire are still to some extent an almost unknown land. A dividing 
barrier between the plains of Assam on the one hand, and of Upper Burma on the 
other, these Nágá Hills were long known as the abode of fierce and intractable 
tribes, living in a state of incessant intertribal warfare, and asserting their 
presence on our border by savage raids; but punitive expeditions and official 
intercourse left us with a very incomplete knowledge of the people. Fearless with 
the courage of savage ignorance, they repeatedly resisted and killed officers in 
frontier work, and entrenched in a remote hill country they eluded detailed 
scientific observation.88 
 
An ethnologist who conducted research in the Philippines noted that the natives were 
“scattered over hundreds of islands, and one who would really learn to know something 
of the country and its people must travel widely.  More than that, he must leave cities and 
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towns behind, and turning from the beaten path, push into the almost unexplored regions 
where the wild tribes are to be found.”89 
 “Wild tribes” were not a phenomenon occurring only in the untamed climes of 
colonial territories; in fact, the modern world itself was home to plenty of feral and 
undomesticated people who lived in the jungles and wildernesses of modern society. 
Reformers interested in the plight of poor, urban children found difficulties similar to 
those experienced by anthropologists, and faced the challenge of tracking subjects in a 
“wild,” uncharted environment. Charles Loring Brace, founder of the New York 
Children’s Aid Society, had observed “thousands on thousands [of] children in New York 
who have no assignable home, and ‘flit’ from attic to attic, and cellar to cellar…”90 In 
New York, Brace continued, “was the infamous German ‘Rag-pickers’ Den,’ in Pitt and 
Willett Streets—double rows of houses, flaunting with dirty banners, and the yards 
heaped up with bones and refuse, where cholera raged unchecked in its previous 
invasion.  Here the wild life of the children soon made them outcasts and thieves.”91 
Jacob Riis also found savage conditions in the heart of civilization: “The story of 
inhuman packing of human swarms, of bitter poverty, of landlord greed, of sweater 
slavery, of darkness and squalor and misery, which these tenements have to tell, is 
equaled, I suppose, nowhere in a civilized land.”92 Brace and Riis were both frustrated by 
the fact that children of the underclass, like the primitives studied by Western 
anthropologists, eluded “detailed observation.” 
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G. Stanley Hall borrowed from anthropologists these temporal and spatial 
structures and used them in his project to link adolescence with savagery. In Hall’s mind, 
both groups lived “elsewhere”—the theory of recapitulation demonstrated that each was 
removed from the Western present, while the work of anthropologists in the field and 
reformers in the streets showed that each lived in a wilderness that was neither inviting to 
outsiders, nor easy to regulate. Hall’s great fear was that many adolescents would 
disappear from view, regressing to an entirely different historical epoch and retreating to 
an unstructured and unsupervised “wilderness.” Like the savage, the adolescent tended 
toward rootlessness, caused by an instinctual urge to travel and migrate and a deep inner 
need to be free from the constraints of civilization. Such urges could be dangerous—if 
given the opportunity, adolescents would prefer to disappear from view and escape the 
educational regimens that proper development mandated. For Hall, the risks were 
obvious: 
the moment his life becomes migratory all the restraints and possibilities of 
settled life vanish. It is possible to steal and pass on undiscovered and 
unsuspected, and to steal again. The vagabond escapes the control of public 
sentiment, which normally is an external conscience, and having none of his own 
within him thus lapses into a feral state.93 
 
“It is a chronic illusion to youth that gives ‘elsewhere’ a special charm,” wrote Hall. 
“Elsewhere” was, for Hall, a psychological condition and an orientation within the real 
world—a figurative state youth longed for because of atavistic urgings, but also a real 
place, beyond society’s gaze and outside the control of its social mechanisms. Both—
temporal and spatial isolation—translated into invisibility.  To dwell “elsewhere” was to 
inhabit a feral and savage-like state and, for Hall, “elsewhere” was an impenetrable 
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jungle, a thick wilderness, which had be explored, charted, and disciplined. Hall’s quest 
was to tame this wild territory, to bring it back within the field of visibility. With savages 
and primitives, the anthropological laboratory made this goal possible—it allowed 
modern man see through time and space, and provided the means to bring order to the 
colonial world. For those interested in children the goal was the same, but in the case of 
children the project attempted to render visible and manageable something that existed 
within Western boundaries.  
 
 
III. Civilization Versus Savagery: The Development of the Adolescent’s Moral Sense 
Adolescence signified for G. Stanley Hall a period of insecure equilibrium, a moment of 
confused and conflicted transition in which the developing child had to navigate his way 
from a state dominated by savage tendencies to one in tune with the demands of modern 
civilization. Few disagreed that this was a crucial point in the life of any young person, 
and many spoke with a sense of great urgency about it: “Puberty and adolescence are 
without doubt the most important period in the life history of a human being,” wrote one 
educator.94 The developing adolescent, thought recapitulationists, was standing on a 
verge: before him lay the civilized world, behind him the savage and primitive past. 
Adolescents were literally caught between historical epochs: “the phyletic stages in the 
development of the race that correspond to puberty fall largely in the unhistoric period—
the darkest of all dark ages, during which brute becomes man.”95 Fortunately, the 
adolescent need not remain stranded forever in the darkness—education could lift young 
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people from their savage state. But, while forward movement was possible, it was not 
necessarily inevitable. Evolution offered only the hope of progress, not the guarantee, and 
on this point leading evolutionary thinkers were clear. Herbert Spencer noted that 
evolutionary change “does not necessarily imply advance,” while Darwin wrote, 
“progress is no invariable rule.”96 Indeed, the very presence of “lowly” and “backwards” 
groups spoke to the fact that evolutionary progress was not evenly divided among the 
world’s peoples. According to Darwin, 
Many savages are in the same condition as when first discovered several 
centuries ago…we are apt to look at progress as normal in human society; but 
history refutes this.97 
 
“Proper” development for the adolescent, however, required progress. But moving 
from a life dominated by savage impulses and desires to a more modest, “civilized” 
existence was difficult for any young person. Life presented young people with constant 
temptations that appealed to their inherent savage desires, and giving in to such 
enticements, while offering temporary satisfaction to the instinctual urges common to all 
adolescents, would hinder moral and intellectual development. These urges, which could 
ruin a young person if unchecked, and could cause harm if not treated with some 
lenience, would have to be balanced by an educational regimen that sought to guide 
youth through this period of transition—Hallian pedagogy held this to be its overriding 
goal, its intention being to help young people navigate humanity’s evolutionary course, 
while, at the same time, embracing in a respectful way the child’s true nature. Hall was 
aware that the adolescent’s primitive tendencies were extremely powerful aspects of his 
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psychic makeup and understood that the sheer strength of those predispositions could 
impede proper development. The point was expressed in his “general psychonomic law,” 
which assumes that we are influenced in our deeper, more temperamental 
dispositions by the life-habits and codes of conduct of we know not what 
unnumbered hosts of ancestors, which like a cloud of witnesses are present 
throughout our lives, and that our souls are echo-chambers in which their 
whispers reverberate.98 
 
That these tendencies were deserving of respect and some indulgence, not to be dispensed 
with too early in a child’s development, will be a point explored in Chapter Four, which 
examines how the findings of Hall’s study of children influenced his pedagogical 
philosophy. And the point that these tendencies should not be overindulged, lest they 
become exaggerated and pathological, will be a theme taken up in Chapter Three, which 
explores the links between Hall’s theory of recapitulation and other theories of 
abnormality. For the moment, however, my theme is Hall’s treatment of primitiveness 
and savagery and their relation to the development of the adolescent’s moral sense.  
The one great threat that permeated the adolescent experience was the potential 
for failure in transitioning beyond the rudimentary stages of human development. Some 
young people would linger indefinitely in the stages of barbarism and savagery, and some 
would remain backwards for the rest of their lives. There was also the possibility that 
normal development could be interrupted; some adolescents would stumble, and instead 
of progressing along the evolutionary scale, they would revert to the savage ways that 
had served them well during early childhood. Victims of arrested development or 
reversion retained primitive characteristics into adulthood; both were destined to endure 
the same struggles and indignities that a savage might experience when living among 
civilized men. If, as one writer noted, primitive groups like the Tasmanian aborigines 
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“cannot endure the spread of European civilization in his neighbourhood; but perishes in 
its atmosphere,” then an underdeveloped and backward adult could be expected to 
experience the same fate.99 The colonies provided countless examples of savages who 
had been made miserable from “partial civilization”: 
At Oyster Cove I witnessed the end of all this civilization.  With the exception of 
Walter and Maryann, the work had been in vain.  The others, nearly all old 
women, were ignorant, almost to brutishness.  They lived wretchedly in dirt and 
neglect.  Their food was cooked in a pot from which I saw the dogs allowed to 
eat.  They lay in their clothes, with a dirty blanket in the cold season.  They could 
not read, and they were never read to.  They cared not for prayer, and had no one 
to pray with them.  They bartered food and blankets with disreputable neighbours 
to obtain drink.  They sat about on the ground with their mangy dogs, smoking 
their filthy pipes, and cackling over stories of their past.100 
 
 Such observations provided a dismal forecast for Western adults who remained mired in 
a primitive state. To guard against this danger Hall sought to design educational strategies 
that would provide adolescents with progressive pedagogical and developmental 
regimens, ensuring that individual growth unfolded in harmony with that of the world’s 
superior races.  
If progress and development were not ineluctable forces, but only potential ones, 
then it was imperative that teachers understand how to nurture the adolescent’s full 
evolutionary potential. They also had to be aware of the dangers that would accompany 
developmental failure. Hall considered these issues to be the main themes of his work. 
Adolescence, he wrote, was a period “of insecurity and ever-impending danger of mental 
or physical relapse, and at the same time, of the promises and potencies of a slow but 
ever higher development.”101 “Young children grow despite great hardships,” Hall added, 
“but later adolescence is more dependent upon favoring conditions in the environment, 
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disturbances of which more readily cause arrest and prevent maturity.”102 Within 
recapitulatory theory, the ideas of arrested development, relapse, and reversion were 
understood in terms of evolutionary failure; those who had not developed “normally” 
were positioned lower on a temporal scale than those who had. Detecting arrest and 
relapse was essentially the practice of diagnosing developmental problems historically—
failure to mature properly implied deviation from a standardized evolutionary course, and 
those who retained adolescent characteristics into adulthood were regarded as under-
evolved and primitive, having failed to transition from a savage child to a civilized man. 
Arrested development or reversion to a lower evolutionary type was manifested in 
a variety of ways. Children so afflicted might be physiologically abnormal, inferior in 
intellectual ability, or deficient in their moral conduct. Anthropologists had observed the 
reversionary process at work in entire populations, where cultural or racial development 
had “backslided” to ruder forms: “It is highly probable that whole nations have 
retrograded in the scale of life,” wrote one of Hall’s colleagues, noting that surrendering 
to primitive impulses could have dire developmental consequences. “Certain savage 
peoples like the Bushmen and Australians are believed by some ethnologists to represent 
decadent stocks.”103 Anthropologists thought degeneration could be caused by a host of 
environmental factors, including war, famine, vice, or the encroachment of civilizing 
forces. Regardless of its cause, however, the lesson was clear to students of 
recapitulation: if degeneration was possible in the history of the race, then it was also a 
danger that threatened the Western child. 
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If, therefore, arrested growth and degeneration be established biological facts, 
and if philology, anthropology and history afford evidence that the same laws are 
operative among men when considered as nations and types, may we not expect 
identical phenomena in individuals, families and communities?104 
 
Recapitulatory theory, based on the premise that individual development followed the 
same processes that governed social development, contended that adolescence was a 
period fraught with same perils and hazards that endangered the social whole. The 
evolutionary history of the “lower” races highlighted struggles, failures, and falls, and 
sounded warnings to those interested in the growth of young people—studies of “savage” 
peoples provided child studiers with points of reference drawn from anthropological 
observations, and those observations transformed the pubertal stage of life into a period 
of risk.   
The path toward evolutionary progress was not easy and the anthropological 
literature cited by Hall provided plenty of examples of failure. At every turn, then, the 
developing adolescent experienced the same evolutionary struggles with which the race 
had been faced, and lived under the constant threat that proper development would be 
interrupted by the pulls of the race’s ancestral legacy. G. Stanley Hall’s work can only be 
understood in light of this tension, and it is a major theme in Adolescence: 
At dawning adolescence this old unity and harmony with nature is broken up; the 
child is driven from his paradise and must enter upon a long viaticum of ascent, 
must conquer a higher kingdom of man for himself, break out a new sphere, and 
evolve a more modern story to his psycho-physical nature. Because his 
environment is to be far more complex, the combinations are less stable, the 
ascent less easy and secure; there is more danger that the youth in his upward 
progress, under the influence of this ‘excelsior’ motive, will backslide in one or 
several of the many ways possible. New dangers threaten on all sides.105 
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Conceiving of adolescence in this way led to portrayals of adolescents as being 
exceptionally sensitive and malleable creatures whose position in life was extremely 
precarious—with the possibility that arrest or relapse could occur at any moment, 
adolescence came to signify the most perilous and hazardous stage of life.  
Relapsed individuals were regarded as evolutionary aberrations, those who had 
retained less-evolved attributes and failed to keep pace with the evolutionary 
developments of the race as a whole. Such people—as we will see in Chapter Three—
were generally regarded as unfit to live in modern society, incapable of adapting to an 
environment that required from its members high levels of moral, intellectual, and social 
development. These were society’s degenerates: criminals, perverts, the insane, and even 
the indigent—each lived among civilized people, but none was able to function within the 
society in which they lived. Life for these so-called evolutionary misfits was no doubt 
difficult and painful, but the more pressing concern for experts of degeneracy was with 
the social whole. The presence of degenerate individuals within the modern social unit 
was disruptive and a threat to the established social order.  
The theory of recapitulation regarded pathological behavior as savage and child-
like, and many thought that all social pathology resulted from failure to transition through 
the evolutionary stages of moral development. Adult deviants had reached physical 
maturity but had not matured morally or intellectually—recapitulationists considered 
deviants to be overgrown children. The improperly developed young person tended 
toward deviant behavior and would become a liability once he reached adulthood. The 
presence of “primitives” in the midst of a civilized world introduced an element of savage 
havoc into an otherwise well-ordered society, and central to the discussion of adolescent 
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development at the turn of the twentieth century was the fear of a barbarian invasion from 
within.  
 Social stability depended on a shared commitment to a moral code, and as 
societies evolved into higher forms their moral systems increased in complexity. 
Spencerians considered social evolution to consist of the “integration of human families 
or tribal communities into larger and larger groups” and this required the development of 
a highly inclusive moral sense that bound distant members of a social whole together.106 
Tylor echoed the point: “civilization may be looked upon as the general improvement of 
mankind by higher organization of the individual and of society, to the end of promoting 
at once man’s goodness, power, and happiness.”107 Complex social organizations relied 
on a broad sense of moral obligation, whereas simple societies required only limited 
commitments to a small band or tribe—“Individuals belonging to the same tribe are 
usually on the best of terms, but the different tribes are each other’s mortal enemies. Woe 
therefore to the stranger who dares trespass on the land of another tribe! He is pursued 
like a wild beast and slain and eaten.”108 Encounters with indigenous peoples in the 
colonies highlighted the fact that some cultures were morally unfit for a modern world 
where social obligation extended beyond the familial or tribal sphere. And 
anthropologists demonstrated time and time again that savage morality clashed with 
European expectations concerning right conduct in a modern world. This posed a 
problem for colonial administrations, which required that subjected groups expand their 
moral obligations to include their conquerors. But, unfortunately, savage and primitive 
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groups frequently proved themselves unable to conform to the moral standards imposed 
by outsiders.  
 In his study of the Burmese people, H. Fielding Hall wrote, they “are now very 
much as we were sixteen centuries ago, when the Romans ruled us.  Now we are a greater 
people, our justice is better…our morality is inconceivably better.”109 Carl Lumholtz’s 
studies in Australia led him to conclude that there “is not much to be said of the morals of 
the blacks, for I am sorry to say they have none.”110 Tylor disagreed, but only slightly: 
“Savage moral standards are real enough, but they are far looser and weaker than 
ours.”111 Tylor considered “the definiteness of moral principles” to be a reliable gauge of 
a people’s evolutionary progress, and comparative studies of morality allowed 
ethnographers to “set up at least a rough scale of civilization.”112 It was, however, an 
extremely difficult task, and Tylor bemoaned the fact that “a combined intellectual and 
moral measure of [the] human condition is an instrument which no student has yet learnt 
properly to handle.”113 Ranking civilizations according to their levels of moral 
development was not a precise science, but generalizations provided anthropologists with 
at least a rough sketch of man’s moral history. 
 Despite the difficulty in arranging evolutionary history according to levels moral 
development, it was clear to anthropologists that, with regard to morality, some races 
were more advanced than others. Primitives were generally thought to have a “general 
want of abstract ideas of morality,” and many anthropological studies provided readers 
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with inventories of customs and beliefs that were thought to be sure signs of moral 
weakness.114 As one anthropologist noted, 
There is, I suppose, some sense of morality, as we understand it, in these 
savages…there appears to be no generally recognized standard of “right” or 
“wrong”; nor any law but revenge.115 
 
A.B. Ellis’ study on the Tshi-Speaking tribes of Africa, cited by Hall in Adolescence, 
made the following observations, all suggesting that his subjects suffered from an 
underdeveloped moral sense: “Chastity per se is not understood”; “a married man can 
and does lend his wife, and the wife submits to be lent, without either of them supposing 
that they are committing an offence against morality”; infidelity was the rule; the sexual 
passion “prevails amongst all uncivilized people”; barbarous practices, such as human 
sacrifice, abound in religious rites and in war; “the infirm and helpless are invariably 
neglected”; infanticide is common; religious leaders led a life of “one continual round of 
debauchery and sensuality.” These natives, it appeared, were destined to remain in a state 
of low moral development and, despite European efforts to civilize them, their moral 
condition had remained stagnant: “the Tshi-speaking tribes are now much in the same 
condition, both socially and morally, as they were at the time of the Portuguese 
discoveries.”116 
Again, primitive behavior was analyzed according to historical criteria—the 
inability to change through history ensured that primitive people possessed anachronistic 
moral codes that were insufficient for governing behavior in a modern context. An 
anthropologist who studied the American Indians made the point clearly:  
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Superstition and sorcery, cannibalism and cruelty, a lax morality and a 
remorseless spirit of revenge—all these too the Indian possessed, and, as a boy 
and man, practiced and adhered to them.  But there is reason in all things, and the 
student of human nature, progressing from the lowest types to the highest 
intelligence, has been able to discover a logical reason for the existence of these 
seemingly evil attributes in the composition of the American Indian.117 
  
The passage reminded readers that “cruel” or “evil” practices had their place in history 
and had once served important functions in less-evolved societies. But, at the same time, 
anthropologists warned that the retention of savage moral codes in the face of 
encroaching civilization was unacceptable and dangerous. Degree of development was 
again measured against a Western standard, and “immoral” behavior was regarded as any 
practice that ran counter to the norms required by contemporary, Western societies.  
 Savage ahistoricism also worked on another level. In The Descent of Man Charles 
Darwin explored the role that the historical sense played in the development of higher 
standards of morality: “A moral being,” wrote Darwin, “is one who is capable of 
comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of 
them.”118 For Darwin, a necessary step in the evolution of moral development was the 
expansion of one’s own historical consciousness, the ability to make decisions in the 
present after reflecting upon courses of action taken in the past. Thought insensitive to 
the historical dimensions of their own actions, both savages and children were regarded 
as unable to make sound moral decisions based on experience and reflection. 
The primitive’s historical shortsightedness was accompanied by an equally 
narrow sense of social obligation. In Descent, Darwin noted that perhaps the greatest 
limitation in the development of a sophisticated moral sense among primitive peoples 
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was their tendency toward exclusivity—“actions are regarded by savages, and were 
probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they obviously affect the 
welfare of the tribe—not that of the species…The chief cause of the low morality of 
savages, as judged by our standard, are, firstly, the confinement of sympathy to the same 
tribe.”119 All degrees of social living—from the tribe to the metropolis to the nation—
required of its members certain bonds of fidelity, and Darwin noted that the breadth of 
one’s associations expanded in relation to the level of civilization that one inhabited. All 
men, he continued, found pleasure in the company of their peers, sympathized with them, 
and were willing to perform services for their benefit, but “these feelings and services are 
by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same 
association.”120 The savage moral code applied only to those who lived in the same tribe, 
and actions that would not have been tolerated internally were “not regarded as crimes in 
relation to men of other tribes.”121 Savage morality was relative to tribal membership, 
which explained its failure condemn robbing, murdering, or acting treacherously against 
members of other tribes: “In a rude state of civilisation the robbery of strangers is, 
indeed, generally considered as honourable.”122 Darwin considered the scope of social 
obligation to be a reliable measurement of the moral development among a people, 
offering Tylor and other anthropologists a more exact method to evaluate and rank 
cultures. The idealized standard, apparently found within Western societies, and by which 
all cultures were to be judged, was an all-encompassing humanitarianism: 
As man advances in civilisation, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to 
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extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, 
though personally unknown to him. This point being reached, there is only an 
artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and 
races.123 
 
But primitive man was hindered by his allegiance to these “artificial barriers” and he was 
a long way from acting in accordance with this ideal. Some even doubted whether 
obligation toward the tribe could be considered a manifestation of moral behavior at all: 
In many of his horrible customs primitive man occupied a lower level than that of 
a large number of the higher animals. But even at this low stage of development a 
certain kind of social solidarity was necessary to prevent the purely selfish 
desires of each leading to the complete annihilation of the race. Self preservation, 
the strongest of all egoistic instincts, required the extension of self to all members 
of the tribe. Tribal interests were thus absorbed in self interest, not because of 
any moral ideas about the rights of others, but solely because each one’s self-
interests were better served.124 
 
Self-interest, thought to guide the actions of savages, was also considered to be an 
impulse that dominated young children’s motives, whose primary concern lay in 
gratifying their own immediate needs. Prepubescent children, thought Hall, acted 
according to the principle, “I will get, be, do the most possible for myself, no matter how 
others suffer, provided only I am not found out and made to suffer myself.”125 But Hall 
considered adolescence to be the point at which young people, if properly raised, 
transitioned from a selfish, egocentric life to an “altro-centric” one—a time when 
children came to genuinely care for the well being of others regardless of their own self-
interests.  
 Whereas young children felt little allegiance to the social whole, at puberty a 
child’s social horizon began to expand. The individual’s social sense grew in harmony 
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with the recapitulatory experiences of the race, and though the adolescent’s social 
obligations became more inclusive as he grew, for a period his moral commitment was 
limited to members of the same “tribe.” Adolescent boys, wrote Hall, found their first 
significant social obligations in “predatory organizations,” the primary mode of 
adolescent social organization, which recapitulated savage tribal institutions: “These 
include bands of robbers, clubs for hunting and fishing, play armies, organized fighting 
bands between separate districts, associations for building forts, etc.”126 The 
recapitulation of rude social institutions constituted a normal stage in a child’s 
development, and it was only natural that fidelity and moral obligation were extended at 
first only to one’s closest peers. In this regard, wrote Hall, adolescents were like savages, 
who “can only love a few, and the diffusion and irradiation of fraternal sentiments 
outward toward ever larger portions and finally to the whole race is a matter of very slow 
and painful growth.”127 Prior to this growth, then, was a period of exclusivity, a 
recapitulatory pull toward the tribal: 
Before ten comes the period of free spontaneous imitation of every form of adult 
institution….From ten to fourteen, however, associations assume a new 
character; boys especially cease to imitate adult organizations and tend to form 
social units characteristic of lower stages of human evolution—pirates, robbers, 
soldiers, lodges, and other savage reversionary combinations, where the strongest 
and boldest is the leader. They build huts, wear feathers and tomahawks as 
badges, carry knives and toy-pistols, make raids and sell the loot.128 
 
Hall considered the organization of gangs to be normal for adolescents, a requisite step in 
the recapitulation of man’s social past—“These barbaric societies have their place and 
give vigor,” he wrote, “but if unreduced later, as in many unsettled portions of this 
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country, a semi-savage state of society results.”129 Indeed, failure to develop strong and 
exclusive friendships at this stage of life was cause for concern: “Careful and sympathetic 
guidance is necessary to such persons, for without it maturity will find some of them 
social misfits, of little worth to the world and of small satisfaction to themselves.”130 At 
the same time, however, Hall was careful to note that adolescent exclusivity could hinder 
the development of a wider sense of moral and social obligation, as it had with tribal 
groups who had never truly developed philanthropic or humanitarian feelings. Hall 
insisted that educators redirect the young person’s tribal instincts toward more productive 
ends, such as athletic clubs or religious organizations, else the adolescent would gravitate 
toward a host of “dangerous” organizations and gangs to fulfill his social needs. If the 
“predatory function” was not properly subordinated it became dangerous: “members are 
no longer satisfied with mere play, but are stronger and abler to do harm, and the spice of 
danger and its fascination may issue in crime.”131 Members of gangs never progressed 
beyond the tribal stage of morality; they held allegiance only to one another and did not 
consider their crimes toward outsiders to be morally wrong. This was a telling example of 
the dangers that accompanied arrested development. 
 Hall instructed his readers that “ideal conduct is that which first develops the 
individual and then subordinates it to the larger interests of the race.” Indeed, for Hall, 
one of the primary aims of education was the inculcation of social obligation, and it was a 
lesson students were most receptive to at adolescence.132 For Darwin this was the point 
on which “the whole question of the moral sense” rested. But the idea that one should 
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place the well being of others before his own ran counter to man’s most basic instincts, 
and in The Descent of Man Darwin wondered “why should a man feel that he ought to 
obey one instinctive desire rather than another?”133 Social obligation and self-interest 
were contradictory impulses, and it was “not surprising that there should be a struggle in 
man between his social instincts, with their derived virtues, and his lower, though 
momentarily stronger impulses or desires.”134 Recapitulatory theorists assumed that 
difficult struggles in the history of the race were reenacted during an individual’s 
development—consequently, maturing persons would have to learn to subordinate their 
“lower” impulses to higher ones. It was one of the greatest challenges during 
adolescence, a period when a number of powerful “antithetic impulses” pulled the 
adolescent in opposing directions. 
 “The power of self-control is latent and undeveloped, and its necessity must be 
slowly learned,” wrote Hall.135 Adolescents should not be expected to master it too 
quickly, or prematurely—as altruistic reasoning was a characteristic of higher racial 
development, it would not be found among young children who inhabited lower levels of 
evolutionary advancement. Further, when moral action based on social obligation first 
appeared, it would be exhibited in imperfect and rudimentary ways. Among primitives 
and children, self-interest was first subordinated not from a highly developed moral 
sense, but out of fear. “It is obvious,” wrote Darwin, “that the members of the same tribe 
would approve of conduct which appeared to them to be for the general good, and would 
reprobate that which appeared evil…It is, therefore, hardly possible to exaggerate the 
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importance during rude times of the love of praise and the dread of blame.”136 Hall noted 
that adolescence was a period when children desired approbation more than anything 
else—“To win good-will and avoid ill-will is now one of the strongest motives”—
suggesting that moral behavior was rooted in self-interest first, in ethical standards 
second.137 Eventually moral behavior would become internalized, ingrained in the habits 
of individuals, a point made by Darwin in Descent: 
After having yielded to some temptation we feel a sense of dissatisfaction, 
shame, repentance, or remorse, analogous to the feelings caused by other 
powerful instincts or desires, when left unsatisfied or baulked. We compare the 
weakened impression of a past temptation with the ever present social instincts, 
or with habits, gained in early youth and strengthened during our whole lives, 
until they have become almost as strong as instincts.138 
 
The degree to which subordination occurred determined one’s position on the continuum 
of moral evolution. Savages, whom Darwin thought possessed a “weak power of self-
command,” were thus distanced from more civilized people, who were endowed with “an 
advanced standard of morality.”139 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The evolutionary possibilities were great—as an adolescent transitioned out of the 
stage of self-centeredness and toward one of altruism, a “voice is soon heard in the soul, 
which says: Renounce and serve, life is short, powers and opportunities are limited, 
suffering is needful to perfection, so obey, find the joy of sacrifice, get only to give, live 
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for others, subordinate the will to live to love, or to offspring.”140 But, as Darwin, 
Spencer, and a number of anthropologists had shown, evolutionary potential was 
accompanied by the dangers of arrest and reversion, equally powerful in the history of the 
race. Those who did not develop a sound moral sense based on social obligation 
remained savage and backward, bringing into adulthood a kind of self-absorption that 
was natural only among children and primitives. Such adults were degenerate, possessing 
a “hypersensitized and abnormal soul [that] in its illusions construes the universe as if it 
all centered about his own person.”141 Self-centeredness and amoral behavior was 
manifested in a variety of social ills, from crime and insanity, to perversion and poverty, 
and the source of these many problems stemmed from the failure to transition properly 
from youth to adulthood. Individuals who so failed became dangerous elements in a 
modern society, savages in a civilized world, a point to be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three 
Strange Conflations: Adolescents and Their Relation to  
Lunatics, Criminals, and Sexual Deviants 
 
 
 
We can not here consider all disorders. It is quite probably not 
too much to say that very nearly if not quite every psychosis or 
neurosis of defect or excess, if not manifest before puberty, will 
appear or at least begin its incubation at this time. 
G. Stanley Hall (1904)1 
 
 
 
 
I. Insanity 
 
In his Text-Book of Insanity, published in 1879, R. von Kraft-Ebing made a startling 
observation: “insanity is a phenomenon constantly increasing in frequency in modern 
society.”2 The causes of this increase were numerous, but included “enormous growth of 
population in great cities, with the resultant evil influences, hygienically (tuberculosis, 
scrofula, anemia) and morally; the increase of a mentally and physically degenerate 
proletariat; pauperism; predominating factory life; lack of marriage; the increasing 
intellectual and morally destructive craze for riches and luxury.”3 G. Stanley Hall agreed, 
and noted that the forces of modernization could be psychologically damaging. This was 
especially true among adolescents:  
Civilization with all its accumulated mass of cultures and skills, its artifacts, its 
necessity of longer and severer apprenticeship and specialization, is ever harder 
on adolescents, and even in a republic the submerged fraction of the population 
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not adequate to achieve success in its ever fiercer competitions, who drop limp 
and exhausted in body and soul to a condition acknowledged by many 
anthropologists to be essentially inferior to that of most of the lowest savages, 
increases, and institutions for defectives and those who live on charities 
multiply.4 
 
The stress of modern life may well have driven many people mad, but historians of 
medicine have located another cause for the perceived increase of insanity: new 
etiological theories within the psychiatric discipline itself. The rise of insanity, these 
historians hypothesize, was the result of changing medical perceptions. In the first half of 
the nineteenth century, most “physicians maintained that insanity was ultimately rooted 
in the organism, particularly the brain”—madness was a disease caused primarily by 
structural defects in the lunatic’s mind. 5 But later in the century the focus of psychiatric 
diagnosis shifted from the physiological to the social:  
Prior to the mid-19th century while the mad might suffer from disturbed passions 
medical explanations predominately attributed insanity to the impaired intellect. 
However, during the 19th century cases of madness were documented in which 
individuals did not display any overt mental defect. Instead they exhibited some 
morally offensive behavior manifested in bizarre or outrageous conduct.6 
 
“Persons perceived as deviating from the moral norm,” the authors continued, “thus 
became the proper subjects of medicine.”7 This diagnostic shift cast a wider psychiatric 
net across society and, as a result, more people were ensnared. The idea that “insane” 
behavior was essentially anti-social and immoral in nature, not necessarily caused by 
physiological irregularities, expanded the scope of the psychiatric examination proper. 
No longer confined to the laboratory or asylum, the new psychiatry positioned patients in 
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a much broader context where mental wellbeing was determined by the ability to function 
within society at large—mental disease, and “abnormal behavior” in general, was 
manifested by a patient’s inability to conduct himself in accordance with social norms. 
Henry Maudsley, an English psychiatrist, considered “moral” insanity to be a social 
disease: 
Insanity means essentially then such a want of harmony between the individual 
and his social medium, by reason of some defect or fault of mind in him, as 
prevents him from living and working among his kind in the social organization.8 
 
Emil Kraepelin, the well-known German psychiatrist, thought that the symptoms of 
dementia praecox—the most common form of insanity, and to which adolescents were 
particularly prone—were exhibited not by physiological irregularities in the brain’s 
structure, but by certain behaviors: 
Parents and friends notice that there is a change in the disposition, a laxity in 
morals, a disregard for formerly cherished ideas, a lack of affection toward 
relatives and friends, an absence of their accustomed sympathy, and above all an 
unnatural satisfaction with their own ideas and behavior. They fail to exhibit the 
usual pleasures in their employment.9 
 
 Representing madness as a defect in one’s moral condition, evidenced by the 
failure to adhere to society’s mores and the inability to fulfill certain social expectations 
and obligations, transformed psychiatry from a branch of medicine that studied the 
physiological mind exclusively to one that assessed mental competency based on a 
patient’s possession of vices and lack of virtues. Moral insanity, however, was not a 
structural defect that could be detected through scientific tests; instead, it was a socially 
determined condition. Diagnosing madness, then, occurred in a value-specific context. 
                                                
8 Henry Maudsley, The Pathology of Mind: A Study of its Distempers, Deformities, and Disorders (London: 
Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1979 [1895]), 3. 
9 Emil Kraepelin, Clinical Psychiatry (New York: MacMillan, 1907 [1902]), 225-226. 
 119 
Psychiatry thus constituted a “privileged source of authority” where “experts of 
normality” defined insanity as “violations of the norms of respectable society.”10 
Historian of medicine Roy Porter noted that the profession’s power grew with the 
expanded definition of insanity: “psychiatry seemed to many to turn into society’s 
policeman or gate-keeper, designed to police the boundaries between the sane and the 
insane, the normal and the pathological.”11  
 The boundary that psychiatrists drew between the normal and abnormal ran 
parallel to the one anthropologists had drawn between civilization and primitiveness, 
evidence that changing views of madness were influenced by the same set of racist 
premises that proved so important to other disciplines in the human sciences.  In fact, the 
resemblances between insanity and savagery were so marked that the two were frequently 
conflated into a single category: “The state of primitive thought is nothing more or less 
than insanity, and has its parallel only in our asylums for mental diseases.”12 Both 
primitiveness and madness were regarded as “conditions” in which the individual’s will 
was overpowered by reflexive and irrational impulses. Neither was thought suited to live 
in the modern context, where social order relied on self-restraint and internalized 
controls. Indeed, many savage practices were deemed “insane” by civilized peoples, 
while behavior exhibited by lunatics was often considered “savage.” The similarities 
shared by psychiatric diagnoses and anthropological observations were sometimes 
striking, a point illustrated by two passages quoted below. The first is a psychiatric 
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assessment of a patient suffering from hysteria and mania, the second an anthropologist’s 
testimony of a religious rite conducted by an African priest: 
Then there is much excitement of a noisy and tumultuous kind, with violent 
outbursts of laughter, loud singing, startling yells and cries, and ceaseless 
chattering; sudden starts, leaps, bounds and runs, and impulsive acts of 
apparently wanton mischief or destruction; paroxysms of aimless screaming, 
writhings, strugglings, pushings, strikings in resistance to control, all having a 
show of willfulness yet without definite method or aim.13 
 
The trembling increased, and soon the priest was shuddering as if in an ague fit.  
Every portion of his body seemed to shake; the head, arms, legs, abdomen, and 
pectoral muscles, all quivering violently.  He leaned forward and appeared to be 
endeavoring to vomit, doubtless to give the idea that his body was struggling to 
expel the god which was now supposed to possess him.  A little foam appeared 
on his lips, and from time to time saliva fell on the ground.  Next, with open 
mouth and protruding tongue, and with eyes wildly rolling, he worked himself, 
still seated and quivering violently, into the middle of the arena.  There he 
suddenly leaped in the air, extending his arms over his head, and the quivering 
ceased.  His eyes were closed, his tongue hung from his mouth, and with the slow 
and uncertain gait of a drunken man he walked backwards and forwards.14 
 
In each case, base impulses had gained control over the individual’s will, weakening the 
inhibitive faculty that sane and moral conduct in a civilized society required.  Both the 
hysteric patient and the African priest exhibited insane tendencies because their behavior 
represented the lowest possible kind of activity, “that of pure reflexes. The acts are 
unconscious (at any rate not deliberate), immediate, irresistible, with an adaptation 
invariable and of little complexity.”15 Hysterical behavior was not only irrational and 
impulsive, it was also socially unproductive—its symptoms prevented productive social 
engagement and the hysteric was thought to be a noncontributing member of society, a 
drain upon its resources: 
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This extreme mobility in their state of mind and their affective dispositions, this 
instability of character, this lack of fixity, this absence of stability in their ideas 
and their volitions, explain the incapacity which they experience of giving their 
attention very long to reading, study, or any kind of work.16 
 
 If increasing civilization and social complexity gave birth to a larger population of 
lunatics and madmen, it was because civilization imposed upon its members a strict code 
of conduct that many found difficult to comply with. And in their noncompliance, 
“insane” people demonstrated either an inability or an unwillingness to adapt to the 
demands of modern, civilized life. From a recapitulatory perspective, patients suffering 
from mental illnesses had failed to transition from a state of savage-childhood to one of 
civilized-adulthood—in Hall’s words, insanity was caused by “difficulty and liability of 
failure to pass successfully to the adult stage.”17  If primitives and hysterics shared the 
same symptoms it was because both, in their failure to evolve an “adult” state of mind, 
retained similar juvenile characteristics indicative of arrested development. Kraepelin 
agreed: “The condition of the patients remains essentially the same as it was in youth,” he 
said of people suffering from “unstable” personalities.18 To be insane was to remain 
childlike: hysterics “behave like children that one sets to laughing with noises when they 
still have on their cheeks the tears that they have just shed.”19  
 For children and members of non-European populations the road to maturity was 
fraught with obstacles—both were thought to inhabit pre-modern historical epochs and 
their predisposition to think and act in “uncivilized” ways could impede development. 
And while the child’s future remained unwritten, many anthropologists thought that the 
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lower races had reached a terminal point in their evolution—many considered efforts to 
civilize the lower races to be futile. Psychiatric studies bolstered these prejudices by 
demonstrating that primitive groups were mentally unfit to thrive in a civilized 
environment. Furthermore, many argued that civilization could actually destabilize the 
primitive’s mental constitution.  The argument appealed to some postbellum Americans, 
who considered the presence of freed slaves to be a vexing problem: could a racially 
inferior group be integrated into a modern civilization? On this problem psychiatrists and 
anthropologists generally agreed: Africans were not mentally equipped to meet the 
challenge. Historian John S. Hughes studied the psychiatric response to the problem of 
emancipation and discovered that it was common for members of the medical profession 
to think that the unnatural “forcing” of civilization upon freedmen was psychologically 
damaging. Whereas insanity among African slaves “was scarcely known,” after 
emancipation the number of cases among blacks exploded. Medical men assumed that the  
the radically changed social and economic environment placed unprecedented 
stresses on the freedmen. Emancipation, according to this racial logic, had 
removed African Americans from the protection of slavery and placed them in a 
state of independence and competition in a civilized society for which nature had 
not fitted them.20 
 
Hughes’ findings were confirmed by John Haller, whose research uncovered a significant 
increase of recorded cases of insanity among Negroes after emancipation: “Without a 
proper ancestry conditioned by the responsibilities of freedom and without the education 
or preparedness for responsibility, the Negro citizen, thrust into a modern world which he 
had in no way helped to create, deteriorated under the strain.”21  
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 Hall generally agreed with this diagnosis. Slavery, he thought, had provided 
African descendants with an “easy” life that was free from worry, a condition not unlike 
childhood. Furthermore, the institution had actually been beneficial: it imposed hygienic 
restraints that ensured healthful living, developed a strong work ethic, and protected the 
slave from his own devices—the slave was “kept indoors at night, there were no liquor 
saloons for him to frequent, and in sickness he was cared for.”22 Emancipation had 
interrupted a stable period in the race’s history; life was no longer going to be so carefree: 
when former slaves “became free and invested with the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship, new and heavy demands were made upon his intellect.”23 Many cracked 
under the pressure—in losing their chains, some psychiatrists concluded, former slaves 
also lost their “mental equilibrium.” The prevalence of insanity among freedmen lent 
scientific credence to the assumption that “the Negro in general is a born slave,” unfit to 
live as a free, productive member of American society. 24 It was a notion entertained by 
Hall: “at a certain stage slavery may be the best discipline for lowly races.”25 
Emancipation required refined methods of oppression, where the logic of racial 
inferiority determined more subtle forms of racism. The perceived increase of insanity 
among African Americans provides a telling example of how social context influenced 
scientific theory and, specifically, how social values affected the practice of psychiatry.  
 The “problem of civilization” also frustrated medical workers in the colonial 
setting, and there too natives were frequently diagnosed as suffering from forms of 
insanity—again, the diagnosis was based on an apparent inability to adapt to the demands 
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of Western civilization. Like anthropology, the history of colonial psychiatry—or 
“ethnopsychiatry”—highlights “the important relationship between scientific knowledge 
and colonial domination.”26 Nineteenth-century colonial psychiatry, which assumed that 
“pathology marched in step with civilization,” delivered diagnoses that modeled those 
reached about liberated American slaves: “Most theorists about African madness felt that 
civilization itself brought psychic disturbances to ‘deculturated’ Africans who were 
unprepared for rapid progress.”27 According to another historian of colonial psychiatry, 
behavior “that did not fit in the Western classification was bizarre, exotic, or esoteric, 
thereby sowing the seeds for culture-bound syndromes.”28 
 Recapitulatory theorists learned important, though misguided, lessons from these 
contexts of transition. G. Stanley Hall imported psychiatry’s bleak racial conclusions into 
his theory of adolescent development: if the savage’s transition to civilization was 
synonymous with the child’s transition to adulthood, and if the primitive’s experience 
was marked by psychological difficulties, then young people could also expect to find 
adolescence to be a psychologically taxing period. More alarming was the possibility that 
children would fall victim to the same illnesses and immoralities from which the non-
Westerner suffered when forced to live according to the dictates of a civilization for 
which he was unsuited—if civilization drove the lower races mad, then it also had the 
potential to destabilize their recapitulatory counterparts: 
Among the chief external causes of the diseases of this age are all those 
influences which tend to precocity, e.g. city life with its earlier puberty, higher 
death rate, wider range and greater superficiality of knowledge, observations of 
vice and enhanced temptation, lessened repose, incessant distraction, more 
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impure air, greater liability to contagion, and absence of the sanifying influences 
and repose of nature in country life. At its best, metropolitan life is hard on 
childhood and especially so on pubescents, and children who can not pass these 
years in the country are robbed of a right of childhood that should be inalienable, 
and are exposed to many deleterious influences which jeopardize both health and 
morals.29 
 
 Puberty was the “age when all the greatest problems of life present themselves 
simultaneously.” And for the first time in their lives, adolescents were confronted with 
“the choice of a career and the anxiety about making a living; all the problems of love, 
and for some the religious problems.”30 It was a stressful period, made more so by “the 
tumult of the first stages of puberty, which often threatens decomposition of the 
personality [and when] the psycho-physic organism is peculiarly sensitive.”31 High levels 
of external pressure, coupled with the internal stress that accompanied pubertal 
development, predisposed young people to a host of mental problems. To some degree, 
mental instability was to be expected—adolescents retained residual traces of the lower 
mental processes from early childhood. But what was normal in one stage of 
development was abnormal in another, and the retention of childlike behaviors into 
adolescence—no matter how innocent or natural they may have been—threatened to 
become pathological. 
Psychoses and neuroses abound in early adolescent years more than at any other 
period of life. This causes great emotional strain, which some have described as a 
kind of repressed insanity that is nevertheless normal at this period. To keep 
down morbid impulses is often a very difficult matter in this age of stress.32 
 
This “repressed insanity” was represented by behaviors that inhered in the adolescent’s 
constitution, a peculiar psychic makeup where savage and civilized impulses battled for 
                                                
29 Hall, Adolescence, Vol. 1, 321. 
30 Ibid., 277. 
31 Ibid., 269. 
32 Ibid., 266. 
 126 
control. To fully understand the adolescent’s tendency toward insane behavior required 
sensitivity to the historical and developmental aspects of this period of life, and this 
understanding relied heavily on recapitulatory, anthropological, and evolutionary 
theories. 
we must seek the key to these perversions by addressing ourselves to the larger, 
underlying, and preliminary problem of determining the natural forms of psychic 
and somatic transitions from  childhood to maturity, and study what puberty and 
adolescence really mean as developmental stages of human life which it is the 
purpose of this work to investigate.33 
  
The psychiatrist Henry Maudsley agreed, noting that “mental organization” had been 
inherited from untold generations and that the study of pathology must be “historical and 
social.”34 The historical method of pathological investigation, proposed by Hall and 
Maudsley, helped to bind savages, children, and madmen into a single developmental 
category, where the characteristics of each were conflated into an overarching category 
that, in the end, failed to differentiate between any of them. The point is best illustrated 
by an example drawn from Adolescence. 
 For Hall, puberty was “the birthday of the imagination,” a time when young 
people lived in a state of constant “reverie,” consumed by daydreams and fantasies. It 
was a period of “inner absorption and meditation, when reality fades and its very 
existence is questioned,” and among “many sane children, their own surroundings not 
only shrivel but become dim and shadowy compared with the realm of fancy.”35 The 
imagination, at this age, was a “totalitizing faculty.”  Hall considered the wandering and 
creative adolescent mind to be a normal rehearsal of the recapitulatory drama, and an 
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absolutely necessary one at that. Imagination was an atavistic inheritance and normal 
development required that it be exercised vigorously as individuals recapitulated the 
history of the race. Savages, with their limited intellects, and their inability to distinguish 
between perceptions of the sense and the purely fictional creations of the mind, relied 
heavily on the imagination in the construction of their worldviews—religions and 
countless cultural and spiritual practices were based on the “misconception” that 
experiences of the mind and sense were equally valid. This limitation, thought Herbert 
Spencer, resulted from the fact that primitive people had no concept of “Mind” as an 
internal agent and thus mistook thought for reality; primitives lacked the understanding 
that some experiences were manufactured internally and had no correspondence with real 
world events. It was a characteristic that primitives shared with children: “Like every 
child,” wrote Spencer, “the primitive man passes through a phase of intelligence during 
which there has not yet arisen the power of introspection implied by saying—‘I think—I 
have ideas.’”36 
 The inability to differentiate between one’s ideas and experiences was frequently 
manifested in the primitive practice of assigning reality to dreams. Spencer hypothesized 
that the evolution of supernatural concepts began with the primitive’s inability to 
distinguish between lived experiences and those occurring in a dream state, a hypothesis 
that Durkheim would later employ. Primitive people thought that their dream experiences 
were real and, from the anthropologist’s perspective, this resulted in a confused picture of 
reality—belief in the literal interpretation of dreams made it impossible for primitives to 
create a “true” picture of the world. As dream-experience often contradicted world-
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experience and tended “to cancel the conclusions drawn from day-experiences,”37 belief 
in their validity sometimes resulted in beliefs that were fantastic or “crazy”: in dreams 
physical laws could be transcended and the dead could be resurrected. To primitives these 
experiences were normal and real, but to Westerners believing in them was a sign of 
insanity. Likewise, adolescents were also susceptible to the misinterpretation of dreams, 
which frequently colored their feelings and perceptions.38 
 Proper development, however, required the eventual recognition that the contents 
of one’s mind did not always reflect reality. And to ensure normal development, the 
individual would have to shift his epistemological allegiance from the realm of mental 
imaginings to the world of sense perception. If this never occurred then the developing 
person would not only retain a rude sense of reality that was commonly found among 
savages and children, but his “dreamy conditions may become habitual, so that we see 
here the natural budding of insane perceptions.”39 Emil Kraepelin’s delusional patients 
shared much in common with Hall’s adolescents and Spencer’s savages. Mentally ill 
people experienced hallucinations—the “falsification of real percepts”—and their 
delusions “cannot be corrected either by argument or experience [because] they are 
always due to a morbid interpretation of the events arising in the patient’s own 
imagination.”40 For Kraft-Ebing, patients suffering from morbid delusions experienced 
their hallucinations “with an equal intensity to that of a sensory experience induced by an 
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actual object”—“in the insane the hallucination is mistaken for an objective sensory 
impression.”41  
 In these sources, Hall found psychiatric authorities whose work could be used to 
support his theory of recapitulation. Kraft-Ebing, for example, was of the opinion that 
delusions sometimes stemmed from cultural and historic causes, and were deeply rooted 
in racial psychology—the view supported the belief that insane behavior need not result 
from physiological causes, but was entrenched in the historic legacy of the human race. 
Religious leaders, Mohammed, for instance, were “hallucinated persons” who “controlled 
the delusions and superstitions of their times.” Thus, the “history of hallucinations 
contains a part of the history of the civilization of the peoples and all times” and they “are 
of the greatest importance as giving origin to folklore and fables.”42 
 Insanity, then, had its historical antecedents. It was caused by the retention of 
primitive mental characteristics and demonstrated a failed transition from one 
developmental stage to another. The potential for psychological breakdown threatened 
savages in their encounter with civilization and children on their path to maturity—
success in each case required that one navigate from a condition of natural insanity to a 
culturally imposed state of “sanity.” Both sanity and madness represented “a fulfilled 
possibility of development in some specific direction” and individual development in 
either direction was determined by any number of predetermined evolutionary courses.43 
Hall’s brand of genetic psychology, whether considering pathological behavior or 
otherwise, evaluated individual behavior in relation to the historical context it most 
approximated, and diagnoses were always relative to the evolutionary frameworks he 
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inherited from Darwin, Spencer, Tylor, and others. Hall’s reliance on the hypothetical 
historical record crafted by evolutionary thinkers required a methodological approach 
with a mental horizon vastly widened and with an historic sense less atrophied. 
We have to deal with the archeology of mind, with zones or stratas which 
precede consciousness as we know it, compared to which even it, and especially 
cultured intellect, is an upstart novelty, with everywhere a fuller and clearer 
expression of a part of the soul, but always partial, one-sided, and more 
accidental and precarious.44 
 
 Combined, the lunatic, savage, and child provided the genetic psychologist with a 
valuable record of man’s history of mental development—as with anthropology, the 
method was comparative. The early history of Western man was uncovered by 
excavating the “zones or stratas” of his primitive past. In the case of psychiatry, lunatics 
and savages each exhibited tendencies ranging from the precognitive to the insane, 
behaviors that were at one point common to all developing races. Practitioners who 
employed this historico-developmental methodology would gather data “empirically from 
the comparative study of lower forms of life and of children and from the collation of the 
varied inner and outer experiences of many minds besides his own.” Few goals were 
more important to Hall than gaining “a far larger command of data up and down the 
phyletic scale” because, ultimately, “we really know things only when we trace their 
development from the farthest beginnings through all their stages to maximal maturity 
and decay.” 45  
 As shown in Chapter Two, anthropological studies led to a “precious” kind of 
self-knowledge—Hall also wrote, “the same is true of defectives, criminals, and the 
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insane.”46 The knowledge gained from the genetic study of abnormal and pathological 
conditions, such as insanity, provided insights that could be shocking: in the 
recapitulation of the race’s history, all children briefly experienced a period of temporary 
“insanity.” Abnormality was normal and was to be embraced, at least temporarily and 
within certain boundaries. Hall urged pedagogues to recognize that seemingly insane 
behaviors exhibited by children must be allowed to have an outlet, while simultaneously 
requiring that teachers understand that proper development required the eventual 
cessation of those same behaviors. The education of adolescents entailed finding 
evolutionary balance: if teachers and parents repressed natural behaviors too early in 
development, or allowed them to flourish after they should have passed, then the child 
would certainly suffer. On the one hand, development could be arrested if atavistic urges 
were stamped out before they had the opportunity to develop into something higher. But, 
at the same time, if adolescence was prolonged indefinitely, and if juvenile attributes 
were carried into adulthood, then those once-natural behaviors could become 
pathological. Unfortunately, the modern school had little knowledge of those dangers and 
was, in Hall’s opinion, sadly out of touch with the adolescent’s nature:  
In no civilized land is teaching so unprofessional or school boards at such a low 
level of incompetence. Nowhere are the great traditions of the race so neglected, 
the high school so oblivious to either the nature or the needs, or both, of the 
adolescent stage of life.47 
 
Schools and teachers, unfamiliar with the adolescent’s nature, demanded more from him 
than he was capable, and expected from youth rational behavior and a logical intellect. To 
force young people along such channels was to rush adolescents through the 
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recapitulatory stage in which they had the natural right to linger. Indeed, for Hall the 
primary cause of insanity was precocious development. Forbidding children to express 
their true inner natures, and forcing them into molds for which they were unfitted, was to 
ignore the lessons of evolutionary history. Sometimes it was enough to drive a person 
crazy, just as freed slaves and colonized natives were driven “mad” by the demands 
placed upon them. To return to Maudsley’s notion of the social causes of insanity:  
He who has in him the current social nature of one epoch and is suited to live in it 
may be quite out of harmony with the social thought and feeling of another epoch 
and unsuited to live in it. 48 
 
 Insanity, so defined, was the result of a patient’s inability to conduct oneself in 
accordance with the norms of society. Hall’s contributions, which relied on the theory on 
recapitulation, added another facet to the argument: certain people were evolutionary 
predisposed to conflict with those norms. From this logic it was clear that savages and 
lunatics, both possessing “social natures” unsuited to the contemporary world, would be 
forced to exist outside of it, forever trapped in an undeveloped, child-like state where 
they would be dependent on the care and guidance of others, always requiring oversight 
in an asylum of one kind or another. What remained to be seen, however, was whether or 
not some or many adolescents would join them. The answer to the question depended on 
the educational response to the problem: Hallian pedagogical and developmental 
regimens ensured the successful transition from one “epoch” to the other, whereas 
subscribing to the educational status quo would guarantee the continued increase of 
juvenile insanity. G. Stanley Hall, always the optimist, took solace in the fact that the 
adolescent possessed the potential to adapt to the demands of a civilized world, 
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something his unfortunate counterparts lacked. For the time being, however, they were all 
one. 
   
 
II. Criminality 
G. Stanley Hall devoted an entire chapter of Adolescence to the issue of juvenile crime, a 
problem he considered to be both “profound and complex,” and one that was gaining 
momentum:  
In all civilized lands, criminal statistics show two sad and significant facts: First, 
that there is a marked increase of crime at the age of twelve to fourteen, not in 
crimes of one, but of all kinds, and that this increase continues for a number of 
years…The second fact is that the proportion of juvenile delinquents seems to be 
everywhere increasing and crime is more and more precocious.49 
 
Many thought that the mounting pressures faced by young people in a modern world, 
particularly in urban-industrial environments, caused the increase in juvenile crime. This 
diagnosis modeled the one put forward by psychiatrists, who also sought to account for 
the rise in deviant behavior among nineteenth-century adolescents and oftentimes relied 
on environmentalist explanations. Hall agreed with the premise: “Juvenile crime shows 
thus the great difficulty which youth finds in making adjustments to the social 
surroundings [and in] passing from home to the new conditions of industrial life with its 
ever severer code, control is increasingly difficult.”50 And the changing social context of 
nineteenth-century life did contribute to an increase in crime. Historians have found that 
the Civil War produced “huge numbers of orphans and impoverished fatherless families”; 
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many children were left “unable to support themselves and hence turned to thievery.”51 
Urban and industrial development, which was accompanied by an influx of poor 
immigrants and a declining standard of living, destabilized life and sowed the seeds of 
discontent from which crime grew. As Michael Katz has noted, nineteenth-century 
reformers thought “crime, poverty, immigration, and urbanization were inextricably 
woven together,” and were of the opinion that “cities bred crime [because] they bred 
poverty.”52 With these social and economic changes, America witnessed an explosion in 
the number of “dependent” children who, without the benefit of family, school, work, or 
home, lived as orphans or vagrants, “wander[ing] the streets in great numbers, sometimes 
ending up in poorhouses and jails.”53 For many children, it seemed as if survival 
necessitated engaging in criminal activities. 
 Theft was the most likely crime committed by juvenile delinquents, which, as 
Hall noted, “constitutes more than half the earliest crimes of youth.”54 Michael Katz’s 
study of juvenile crime in mid-nineteenth century Massachusetts confirmed the point: 
most of the “offences involved stealing under one label or another.”55 The problem of 
theft among young people was commonplace and, to some extent, normal: “Theft in 
childhood,” wrote Hall, “is generally to satisfy immediate wants and desires, and it is 
interesting to see how edibles, or thefts of money to procure them, predominate.”56 Most 
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children had been raised in “communal” households where everything around them was 
theirs to take and use, and it was a “long, hard curriculum” to learn that goods in the 
marketplace were not common property—it was understandable that acts of petty larceny 
would be committed by children who simply didn’t know any better, and especially 
among those who were impoverished and destitute. It was certainly a crime was easily 
explained by the theory of recapitulation, which demonstrated that notions of private 
ownership came late in man’s development. 
The earliest form of theft is due to ignorance of what ownership is and means. 
Primitive man under the tribal organization had most things in common, and 
isolation was such that where every community was surrounded by 
unappropriated land and all the fruits of nature and animals of hunt, individual 
possession had a very limited sphere.57 
 
 Less understandable than theft, but certainly more harmful, was the increase in 
criminal vice, or “crimes against purity,” as one nineteenth-century criminologist labeled 
them.58 In Katz’s study, crimes of juvenile “stubbornness,” which were defined as 
transgressions against society’s moral code, included intoxication, lying, profanity, 
sleeping out, truancy, tobacco use, association with low classes, running away, filial 
insubordination, and Sabbath breaking.59 These crimes were less straightforward than 
offences committed against persons or property, as infractions like truancy, gambling, 
drinking, and sexual promiscuity had no assignable victim. But, as violations against 
society’s moral precepts, they were considered more egregious. Labeling such infractions 
“criminal,” however, was an imprecise science and one that relied on the subjective 
judgment of criminologists and other reformers. As historian Lawrence M. Friedman has 
written: “Whatever else it does, the criminal code reflects…some notion of the moral 
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sense of the community—or, to be more accurate, the moral sense of the people who 
count, and who speak out, in the community.” 60 From this perspective, criminality, like 
insanity, was an abnormality defined by a select group of privileged professionals who 
determined which behaviors were normal and which were not; both were relative to 
context and determined by social bias:  
ideas about what is right and wrong ebb and flow, in space and time; what is 
heinous  in one period is shrugged off in another, or even lauded to the 
skies…And of course these values and ideas change over time. The ideas in 
people’s heads reflect their experiences; and their experiences are distinctly time-
bound and culture-bound.61 
 
 Friedman suggests that criminal codes are somewhat arbitrary, determined by 
social context, and written and enforced by privileged and powerful groups whose 
interests are reflected in the very laws they write. Evolutionary thinkers like Hall also 
understood that the “criminal” was not an immutable type, but one that changed with the 
social and ethical needs of any given society. Indeed, some activities deemed criminal by 
the contemporary world would have caused little or no alarm in the past: “Many of our 
greatest criminals would have been normal and perhaps eminently useful citizens in other 
ages and places.”62 The same was true for history’s criminals, some of whom may have 
found a welcome place in the modern world: “Socrates and Jesus were criminals 
according to the legal standards of their day.”63 It was clear to Hall that ancient and 
modern notions of criminality were often antagonistic: 
We confine and kill those who in the days of Abraham and Ulysses or in 
positions of power and influence would be heroes. Of the ten chief crimes of the 
Hebrews of old, only one is now a crime. Many of the knights and barons of the 
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Middle Ages were brigands, but were not then outlawed by public sentiment as 
abnormal.64 
 
In many passages of Adolescence Hall sounds like a strict environmentalist and attributes 
the causes of crime to a more demanding, and sometimes unrealistic, criminal code—if 
more prohibitions led to more crime, then perhaps the cause of increased criminality lay 
in society’s expectations, and not in the criminal’s own flaws: “Extreme views of the 
abnormality of crime may well make us pause, when we reflect on its relativity.”65 But 
Hall’s admission that all criminal codes were relative to time and place did not lead him 
to dismiss their validity. Never did he waver in his conviction that it was the duty of all 
citizens to obey the laws of their land, and he certainly did not condone theft, violence, 
drunkenness, prostitution, or any of the other crimes and vices that plagued modern life. 
“Relative” as the society’s body of laws may have been, Hall’s concern was not with the 
laws per se, but with the great number of people who were having difficulty in obeying 
them. Social living required the subordination of one’s impulses to the legal dictates of 
society, and the pressing question for Hall was why modern man was having an 
increasingly difficult time in doing so. And in asking that question he joined a heated 
debate in criminal studies, one that pitted environmental explanations against hereditary, 
or atavistic, ones: 
Criminal anthropology is a branch of sociology, and its purpose is to investigate 
crime scientifically: to study its origin and causes, and to determine, if possible, 
what proportion of responsibility belongs to society and what to the criminal.66 
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 Hall shared his commitment with both schools, rejecting the nature-nurture 
duality as artificial. On the one hand, he agreed with the environmentalist position that 
criminals were products of the social organism: “Hence the increase of juvenile crime, so 
deplored, is not entirely due to city life or growing youthful depravity, but also to the 
increasing ethical demands of society.”67 But Hall’s commitment to the theory of 
recapitulation ensured that his interpretations of social problems could never be strictly 
environmentalist. Inherent in the theory was an element of biological determinism, which 
often explained an individual’s actions as resulting from atavistic impulses that were 
deeply engrained in man’s nature. In fact, for Hall, all people possessed inherent atavistic 
tendencies that, if unchecked, predisposed them to act in criminal ways: “Who that is 
honest and has true self-knowledge will not confess to recognizing in his own soul the 
germs and possibilities of about every crime, vice, insanity, superstition, and folly in 
conduct ever heard of?”68 Hall was sympathetic toward environmentalist explanations, 
but his allegiance was never total. He was equally indebted to another strand of 
criminological studies, one that located the causes of criminal behavior in inborn defects, 
atavistic reversions, and physiological abnormalities. 
 The most influential advocate of this school was the Italian criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso, who founded the field of criminal anthropology. According to historian of 
criminology Nicole Hahn Rafter, Lombroso’s doctrine was “materialist” and “positivist” 
in that it “invoked a philosophical position according to which all phenomena [could] be 
explained in terms of physical laws.”69 The laws Lombroso relied on were drawn from 
the field of evolutionary biology, and his work was clearly influenced by the theory of 
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recapitulation and its application to anthropometry and anthropology. Lombroso’s 
laboratory investigations had revealed that born criminal types possessed physiological 
atavisms inherited from the race’s primitive past—the criminal, in essence, was a 
reversionary savage who “reproduces physical, psychic, and functional qualities of 
remote ancestors.”70 Born criminals, who accounted for approximately one-third of all 
criminals, possessed the same physiological attributes that physical anthropologists 
thought marked the savage type: prognathous and asymmetrical cranial and facial 
structures; the eyes of the Mongolian type; oddly shaped ears typical of the ancient 
Egyptians; noses like the “Akkas, a tribe of pygmies of Central Africa”; Negroid mouths; 
simian-like teeth—all of these characteristics were “the outward and visible signs of a 
mysterious and complicated process of degeneration, which in the case of the criminal 
evokes evil impulses that are largely of atavistic origin.”71 
 Lombroso’s studies in criminal anthropology were, in the words of Stephen Jay 
Gould, “the most influential doctrine ever to emerge from the anthropometric tradition.”72 
Lombroso’s treatise, Criminal Man, was not available in English until 1911 when his 
daughter published a summarized account of the text, but Americans were familiar with 
his work through secondary sources.73 And those sources were influential—as one 
contemporary noted, “Americans, as a rule, are familiar only with the Italian school” 
which “has continually sought to ally the criminal with animals and barbaric peoples.”74 
Hall’s familiarity with Lombroso’s work is demonstrated by frequent citations in 
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Adolescence. And though Hall was unsatisfied with Lombroso’s strict biological 
determinism and his extremely low opinion of savages (which Hall considered to be 
greatly exaggerated), he did find in Criminal Man a work of “great and epoch-making 
significance” that, if tempered, could serve as a useful model.75  
 Aside from cataloguing marks of physical inferiority, Lombroso also found that 
criminals and savages shared a number of “mental affections”: “in the place of domestic 
and social affections, the criminal is domesticated by a few absorbing passions: vanity, 
impulsiveness, desire for revenge, licentiousness.”76 The savage-criminal was also 
thought to be cynical, treacherous, vain, vindictive, idle, debauched, and lacking in 
remorse—needless to say, Lombroso’s opinion of primitive peoples was extremely low. 
Hall thought Lombroso’s pessimism was excessive, disagreed with his extremist position 
that all savages were essentially criminal, and chided him for ignoring that fact they were 
“mostly virtuous, simple, confiding, light-hearted, amazingly religious and healthful.”77 
What savages did possess, however, were instincts and impulses that became “deviant” 
when exercised in the modern context—if left isolated and to their own devices, primitive 
man’s instincts would not have proven criminal, and it was only when primitives and 
colonizers clashed that their inferiority became manifest and their abnormality 
pronounced: 
If unspoiled by contact with the advanced wave of civilization, which is too often 
its refuse, and in which their best is too often unequally matched against our 
worst, they are mostly virtuous, simple, confiding, affectionate, and peaceful 
among themselves…the faults we see are usually those we have made.78 
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 Lombroso was unsympathetic: “the criminal type results from the aggregate of 
these anomalies, which render him strange and terrible, not only to the scientific 
observer, but to ordinary persons who are capable of an impartial judgment.”79 But 
savage criminality, for Hall, was not caused by an innately evil character, but by the 
imposition of moral and legal standards that were beyond the primitive’s grasp. Western 
law expected from primitive man obeisance to legal codes and moral principles that so 
frequently ran counter to his nature. Such impositions were unrealistic, unnatural, and, 
perhaps, even unfair: “The native to-day is an anomaly in civilization; he cannot 
understand its significance or adjust himself to its requirements.”80 Behaviors that were 
relatively harmless in their appropriate context became criminal and immoral in the 
modern world. Hall and Lombroso agreed that primitives had “pre-modern” impulses, but 
Hall considered Lombroso’s read on savage criminality to be weakened by his failure to 
understand the problems of evolutionary context.  
 Hall’s interpretations of savage and adolescent criminality were essentially the 
same: both possessed natural impulses and struggled to adapt to the constraints that 
modern civilization imposed upon its members. That children possessed impulses that 
were essentially “criminal” was an idea Hall inherited from Lombroso, who thought 
children passed through the same “criminal” stages that savages and born degenerates 
remained in. It was an important point in Lombroso’s work, as Stephen Jay Gould has 
observed: “The recapitulatory argument for natural criminality of children is one of the 
two or three central themes in Lombroso’s fabric—not a mere collateral point.”81 And it 
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was a point that Hall incorporated into Adolescence, and without the criticism he had for 
some of the other aspects of Lombroso’s work. 
Far sounder and more helpful is [Lombroso’s] suggestion that normal children 
often pass through stages of passionate cruelty, laziness, lying, and thievery. He 
reminds us that their vanity, slang, obscenity, contagious imitativeness, their 
absence of moral sense, disregard of property, and violence to each other, 
constitute them criminals in all essential respects, lacking only the strength and 
insight to make their crime dangerous to the communities in which they live.82 
 
Lombroso’s disciple, Enrico Ferri, agreed: “the psychology of the criminal is summed up 
in a defective resistance to criminal tendencies and temptations, due to that ill-balanced 
impulsiveness which characterises children and savages.”83 For the committed 
recapitulationist, understanding crime required the study of both children and savages, as 
both exhibited the earliest forms of the criminal impulse: “Adolescence is the best key to 
the nature of crime. It is essentially antisocial, selfishness, refusing to submit to the laws 
of altruism.”84 
 Criminals, savages, and juvenile delinquents were conflated into a single 
category, with each sharing the same essential natures: each was impulsive, unable to 
delay gratification, and placed their own needs above those of the social whole. The 
adolescent’s natural impulsivity oftentimes clashed with the behaviors and norms 
expected of him, especially when he acted “unconsciously” in a structured society that so 
highly valued reflection and restraint: “Many crimes and immoralities of early 
adolescence,” wrote Hall, “are from a blind impulse on which consciousness does not act 
at all.”85 As seen in the previous section, impulsivity was also a symptom of insanity and, 
indeed, the distinction between criminals and lunatics was not precisely drawn. Kraft-
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Ebing noted, “the dividing line between criminality and insanity is still vague and 
uncertain.”86 Emil Kraepelin considered impulsivity to be a primary trait of both the 
criminal and the madman, and both suffered from the “diminution of the volitional 
impulse…characterized by a marked diminution of personal initiative, except in 
gratification of the lower, selfish, and vegetative impulses, such as greed, gluttony, and 
sexual desire.”87 
 For Hall, the increase in juvenile criminality was caused by the exercise of natural 
impulses in an environment that required their subordination—his understanding of 
youthful deviance was based on both biological and social premises: the social demands 
that society placed on its members were antithetical to the biological impulses that were 
natural to all youth. Hall’s position led him to issue two practical aims concerning 
juvenile criminality: first, the realization that certain behaviors were “natural” required 
that adolescent transgressions be indulged, at least to a degree; and, second, that 
adolescents needed proper guidance to ensure that they develop past the “criminal” stage 
of human history. 
 Among the many natural but potentially dangerous tendencies found among 
adolescents was the “overassertion of individuality.”88 An exaggerated ego could 
manifest itself in antisocial behavior, where selfish aims determined which course of 
action an individual took. It was a trait common to all criminals:  
The welfare and suffering of their fellow-men no longer appeal to them. Even the 
old bonds of family and friendship are loosened and only maintained by habit. 
With this lack of interest in all the higher esthetic and ethical relations of 
civilized life they satisfy their material needs and perform their duties.89 
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During the period of maturation, adolescents shared, for a time, those egotistic and 
impulsive tendencies that were characteristic of savages and criminals, and were equally 
reluctant delay the gratification of those impulses. “The youth who has been amenable to 
advice and even suggestion,” wrote Hall, “now becomes obstreperous, recalcitrant, filled 
with a spirit of opposition.”90 In an environment that demanded self-control, the 
adolescent, like the savage, oftentimes found it difficult to conform and, consequently, 
sought escape. Trapped in an environment that felt repressive, and tempted by their 
atavistic urgings to be free, adolescents 
long[ed] intensely for the utter abandon of a wilder life, and very characteristic is 
the frequent discarding of foot and head dress and even garments in the blind 
instinct to realize again the conditions of primitive man.91 
 
Hall considered such behavior to be a manifestation of the adolescent’s “truant instinct,” 
and when it was at its strongest “tying will not prevent it, and where the child feels the 
impulse to abandon everything and go with the birds, dog, car, circus, clouds, or to see 
where the road goes, to see what will come next, etc., this may be irresistible and almost 
epileptic.”92 
 In the modern context young people were sedentary and stuck in school—at the 
same time, they were impelled by “an instinctive rebellion against limitations of freedom 
and unnatural methods of education.”93 The desire to break free from society’s 
constraints was natural for adolescents, just as savages often resisted the routines of 
civilization and its institutional restrictions. The need for liberty was deeply engrained in 
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man’s consciousness and was part of the phyletic legacy. But, if unrestrained, the urge 
could unfit a person for society, as it had for many criminals: 
Here, then, is an activity of the soul, woven into legends and folk-lore, is 
discussed in history and science, and affects profoundly the social and domestic 
life of a people. An instinct that destroys for the time being even the activities 
that provide for the immediate wants of life, that drives out considerations for 
home, relatives and friends, that overpowers the sympathetic, the domestic, the 
home-making spirit of man, that unfits him for static toil and conditions, and 
impels him to seek a change, the new, strange and untried.94 
 
Alexander Chamberlain, a colleague of Hall’s, made a similar point: 
A savage, a soldier, a lover, a child best of all, knows what it is to be homesick, 
and to feel that loss of liberty which makes life scarcely worth the living, and for 
which all the ‘advantages’ of so-called civilisation are but a mean 
compensation.95 
  
 Adolescents, like savages, could not be expected to conform to a society’s legal or 
moral code without difficulty; governing one’s behavior in accordance with society’s 
expectations was a skill to be learned and, more importantly, it was a hard one for 
adolescents to master. What modern criminology required was an awareness of the 
child’s unique nature and an acceptance that “normal” behavior had to be developed, not 
simply expected. “Thus the problem of criminology for youth can not be based on the 
principles now recognized for adults.”96 It was just as problematic to expect sound moral 
judgments from adolescents as it was to hold primitives to the same standards expected of 
civilized men: “By nature, children are more or less morally blind, and statistics show 
that between thirteen and sixteen incorrigibility is between two and three times as great as 
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at any other age.”97 If reformers remained unaware of the child’s true nature, then the 
statistics of juvenile criminality would continue to rise and more institutions of detention 
would have to be built. 
 Hall’s commitment to the theory of recapitulation required that the study of 
juvenile delinquency, like all social ills, be informed by the principles of racial 
phylogeny. And a historical awareness, based on phylogenetic insight, of the problem of 
criminality led to two realizations: first, practices outlawed by modern society were once 
normal, natural, and evolutionarily advantageous; and, second, young people necessarily 
experienced a period in their lives where “criminal” instincts surfaced. Criminal behavior 
was evidence of man’s past—its tendencies were atavistic, and the study of criminal 
practices revealed historical lessons in the same way that anthropological study did. Thus, 
the study of the criminal, like the study of the savage, could result in an improved self-
understanding among the civilized races. It also suggested that criminal activities in the 
colonial realm should be understood as a natural conflict that arose when one society 
imposed its moral and legal customs upon another’s: “Race instincts are amenable to 
primitive custom, and not to the laws of civilization.”98 An informed colonial policy, as 
we will see in the next chapter, would have to come to terms with the fact that civilizing 
efforts sometimes ran counter to the nature of its subjects. 
 Criminal impulses dwelled within, explaining why adolescents were not only 
drawn toward criminal activity but also deeply interested in it: 
Vice and crime are so manifold and diversified, so highly colored with genuine 
human interests, and open such wide fields of originality and differentiation of 
human varieties, that it is no wonder that the feral traits of man often seem so 
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attractive to children and even to women, compared to the more monotonous, 
tamed, and toned down humdrum life of good citizenship.99 
 
Children on the verge of adolescence were not equipped with the same level of moral 
behavior that was to be expected from adults, and Hall thought that it was normal for 
young boys commit infractions: “Morally he should have been through many if not most 
forms of what parents and teachers commonly call badness.”  
He should have fought, whipped and been whipped, used language offensive to 
the prude and to the prim precisian, been in some scrapes, had something to do 
with bad, if more with good activities, and been exposed to and already 
recovering from as many forms of ethical mumps and measles…100 
 
Indeed, Hall continued, something was “amiss with the lad of ten who is very good, 
studious, industrious, thoughtful, altruistic, quiet, polite, respectful, obedient, 
gentlemanly, orderly, always in good toilet, docile to reason, who turns away from stories 
that reek with gore, prefers adult companionship to that of his mates, refuses all low 
associates, speaks standard English, or is pious and deeply in love with religious services 
as the typical maiden teacher or the à la mode parent wishes.”101  
 “Antisocial” behavior, which was perfectly normal in boyhood, would, if retained 
into adulthood, become pathological; previously “mild” forms of criminality would 
metastasize and become  “depraved.”102 Indeed, the traits of normal boyhood 
“naughtiness,” if carried into adulthood would render a person “savage or half-animal”—
what was natural for boys was abnormal for adults. Tylor made the point clearly: 
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in a sober fact, a Londoner who should attempt to lead the atrocious life which 
the real may lead with impunity and even respect, would be a criminal only 
allowed to follow his savage models during his short intervals out of gaol.103 
 
In the literature, the adult criminal is eerily similar to Tylor and Lombroso’s savages, as 
well as Hall’s naughty boy, which speaks to the fact that criminals were regarded as 
backwards and childlike. Among the many traits of the habitual criminal, Kraepelin 
included the inability to “perform exacting, intellectual work,” unaffectionate, selfish, 
egotistic, vain, idle, foolish, possessing “weak sentimentality,” impulsive, and vulgar.104 
Hall also found in adult criminals a host of juvenile attributes: “Criminals are much like 
overgrown children—egoistic, foppish, impulsive, gluttonous, blind to the rights of 
others.”105 
 Hall’s understanding of man’s criminal legacy, then, allowed him to promote an 
attitude toward young people that was indulgent—he embraced the young person’s 
waywardness. In a sense, Hall’s work liberated young people, for it provided them with a 
good deal of leeway in a society that was often oppressive. At the same time, however, 
phyletic explanations of criminality reinforced ideas of the essential “badness” of young 
people—recapitulatory logic concluded that all young people were, at some point in their 
development, overtaken by criminal impulses. It is likely that the second part of Hall’s 
theory had more lasting impact an than the first—ironically, Adolescence may have 
reinforced the very attitudes toward children that it was hoping to change. 
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III.  Sexual Deviance 
Adolescence was a revolutionary work in that it positioned the developing adolescent 
along a number of different evolutionary frameworks; at the same time, however, there 
was much about the book that was traditional. Historian Jeffrey P. Moran, who has 
written on the history of adolescent sexuality, noted that Hall’s work was very much in 
step with the moral climate of the day: “he employed almost exclusively the traditional 
materials of Victorian sexual respectability [and he] placed chastity and self-denial 
directly at the center of his interpretation.”106 Hall’s biographer, Dorothy Ross, agreed, 
noting that Hall’s sexual views fell very much in line with Victorian attitudes: “Hall’s 
idealization of sexual intercourse was only a more enthusiastic and positive rendering of 
the doctrine propounded by guardians of Victorian respectability, that physical love, to be 
permissible, had to be hallowed by respectable ends beyond itself. As such it was typical 
of many reformers of sex in America during this period.”107 Historian Bryan Strong has 
shown that the idea of sexual repression was part and parcel of the nineteenth-century 
world, influencing many of society’s other values: 
Because repressed sexuality was believed to provide the force for creating values, 
chastity and sexual restraint were directly related to the middle-class 
constellation of values that included work, industry, good habits, piety, and noble 
ideals. Indeed, without sexual repression it was believed impossible or such 
values to exist in an ideal character. It a man were pure, he would be frugal, hard 
working, temperate, and governed by habit. If, on the other hand, he were 
impure, he would also be a spendthrift, disposed to speculation, whiskey-
drinking, and ruled by his impulses.108 
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Medical men considered the inability to control one’s sexual impulse to be not only a 
moral failing, but also a psychiatric disorder. Kraft-Ebing diagnosed patients suffering 
from “hyperesthesia” as being unable to inhibit the sexual drive, resulting in the “reckless 
expression” of sexual desires:  
[he] desires sexual gratification at any price, and as a substitute may abandon 
himself to onanism or sodomy. The nymphomaniacal woman seeks to attract men 
by exhibition or lustful gestures, and at the sight of them becomes extremely 
excited sexually and may resort to onanism or ‘imitatio coitus.’109 
 
 Dorothy Ross and Jeffrey Mann are correct: G. Stanley Hall was no sexual 
iconoclast and his opinions on the subject were properly “Victorian.” Masturbation was 
“one of the very saddest of all the aspects of human weakness” and “the most perfect type 
of individual vice and sin,” while unrestrained sexual activity led to racial degeneration: 
“The ascendant individual family or stock is the one that refuses to yield in excess to the 
temptation of the flesh, and the descendants are those whose instincts for selfish 
gratification preponderate over those of race-conservatism.”110 But Hall’s sexual 
conservatism was not wholly in step with his times, for he promoted open and honest 
discussion of sexual matters; this constituted a departure from the nineteenth-century 
cultish commitment to silence. Sexual education at the time of Adolescence’s publication, 
writes one historian, was nonexistent: “The traditional method of educating children 
concerning sex was not to educate them at all and to allow the silence regarding sex to 
indicate the necessity of repressing its expression.”111 But Hall insisted that the 
importance of the subject forbade silence and he advocated that problems such as 
homosexuality and masturbation, both of which were epidemic among the adolescent 
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population, be discussed candidly. And though problems like masturbation were “painful 
to consider,” the traditional model of non-education had surely failed. “Until recently [the 
topic of masturbation] has been met on the one hand with either prudery and painstaking 
reticence or treated in terms of exaggerated horror, as in the ‘scare’ and quack 
literature.”112 Sex needed studying and, to an extent, it was worthy of celebration.  
 Predictably, sex concerned adolescents more than anyone else, for puberty 
marked the period when the sexual impulse awoke and when the individual was most 
susceptible to morbid development. Thus Hall plunged into the subject with great 
enthusiasm, treating his readers to some of the most colorful passages found in 
Adolescence: 
As this vast subject looms up to the psychologist and he begins to catch glimpses 
of its long-neglected wealth and beauty overgrown with foul and noxious 
fungoids and haunted by all the evil spirits that curse human life…he realizes that 
it is his preeminent prerogative and duty, from which it would be base cowardice 
to shrink, to sound a cry of warning in terms plain enough if possible to shock 
both quacks and prudes, who have, the one perverted, and the other obscured, the 
plain path of life for adolescence.113 
  
Curiously, however, Hall’s strategy for investigating adolescent sexuality deviated 
somewhat from the method he employed in examining youthful insanity and criminality. 
In all three cases he was concerned with abnormal development, but his treatment of 
adolescent sexual pathology did not rely on evidence that demonstrated the presence of 
morbidities in primitive society—savages were not claimed to be obsessive about 
masturbation, prone to homosexual orgies, or extremely loose in their ways. Hall thought 
that primitive culture often gave sex an excessive role in customs, rites, and mythologies, 
but he did not consider those groups to be any more perverse than modern man. An 
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opposite conclusion could have easily been reached, however, as the anthropological 
record was peppered with characterizations of low sexual morality among savage 
groups—quoting from two volumes found in Hall’s bibliography: 
The chastity of women does not appear to be held in much estimation [by the 
Andaman Islanders]. The husband will, for a trifling present, lend his wife to a 
stranger, and the loan may be protracted by increasing the value of the present.114 
 
 
Some priestesses have as many as half-a-dozen men in their train at one time, and 
may, on great occasions, be seen walking in state, followed by them.  Their life is 
one continual round of debauchery and sensuality, and when excited by the dance 
they frequently abandon themselves to the wildest excesses.  Such a career of 
profligacy soon leaves its impress upon them, and their countenances are 
generally remarkable for an expression of the grossest sensuality.115 
 
 
 In light of such “evidence,” it was surprising that Hall did not utilize it—linking 
savage sexual degeneracy to the problem of juvenile sexuality would have made perfect 
recapitulatory sense; the argument was begging to be made. But Hall did not consider the 
savage’s sense of sexual morality to be lagging significantly behind civilized man’s. In 
considering masturbation, for instance, Hall offered his readers this surprising 
conclusion: “the whole literature of the subject attests that…the Occident has little, if 
any, advantage over the sad records of the Orient, and that civilized man is on the whole, 
to say the least, no better, if not far worse, in this respect that his savage brother.”116 Nor 
were primitives necessarily lacking in sexual propriety, as one of Hall’s sources from 
Philippines made clear: 
one might imagine that morality would be at a low ebb among a people whose 
women are almost without modesty, and where all alike agree that there is no 
future life nor any sure retribution for evil deeds in this. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. Such a thing as a faithless wife is almost unknown.117 
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And, frequently, when Hall found that sexual vice did exist among primitive groups he 
attributed its cause to the influence of white settlers, who mistreated native women and 
spread venereal diseases. “The barbarities of trappers and the villainies of fur traders and 
the vices of borderers are mainly responsible for the present bad character of the 
Indians.”118 
 Hall relied heavily on the work of Havelock Ellis, the British psychologist who 
studied sex from an evolutionary point of view and paid careful attention to the sexual 
practices of savages. Ellis was quite liberal for his day and his multi-volume effort 
Studies in the Psychology of Sex was extremely graphic—not at all typical of the period. 
Ellis was a progressive influence on Hall’s work, and it is likely that his high opinion of 
savage sexual morality came from Ellis, whose extensive researches did not find lower 
cultures to be sexually depraved. On the topic of homosexuality, Ellis noted that it “is at 
least as marked in civilization as it is in savagery.”119 He also found, as Hall would, that 
masturbation was practiced “among the people of nearly every race of which we have any 
intimate knowledge” and did not consider it be a defect that was peculiar to primitive 
groups. In fact, thought Ellis, it was quite possible that “auto-eroticism” was increasing 
with civilization, caused in part by the many modern apparatuses that stimulated sexual 
feelings, including hobby horses, climbing poles, sewing machines, bicycles, and tightly 
laced clothing: “I refer to the effects that, naturally or unnaturally, may be produced by 
many of the objects and implements of daily life that do not normally come in direct 
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contact with the sexual organs.”120 Despite its causes, both Hall and Ellis called for a 
more balanced discussion concerning the dangers of masturbation, and both were 
interested in putting to rest the many myths that terrorized youth: “The brain is not 
literally drained away; dementia, idiocy, palsy, and sudden death are not imminent, nor is 
there any peculiar infallible expression, attitude, or any other manifestation instantly 
recognizable by experts.”121  
 The bulk of Hall’s discussion on sex focused on masturbation and nocturnal 
emissions, and the method, as mentioned, was a departure from the rest of Adolescence. 
Sexual problems were dealt with in a rather technical way and with an eye toward 
developing “curative” strategies. Specific abnormalities were not correlated with phyletic 
precedents. There were, however, general similarities between savage and adolescent 
sexuality.  In particular, each devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to 
matters sexual. Adolescents were consumed by sex: “My distinguished teacher, Ludwig, 
the leading physiologist of the time, once told me that he thought that for some years 
about nine-tenths of the psychic processes of adolescents centered in sex and its 
functions.”122 Hall also thought that the sexual instinct was more pronounced in primitive 
societies than among civilized cultures, as evidenced by the strong sexual content in 
primitive myths and religious rites. Modern societies, thought Hall, tended to sublimate 
the sexual instinct more thoroughly, and sex did not as often rise to the surface of modern 
life. The phyletic record seemed to prove the theory, as history and anthropology 
provided “abundant evidence that the race has had a sexual consciousness more all-
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dominating and pervasive than now appears, and many a conception in nearly if not quite 
all religions, primitive, ethnic, or Christian, shows many traces of having been slowly 
sublimated and refined out of these bases.”123 Recapitulation suggested to Hall that 
adolescents would have to follow the same course—a deep interest in sex followed by its 
sublimation in higher ideals, such as love, art, and altruism. The key point, however, was 
that Hall was referring to interest in sexuality, and not to its practice.  
 Hall did not portray adolescents as wild, sexual beasts prone to orgies and driven 
by an insatiable sexual passion; nor were they chaste—sex was central to the adolescent 
experience: “Neither the psychology nor the pedagogy of adolescence can be treated 
without careful consideration of the whole problem of sex.”124 As with other impulses 
that could become morbid if not properly developed, Hall issued the same 
recommendations when it came to sex: the child’s exhibition of desires and needs that 
may have seemed unsavory to adults were the phyletic manifestations of impulses rooted 
deep in the race’s consciousness. Premature suppression would lead to arrested 
development, while giving them too much leeway would ensure pathological 
development. The great problem of adolescent sexuality lay in resolving the tension 
between the young person’s deep-seated urge to express his sexual side and to explore 
sexual themes while living in a context that was highly repressive: 
It is, therefore, one of the cardinal sins against youth to repress healthy thoughts 
of sex at the proper age, because thus the mind itself is darkened and its wings 
clipped for many of the higher intuitions, which the supreme muse of common 
sense at this its psychologic moment ought to give. If youth are left to themselves 
and the contagion of most environments, this mental stimulus takes a low turn 
toward lewd imaginations and vile conceptions, which undermine the strength of 
virtue, and instead of helping upward and making invulnerable against all 
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temptation, it makes virtue safe only in its absence and prepares the way for a 
fall, when its full stress is first felt.125 
 
 Left alone, youth were likely to be tempted to engage in sexual experimentation, 
which could be detrimental to their development. Adolescent sexual activity, which 
rarely served the purpose of procreation, was thought to greatly tax both body and mind. 
Hall subscribed to the popular nineteenth-century belief that the semen possessed 
regenerative power, and that when 
not expended [it was] absorbed by the blood. The reabsorption of these seminal 
cells enabled the young male to develop his body…If the physically mature man 
refrained from sexual excesses and remained continent, then the semen was 
absorbed by the blood and was carried to the brain where it was ‘coined into new 
thoughts’…This explanation, however much disguised as science, in reality 
reflected the dominant morality since its actual function was to offer positive 
rewards for sexual repression.126 
 
Hall believed that sperm had the power to destroy disease-causing toxins that lived in the 
blood and that its loss was a “drain upon the system.” Reabsorbed sperm “freshened” 
nerve tissue, while its expenditure led to weakness, depression, physical and nervous 
exhaustion, and a host of other health problems.127 Consequently, 
The most rigid chastity of fancy, heart, and body is physiologically and 
psychologically as well as ethically imperative till maturity is complete on into 
the twenties…Restraint is now true manhood and makes races ascendant and not 
descendant, while from the plant world up, prematurity, that goes too early to 
seed, means caducity. The perfected adolescent will now have systematized his 
ideals.128 
 
If the theory was true, then the prevalence of sexual excessiveness among primitive 
groups would have presented Hall and others with a difficult challenge—if all savages 
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were sexually degenerate then the race as a whole would never have had the physical or 
mental energy to evolve. Whereas criminal or mental “abnormalities” had once been 
evolutionarily advantageous, sexual perversions had not—the Victorian science of 
sexuality did not allow for a salacious period of race history. Consequently, for the theory 
of recapitulation, adolescents never inhabited a period of all-consuming perversion. But, 
while sexual degeneracy may not have been a historical problem, it was a present one. 
Sexual deviance, then, was envisioned differently from other forms of moral 
abnormality—the focus of its examination lay on the individual and the future, rather 
than on the race and the past. Hall’s studies on sex do not flow with the rest of 
Adolescence. 
 The theory of recapitulation notwithstanding, sexual excess was still a problem 
facing adolescents—as seen in previous sections, young people struggled to restrain 
themselves and oftentimes found it difficult to control their impulses. Consequently, 
sexual pathologies were statistically more likely to develop at this age than at any other: 
“I believe that it is in this stage of development that sexual perversions of certain classes 
are rooted.”129 Most perversions, thought Hall, were manifested in fetishistic peculiarities 
in which the sexual feelings were assigned to something (or someone) for which nature 
had not intended—at adolescence, he wrote, before young people had firm command of 
their desires and drives, “the sexual glow may come to be associated with almost any act 
or object whatever and give it an unique and otherwise inexplicable prominence in the 
life of the individual.”130 And later in Adolescence: “In the degenerate soul, the whole 
energy of love may center upon some single trait which may thus come to play a 
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disproportionate or even demiurgic part in the life of sex.”131 Again, Hall could have 
examined the fetishistic practices of savage groups, as many anthropologists did, but he 
refrained from doing so—once more, sexual perversion was explained as a degenerative 
process, and not an evolutionary one; and sexual deviance was an ontogenetic problem, 
not a phylogenetic one. In a telling passage, Hall even advocated Freud’s theory that 
sexual neuroses were rooted in early childhood experiences and traumas, a stance that 
had little value from a recapitulatory point of view.132 
 What did separate savage from civilized men was the level to which they could 
sublimate their sexual urges. Higher societies redirected their sexual energies to broader 
feelings of “love”—expressed through art, in caring for the young and infirm, in serving 
the community, and, later, in a “love of the race” as a whole. Ultimately, the most 
advanced societies would be attain an all-encompassing love that knew no bounds: 
The final stage is love of being or of all that exists, visible and invisible. The 
ontological passion culminates thus in a mystic devotion to the absolute in which 
self is forever merged and swallowed up, and the mind and life find their 
supreme virtue in anticipating and accepting with joy their inevitable final fate.133 
 
But, again, the problem of recapitulation presented itself, and Hall was forced to admit 
that “perhaps no individual or race passes through all these stages in the phenomenology 
of love, for neither a single personal nor even one ethnic soul is large enough to do justice 
to them all.”134 But the lesson remained clear: sublimation was necessary to develop into 
something higher and those who submitted to sexual temptation were certain to miss out 
on much that life had to offer: “Alas for those in whom this experience is mutilated by 
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premature or excessive experience in Venusberg, for these can never know the highest, 
largest, and deepest things of life!”135 Sexual deviance may not have been part of man’s 
history, but its increase ensured that the race’s future would be greatly affected by it. 
Sexual perversion and pathology could destroy the evolutionary progress that had taken 
so long to achieve, resulting in a weakened and degenerate race. But, with the proper 
guidance, G. Stanley Hall’s adolescent could play a special role in ensuring that this did 
not happen—it was a heavy burden to carry. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Adolescence was not without contradictions, a point acknowledged by historian Joseph F. 
Kett: “The doctrine [of recapitulation] justified the prolongation of adolescence, the 
removal of pressures for accelerated development, although it was also a source of some 
repressive conclusions.”136 Kett’s observation is an important one. In Adolescence Hall 
intended to demonstrate that young people possessed a nature that was different from the 
adult’s and thus could not be expected to conform to the stringent regulations of modern, 
civilized life—in that sense the book was a program for the liberation of the American 
adolescent. But in allying young people with savages, criminals, lunatics, and sexual 
misfits, Hall demonstrated that the adolescent’s nature was, essentially, a deviant one—in 
that sense Adolescence was a justification for the oppression of young people. After all, 
none of the adolescent’s recapitulatory siblings was permitted to live free and 
unmolested; each was institutionalized, considered to be a menace to society, and forced 
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to become “civilized.” In many ways, then, Adolescence was a dangerous book, even if 
that hadn’t been the intention of its author. What remains to be seen, however, was the 
influence that Hall’s ideas had on the education and treatment of young people. Did his 
work help to liberate adolescents, or did it contribute to their subjugation? The final two 
chapters seek to address that important question.
 161 
 
Chapter Four 
The Child Study Movement and the Application of Recapitulatory Science 
 
Child-study is a life-process. 
T.P. Bailey (1900)1 
 
I. Child Study and the Dissemination of a New Science 
By the early 1890s child study had become a professionalized discipline, insofar as it 
possessed the trappings of a specialized field: academic chairs, a particular cant, private 
meetings, and selective journals. But in terms of credentialing, another measure of 
professionalization, it lagged behind many other disciplines. Practically any person, at 
any time, could become a child studier—no certifications or licenses were required to 
conduct studies upon children and no centralized regulatory agency existed to ensure that 
those studies were properly carried out. The movement’s leaders, who sought to elevate 
child study to the same status as medicine or law, were sometimes made self-conscious 
and insecure by the fact that their discipline attracted amateurs. But, humbling as the 
presence of non-specialists may have been, their participation was necessary if child 
study was to flourish. Child study was not designed to be a mere academic exercise. It 
was a movement with ambitious practical goals and sought to reform the way normal 
people—parents and teachers—interacted with their charges. This required that child 
study be inclusive, and though a hint of academic snobbery was always evident in the 
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publications of university men, they clearly realized that success depended on the 
cooperation of a broad range of individuals.  
To enlist allies, a public relations and marketing campaign was waged to 
familiarize and sell child study to the nonacademic world; public familiarity with child 
study was essential if the movement was to take root in homes and schools. Thus the 
movement’s journal of record, the Pedagogical Seminary, though a specialized academic 
publication, was also an organ that sought to attract university outsiders. The Seminary 
led a campaign of conversion that attempted to proselytize those in the university as well 
as school administrators, teacher educators, teachers themselves, and even parents. It also 
sought to inform the public by making vast amounts of complex scholarly information 
available and accessible. To this end, Hall marketed the journal as a kind of digest that 
would provide casual readers with summaries of recently published child study and 
educational literature; condensed within one of the early editions were “17,000 pages of 
carefully selected and recent educational literature” boiled down to manageable 
proportions for those who lacked the time and ability to keep up with an expanding body 
of professional literature.2  
The colonels of the child study movement had a vested interest in keeping the 
public informed about the goings-on of the movement—familiarity led to acceptance, and 
acceptance to implementation. The movement’s success depended on the enlistment of 
amateur and semi-professional partners; real-world practitioners who could help 
academics achieve their important goals.3 The business of child study was, quite simply, 
far too large an operation for university-based experts to go it alone. They hadn’t the time 
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to analyze and collect data, develop policy recommendations and implement them; 
consequently, they came to rely heavily on those who spent the most time with children: 
parents and teachers. Necessity required a mixing of the educational ranks, which 
generated a good deal of cooperation and fluidity in the movement—mothers organized 
and presented at conferences, teachers collected data for university professors, and 
normal school principals worked in concert with school superintendents. The 
movement’s power, however, always remained centralized: orders and fiats were issued 
from above and the movement’s agenda was set by an elite group of university men. 
Atop the child study pyramid sat G. Stanley Hall and his colleagues at Clark 
University.  From his privileged position as the President of Clark and editor of the 
Pedagogical Seminary, Hall portrayed child study as a cure to a very real crisis, one that 
threatened to undo civilization itself—his rhetoric infused into the movement a sense of 
urgency and moral obligation. In Hall’s view, America’s school children were under 
attack, underserved by an educational system that was dangerous and harmful because it 
was wholly ignorant of the developmental aspects of child-life. Hall promoted his agenda 
in language that was dramatic and hyperbolic and his writings were crafted to strike the 
reader’s emotional chords, hoping to convince his audience to take quick and decisive 
action. From the second number of the Seminary: 
Indeed the mutilation which so powerful an engine as the modern school may 
inflict upon the tender souls and bodies of our children, and thus upon our entire 
national future, is too little realized. Let us hope it will not bring a sick or sterile 
epoch upon the world as Catholicism is sometimes said to have had caused the 
dark ages…The only safety lies in the study of and better adaptation to the nature 
and needs of childhood.4 
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Child study was marketed as a scientific undertaking that would benefit any group that 
interacted with children. And to promulgate this message, the movement’s leaders crafted 
a program of dissemination that broadcast across the entire educational spectrum—the 
aim was to generate such a buzz that any and all groups involved with the instruction and 
rearing of children would be attracted to the solutions offered up by Hall and his 
colleagues.  
The work of many different parties necessitated a careful division of labor, to 
ensure that each had a role to play in the movement. Those roles were carefully defined 
by the movement’s leaders and orchestrated into a coherent whole. University professors, 
naturally, stood at the top of the child study hierarchy and were responsible for 
formulating a body of scientific knowledge that outlined the child’s developmental needs 
as determined by researches in the recapitulatory sciences. Below them were normal- and 
public school officials, who would train teachers and spearhead reform in professional 
development and classroom instruction. Teachers followed, and they were expected to 
adapt their pedagogical techniques and lesson plans to the movement’s suggestions. 
Finally, parents were called into action, with the hope that children would be reared in the 
home using strategies that were harmonious with the progressive techniques employed by 
a school informed by the findings of child study. The movement was splintered into a 
number of different factions, but there remained a great deal of cohesion. Each had its 
own particular methods of inquiry, social and scientific rationales, and relationship with 
the child, but they were all to work to the same end. Moreover, each group depended on 
the next—university professors set the agenda for normal school principals and other 
administrators; those groups, in turn, dictated the role that teachers would play in the 
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movement; finally, teachers oversaw the involvement and education of parental child 
studiers. The result was a well-oiled and consensual movement that was able to assert 
itself across a wide section of society.  
University professors stood at the fore, and the ranking member of this elite corps 
was the psychologist G. Stanley Hall. Speaking at the National Education Association’s 
annual meeting in 1905, the president of the Department of Child Study said in his 
address that “no one before Dr. Hall had taken up child-life scientifically, and by more 
thorough and extended investigations into the psychic and psychical life of the child 
[which] has revealed to us the nature and activities and phases of development of the 
child’s mind.”5 Hall was something of a legend in these matters, and rightly so. His 
seminal essay “The Contents of Children’s Minds on Entering School,” published in 
1883 and researched for a series of Harvard lectures, became the model for scientific 
pedagogy and the official beginning of the child study movement in America.6 After an 
indecisive and slow start in the academic world, Hall, forty at the time of the essay’s 
publication, rose meteorically: in 1884 he was appointed full professor of pedagogy and 
psychology at Johns Hopkins, a premier research institution; in 1887 he became a co-
founder of The American Journal of Psychology and a year later he accepted the 
presidency of Clark University, a newly endowed graduate institution that stressed 
research and scientific investigation. In 1891 Hall founded and became sole editor of the 
Pedagogical Seminary, the child study movement’s official organ; and, finally, in 1904 
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Hall published his magnum opus, Adolescence, the culmination of two decades’ 
commitment to child study. Clark, under Hall’s tenure, promoted child study tirelessly, 
provided the movement with institutional leadership, and helped to ensure that the 
development of the new discipline adhered to rigorous academic standards.  
University professors, “eminent scientists” who sought to elevate the study of 
children to the same prominence enjoyed by other scientific professions, served as the 
movement’s leaders.7 These scientists organized themselves under Hall, many working 
by his side at Clark University and publishing in his journal. In the Seminary’s second 
number, Hall noted that child study would have to imitate the other academic disciplines 
if the project was to be taken seriously: “The entire modern world is coming to be more 
and more in the hands of experts and specialists educated to the very frontier of their 
subjects,” he wrote, imploring educators to follow suit.8 If the primary role of modern 
research universities such as Hopkins and Clark was to train specialized academics, then 
Hall’s contribution to that end would be the development of scholars whose expertise on 
children was unmatched. It was, for him, an almost holy project:  
 
It is the Universities which largely determine whether a land is cursed by a 
fictitious, superstitious, half-cultured clergy, or blessed by ministers of divine 
Truth who understand and believe the doctrines they teach, who can attract and 
enlarge the learned…9 
 
 
 Should the truth be found, and Hall expected that it would, the Pedagogical Seminary 
would spread it to the rest of the world, debunking entrenched myths about childhood and 
initiating a new and enlightened age in education. Gathered in the Seminary’s pages 
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would be the latest scientific data on the development of children; it was to be a journal 
of science “which cannot fail to be definite and meaty, and will not go to seed in dogmas, 
formulae, and abstractions.”10 Hall outlined the duties that the professorial, university-
based branch of child studiers were to perform: the development of a “science” of 
education based on the study of children and influenced by recapitulatory science; to 
supply leadership to the rest of the educational world; and to disseminate their findings in 
university course offerings, at professional conferences, and in publications, both 
scholarly and popular. An educated and expert leadership would make converts to the 
movement by elevating child study to the same level as the university’s other scientific 
programs.  
At the heart of the university-based program was the goal of creating unity and 
consensus among the rank and file, for it would be difficult to implement reform in the 
face of dissent and conflict. Child studiers hoped to bring order to an educational system 
they thought was in disarray: an “anarchy that reigns supreme in the domain of general 
pedagogy,” wrote one, caused by a “collection of bitterly opposed sects, each of which 
believes that salvation of the world lays upon its own dogmas and that all other pedagogy 
is a delusion and snare.”11 But an objective science could calm the educational waters, 
and it was the university’s job, thought many in the movement, to develop that science: 
let it be frankly admitted that a scientific study of childhood, which shall give 
results so reliable that we may accept them and abide by them, must be carried 
out by expert investigators, whose schooling, training, high aims, and facilities 
for the work shall command our acceptance of the results of their 
investigations.12 
 
                                                
10 G. Stanley Hall, “Editorial,” Pedagogical Seminary 1 (No. 1, 1891), vi. 
11 E.W. Scripture,  “Education as a Science,” Pedagogical Seminary 2 (No. 1, 1892), 114. 
12 Anna Buckbee, “Methods of Teaching Child Study in Normal Schools,” Journal of Proceedings and 
Addresses, NEA (1904), 790. 
 168 
The university’s work, when “purified of deceit and error, is rounded to completeness, 
culture will have abandoned much useless luggage, the chasm between instruction and 
education will be less disastrous, and all the highest and most sacred human ideals will 
not be lost or dimmed but will become nearer and more real.”13 Scientific child study 
promised to usher in an era of pedagogical truth and harmony, but it would take a highly 
trained corps of specialized experts to accomplish this task. Through such rhetoric, 
millennial and evangelical in tone, the professional child studiers created an aura of crisis 
and urgency. But, at the same time, they promoted their movement as the solution. 
Success depended on communicating those messages to the rest of the educational 
community, and they did so vigorously. 
The first line of attack was with school administrators and normal school faculty, 
the movement’s lieutenants. Both groups were assigned considerably powerful roles in 
the promotion of child study and their primary role was to act as the intermediaries 
between the development of theory and its practical implementation. As one theoretician 
noted, knowing well that school administrators would ultimately decide whether or not 
his work would reach the classrooms, “Inside the school are the children; outside are the 
sciences to help; at the door stands the schoolmaster.”14 School administrators controlled 
access to teachers and students and child studiers had to convince those officials to allow 
them into the schools they were attempting to reform. But administrators possessed other 
powers as well: an informed superintendent or principal could arouse interest in child 
study by familiarizing teachers with its message and by allowing them to pursue their 
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own investigations. Child study experts urged school administrators to give teachers the 
freedom that the discipline required: 
Complete success, both with the teachers of the present and the future, will 
depend on the independent, enthusiastic, self-active investigations of the teachers 
themselves. They must be made free from the blight of domination and inspired 
with self-reverence. They must be originative as well as imaginative, in order that 
they may grow.15 
 
Another ensured his readers that “everything which discourages true growth and 
originality in teachers is wrong,” suggesting to school officials that they grant teachers 
the autonomy to conduct investigations and reform their teaching techniques according to 
the findings of child study.16 But administrators were encouraged to take active roles 
within the movement as well; its promoters promised that a school official informed by 
the findings of child study would be a more effective one: 
A superintendent or principal, with keen perceptions exercised or developed by 
practice, will, in one swift glance, often detect hidden factors, and vastly 
increases the probabilities of giving the correct advice to a nonplussed teacher, 
besides gaining increased respect from teacher and scholar for power to penetrate 
character and detect motives.17 
 
G. Stanley Hall perceived two major means of advancing and reforming education 
in line with the findings of child study. The first spoke directly to school administrators 
and focused on the “administrative-logical” processes of schooling—here administrative 
officials would direct change through restructuring, reorganization, and campaigning for 
legislative reform. The other method of reform, focusing on the “internal or bio-
psychological” processes, was the responsibility of theoreticians and practitioners. It 
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focused on the procedural aspects of education, or the reformation of classroom practices 
based on the findings of child study.18 Hall’s vision required that both arms of the reform 
process work in tandem, ensuring that theory and practice sought the same ends. Hall 
clearly understood the complexities involved in a reform effort that sought to overhaul 
the entire educational system and knew that success depended upon a shared commitment 
between the various participants involved. In a movement that divided its labor, 
cooperation was important, especially among administrators who ultimately controlled 
access to the schools. Principals and superintendents were to be the “directors” of the 
movement, performing the “mechanical work” of allowing access and promoting 
implementation, and Hall sought to ally the administrative arm with the rest of the 
movement’s participants.19 
Public school officials were mentioned frequently in the child study literature, and 
though they did play a role in the discipline’s meetings and publications, far more 
attention was given to the faculty and administration of the normal schools. The 
movement invested greater hope in the next generation of teachers, was far more 
vigorous in its appeal to those who oversaw their education, and spoke more frequently to 
them though publications. The child studiers viewed in-service teachers with suspicion. 
They were thought to be less malleable than pre-service teachers, fast in their ways, 
skeptical, and with “little time, opportunity, or capacity” to relearn their art; besides, the 
observations and generalizations of poorly trained, in-service teachers were often 
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“lacking intelligent direction” and were likely to “come to but little.”20 It is interesting 
that the movement did not devise a training program for teachers who already had control 
of a classroom, but not surprising—logistically it would have been very difficult.  
The training of pre-service teachers, however, commanded more attention and 
offered greater promise. And normal school faculty, compared with school officials who 
worked with practicing teachers, were given the greater role in spreading child study. 
School officials only had to demonstrate their commitment by providing access; it would 
not be their job to develop child study as a science. Their contribution was different from 
that expected of normal school faculty, whose primary contribution would be the 
transmission of a “science” of childhood that would influence the classroom practices of 
prospective teachers. Both groups acted as intermediaries between the development of 
theory and the implementation of those ideas into practice, earning for each specialized 
places within the movement. Normal school personnel would transmit to future teachers 
the science that had been discovered and worked out at the university. Faculty and 
students in the normal school would teach and study the new “science,” but its experts 
made it clear that their contributions were to be limited.  
 Even though it was imperative that future teachers be educated in the science of 
child study, child studiers always made it clear that teachers were not scientists. And 
normal school faculty, careful not to tread on the ground of their university colleagues, 
agreed. Said one normal school principal, the “teacher in training or in actual service can 
be interested in the advancement of child study as a science only incidentally.”21 A major 
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concern of child-science at the university level was the discovery of generalizations that 
explained the developmental history of the human race as a whole, which in turn led to 
the “discovery” the child-soul and the reformulation of method and content. This 
ambitious program necessitated collecting and collating vast amounts of data, a 
familiarity with all other work done in the field, and a thorough knowledge of many 
different disciplines, including biology, anthropology, and psychology. “Child science,” 
as defined at the university level, was deemed inappropriate for teacher education 
programs, which focused primarily on the practical application of the movement’s 
pedagogical findings.  
 Science was actually anathema to a teacher’s education, for the scientist’s cold 
and unfeeling eye was not appropriate in the classroom. Therefore, love for the child, 
rather than a love of science, was advocated and cultivated within the normal school 
program of studies. Child study at the classroom level meant unraveling the mystery of 
each individual—not in trying to understand how the study of children informed the 
study of the human race. For teachers, child study was an undertaking that focused on 
individuals and not on conceptual, phylogenetic generalizations: “the teacher’s chief 
interest is not in the child of five years of age, nor the child of the first grade, but in Mary 
Smith, Johnny Brown, and Susan Jones.”22 This was an important differentiation in the 
roles of child scientists: the university scientists would unveil the nature of children as a 
whole, while the teacher would uncover the individual’s nature. University men worked 
with a set of masculine and scientific tools—objectivity, precision, logical explanations—
while teachers carried a feminine toolbox that contained empathy, love, and concern. The 
kind of child scientist that the normal school nurtured was, in fact, not a scientist as all: 
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I believe that those who study boys and girls for the love of child study, for the 
love of science, rather than for the love of children, will in time be obliged to 
confess that they have lost the power to appreciate the highest and the best that is 
in the child.23 
 
Child study in the normal school continued to wear the label “science,” and though it did 
carry some attributes that were “scientific,” it was, for the most part, a domesticated 
science where particular methodologies “were always of less importance than the interest, 
sympathy, intelligence, [and] persistence which the teacher brings to the work.”24 Still, it 
was an important role: academic generalizations could be made only after teachers had 
supplied them with enough individual data—knowledge of the individual, supplied by 
teachers, allowed child study experts to formulate broad conclusions. 
 The questions relevant to the normal school curriculum were sometimes 
ambitious—“what does [the child] demand in school environment and equipment, in the 
physical life of the schools, in curriculum, method, and organization, to give him sound 
development and make him more efficient?”—but, for the most part, the concern lay in a 
more basic question: what does this particular child need in order to learn?25 To answer 
the question did not require a bag of methodological tricks or scientific premises, but a 
distinct attitude and a particular way of thinking, acting, and being. The appropriate role 
for the normal school was to awaken interest and zeal among its students. Learning this 
“science” depended more on the learner’s attitude and less on scientific methods, and the 
end result would not illustrate immutable truths so much as it would fit the classroom to 
the needs of its members: “the main impulse which sustains our understanding comes not 
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from a conviction of the direct service that it may be capable of rendering to science, but 
from witnessing its strong and wholesome influence upon all who engage in it.”26 Unlike 
earlier reform movements, child study was not attempting to reform the child; rather, it 
was seeking to reform those who worked with children. Child study was in many respects 
an educational program for teachers, and this program delivered an ideology that placed 
the teacher below the child, specific knowledge below interest, and the whole underneath 
the individual. 
This attitude was developed in the normal school curriculum by conducting 
observations of children. The Worcester Normal School, in Massachusetts, required that 
students spend hours carefully observing children, an exercise that was common to many 
teacher training programs. To quote from Worcester’s catalog: 
The principal requests the students to observe the conduct of children in all 
circumstances—at home, at school, in the street, at work, at play, in conversation 
with one another and with adults—and record what they see and hear as soon as 
circumstances will permit.27 
 
Students at the State Normal School in Pennsylvania kept their observations organized in 
“child journals,” booklets students recorded information on children ranging from 
physical measurements, habits, and diet, to any number of miscellaneous observations 
that may have been of interest. This practice was not very methodic, and students, it 
seems, more or less simply jotted down what children said and did. They were instructed 
to not carry specific questions into these sessions; in fact, such baggage could interfere 
with observations and distract them from seeing other more interesting and significant 
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things: “To try to find what, induces a better habit of observation, we find, than to try to 
see whether.”28 The lack of hypothesis and guiding questions led some critics to suggest 
that this was a flimsy science with limited practical value. As John Dewey wrote, 
Its [the child study movement’s] final value for the great mass of teachers will be 
measured by the extent to which it enables a teacher to see more accurately and 
adequately into the different individual pupils that present themselves. More 
general theories about children are no substitutes for insight into children.29 
 
Another critic suggested that the method of collecting random observations by a single 
person had little value and that there “seems to be no agreement as to what is really worth 
studying.”30 
 But normal school students were not autonomous and enterprising child studiers 
who published their findings and drew generalizations about child-life; rather, they were 
employing a method—be it scientific or not—in order to foster a more harmonious and 
sympathetic relationship with the child while, at the same time, providing researchers 
with raw data. The principal of the normal school in Worcester gave the rationale for the 
exercise: 
It is the gathering of these [facts], in greater numbers, that constitutes the simple 
task of our students. They are to report everything they can get hold of that goes 
to make up the manifold activities of children’s lives; and they are to reject 
nothing because it seems remote or trivial, for they can never tell at the moment 
what significance may lurk unperceived in the most ordinary or the most 
extraordinary word or act or gesture.31 
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The data were to be collected in a disinterested manner, or with “disinterested interest.”32 
This task required an open mind and a willingness to record even events that seemed 
insignificant and unimportant; it also meant that the observer had to efface herself to 
some degree: “she must forget that she is a teacher, must enter unreservedly and joyfully 
into the child’s world, adopt his language, accept his ways, and learn to live intimately 
with him, and share on equal terms his aims and interests.”33 The teacher-observer, then, 
entered the child’s world secretly and in disguise. She was “to make a friend of him” and 
was “very careful not to let the child know that any especial study is being made of 
him.”34 The type of surveillance described in these writings is secretive, participatory, 
and total: 
[The observer] may frequent the haunts of the street urchin, and note how one lad 
succeeds in conveying an idea to another; note the way in which a motive impels 
an action; the effort spent to achieve a purpose...in brief, he may discover the 
way which a live, natural boy perceives, reproduces, apperceives, cognizes, 
recognizes, interprets, creates.35 
 
Total surveillance—studying children in all of their various “haunts”—was necessary 
because it was believed that schoolroom observations provided an incomplete picture of 
the child’s nature. A primary goal of the child study movement, it should be remembered, 
was to harmonize the school with the child’s nature; this goal was predicated on the idea 
that the school, as it stood, ran counter to that nature: “Nature inclines the normal child to 
free and almost incessant activity; the modern school requires him to sit still.”36 Thus, to 
obtain an accurate picture of a child’s true nature, the child studier had to venture outside 
the confines of the school. Only by gaining an understanding of the child could the school 
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adapt itself to the needs of that child; this method alone ensured that the school’s regimen 
would become “plastic to the needs of the growth of childhood.”37 
 Observation and fact collecting, however, were the means to an end; these 
practices alone did not sufficiently unveil the child’s true nature and interests. The 
teacher had to recognize the child, to be sure, but she was also asked to “experience” him: 
“the teacher...must live, to some extent, the life of some thirty to forty children everyday 
she is in the classroom.”38 Teachers, over time and through an education that had literally 
beat their childhood nature out of them, had forgotten what it was like to be children—if 
they had ever been allowed to be children in the first place. Child study, then, was also a 
process of personal rediscovery requiring the teacher to open her heart and quiet her 
head. Teachers should not overly concern themselves with the child’s intellect, wrote 
Hall, for it is “not the intellect, but the heart of the adult and child [that] are most alike; 
therefore appeal to the heart, which is the strength and source of life.”39 Consequently, 
child study “awakens a true love for children” and brought teachers and students “in 
bonds of sympathy so close as to make the work of the schoolroom full of joy and 
pleasure.”40 Empathy with children would provide teachers with a compassionate 
understanding that could only redirect educational reform in positive ways. 
 Teachers in training were taught a method of inquiry that would reform the way 
they taught and interacted with children. The methodology advocated an emotional 
approach, but it did possess some “scientific” characteristics: it was secretive (the 
observer learned to “efface himself and conceal his purpose, to keep note-book and pencil 
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out of sight and feign preoccupation, watching the child, as it were, out of the side of the 
eye”), objective (freed from “sentiment of any kind”), and total (“study the children at 
home, at school, everywhere”).41 Though the methodology did possess some trappings of 
scientific investigation requiring specialized training, it was, for the most part, an 
unintellectual endeavor where personality and emotions counted more than scientific 
scrutiny. By adopting the ideology of the child study movement, normal schools prepared 
teachers for a particular strand of pedagogical thought in which catering to the child’s 
interests, and molding the schoolhouse and its curriculum to their natures, took 
precedence over the traditional, content-based academic pedagogy which had, 
theretofore, comprised educational practice. 
 Below teachers, both practicing and aspiring, stood parents, the final group 
targeted by the child study movement. Parents and teachers, for the most part, shared the 
same nonscientific methodology and the study of children by parents would reform and 
remake the adult-child home relationship in much the same way that it would change 
relationships at school—again, the watchwords were sympathy and love, and the goal 
was to bring home-life into accord with children’s natures and interests. The benefits of 
adapting the schoolhouse to the child’s nature, it was thought, would be undermined if 
the home continued to raise children in ways that ran counter to nature’s decree, and the 
movement insisted that the private sphere harmonize its aims with those of the school: 
“Teachers must know the individual’s home life and utilize his home-past in establishing 
an easy transition to the school-present.”42 This reform ideology, then, knew no 
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boundaries, and it sought influence well beyond the schoolroom: “with a thorough 
knowledge of the recent works on child training, it would seem that no child should grow 
up unsystematically, with so much wisdom waiting to be applied.” In fact, all the promise 
and progress of child study would come to naught unless all that was learned “enter[ed] 
into the life of the home.”43  
 Child study would make its way into the home via teachers, forging a new 
relationship between educators and parents. As mentioned, the two groups had much in 
common, and their missions could be easily harmonized: both were concerned with 
practical ends, and the means by which those ends would be achieved required that both 
parties be in tune with the needs and interests of children. Teachers, in this context, 
became the experts, and parents the students. After all, teachers did possess specialized 
training, institutional support, and the earned credentials that parents lacked; parents, on 
the other hand, generally derived their expertise from experiences that were unsystematic 
and theoretically groundless. Parental deference to the “experts,” then, secured teachers’ 
power in a movement where they generally lacked it, elevated the scientific respectability 
of classroom-based child study, and helped to justify and legitimize the entire venture.  
 As should be clear by this point, the attitude of the professoriate toward the strand 
of child study practiced in the schools was somewhat superior and condescending. Said 
one university professor, “perhaps [child study as conducted by teachers] is not worthy of 
the name ‘child study.’ It can lay no claim to scientific and analytic value.”44  Such 
rhetoric, while securing the power of university child studiers, certainly threatened the 
legitimacy of the teacher’s work in the movement. But teachers themselves were able to 
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retain some shred of scientific legitimacy by taking inexperienced and uneducated 
parents under their wings. In doing so, teachers were able to appropriate the criticisms 
directed at them and shift them onto a new and unsuspecting audience: “Possibly such 
work as parents can do may not properly be called child study,” wrote one teacher, 
sounding very much like the professor quoted above.45  
 The child study hierarchy was cooperative but not democratic. Its participants 
were insulated from one another, and this secured for each a relatively autonomous 
position within the movement—all groups were able to acquire all of the hallmarks of 
professional expertise as outlined by Burton Bledstein: an esoteric body of knowledge, a 
period of theoretical training, and earned credentials.46 The qualifications were often 
defined by what the lower group lacked, and each group (with the exception of parents, 
who really had no professional interest at stake) stood superior to the next in terms of 
exactly how esoteric the knowledge was, how long the period of training had taken, and 
how prestigious the credentials were. The result of this organizational pattern was 
twofold: first, it divided one group from the others—normal school faculty, for instance, 
had a mission very different from the one assigned to university professors. A second 
consequence was that each group became an indispensable component of a large and 
powerful movement—the division of child study’s labor ensured that each group had a 
specific role to play; the entire scheme would founder without cooperation. The child 
study movement succeeded brilliantly in this regard—it introduced into the pedagogical 
conversation an impending crisis and developed an institutional response that spanned 
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from the university to the living room. Thus, child study affected all educators at all 
times, and, for a time, it was a very “potent force in American education.”47  
 
 
II. The Syllabus Method 
 
The university-based child studiers were remarkably successful in their campaign to 
promote their discipline. Interest in child study exploded in the 1890s, leading one 
member of the movement to claim that “there is a wholesome interest in Child Study 
from the pine trees of Maine to the peaceful waters of the Pacific.”48 G. Stanley Hall 
wrote, “It would take long to enumerate the academic chairs, the journals, and the 
important books all new in the field, where so little was lately definitely known.”49 A 
major reason for child study’s successful spread was that it was made accessible to many 
different participants, with a diverse number of groups finding within the movement 
something that interested them specifically. As one historian of the movement has 
written, 
Child study bridged the gap between pseudoscientific philosophical speculations 
and a true science of the child, between “rational” education and educational 
psychology, between sentimental, romantic, permissive child-rearing attitudes 
and modern child-rearing based on scientific principles.50  
 
The blending of scientific respectability with a romantic idea of childhood made child 
study appealing to different groups, and for different reasons, explaining why it “caught 
the imagination and enthusiasm of parents and teachers as well as of educators, 
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philosophers, and psychologists.” Indeed, few “could have foreseen the tremendous 
stimulation and growth of interest in the study of children that was to typify the 
movement.”51 Ironically, popularity ultimately proved to be a crippling weakness; as one 
historian has noted, widespread appeal eventually discredited the movement itself: “Child 
study became disreputable and lost popularity since perceived as a movement of 
amateurs.”52 And it was, in fact, a movement comprised largely of amateurs. Though a 
small band of eminent university men led from the top, they relied heavily on the 
involvement of nonspecialists who collected data and, for the most part, actually 
conducted a bulk of the studies produced throughout the 1890s and into the twentieth 
century. 
 Most of the studies published in the Pedagogical Seminary relied on massive sets 
of data collected by schoolteachers from across the country. From Clark University, Hall 
and his colleagues issued topical questionnaires, or syllabi, that focused on particular 
subjects they wished to study, such as children’s fears and friendships, the contents of 
their imagination, or their relationships with toys and pets. Armed with these sets of 
predetermined questions, teachers presented them to their students, and they did so under 
strict instructions: they were not to offer assistance or color their student’s answers in any 
way. There was no right or wrong involved; what was sought was an unadulterated 
glimpse into the child’s mind, “a sound and intimate knowledge of the child’s character, 
in all its manifoldness and unity.”53 The role of teachers, then, was merely mechanical, 
and child studiers hoped that the minimization of the teacher’s influence would provide 
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data that was “uncolored and unclouded by a present personality.”54 Despite this limited 
role, however, it did provide teachers with an important place within the movement. As 
Dorothy Ross has written, the topical syllabi supplied “the glue which held a great 
majority of the teacher participants to child study.”55 Teacher involvement achieved two 
goals set by the movement’s leaders: first, their participation proved indispensable in 
collecting large sets of data; and, second, their membership ensured that teachers would 
become familiar with the basic tenets of child study itself. Many of the ideas explored in 
previous chapters, such as the theory of recapitulation, were fundamental components of 
the movement’s philosophy, and involving teachers was a way to broadcast those ideas 
beyond academia and into the nation’s classrooms. 
 The completed questionnaires were returned to Clark, where the data were 
analyzed, conclusions drawn, and results published. Child studiers had great faith in the 
questionnaire method and considered it to have many advantages. Most important, syllabi 
provided researchers with high volumes of untarnished, “objective” data. Large studies 
were thought to be superior to investigations that focused on a small number of children 
and relied on the competence of a single observer—data derived from such studies, 
however valuable, were insufficient in meeting the movement’s ambitious goal of 
understanding childhood as a whole. As one scholar noted, “where returns from hundreds 
or thousands are involved, individual errors obliterate each other. For these reasons, the 
results are likely to be more generally applicable than those of a more careful study of a 
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more limited area.”56 Another advantage of the syllabi method was that it allowed 
researchers to study all ages at one time, making it unnecessary to follow a cohort over its 
entire educational career. Most important, however, was that the open-ended nature of the 
syllabus freed children from the expectations and pressures that may have been exerted 
by a more forceful or invasive investigative technique: syllabic investigation allowed for 
creativity and spontaneity. Children, who generally knew “nothing of the purpose of the 
theme” on which they were being questioned, were encouraged to jot down whatever 
popped into their heads, providing researchers with many surprising bits of information 
that would have otherwise gone unnoticed.57 Child studiers hoped that the method would 
lead to significant reforms: “If we could get at the child’s inner life, could look upon the 
world through his eyes, it seems plain that we should know him in part, live with him 
more intelligently, treat him more fairly.”58 
 The movement was extremely vigorous in its campaign to distribute syllabi 
throughout the American school system. Between 1894 and 1896, a particularly active 
moment in the movement’s history, Clark University sent out thirty-one syllabi on a 
diverse number of topics to numerous individuals, mother’s organizations, teachers and 
normal schools, women’s clubs, and collegiate alumnae groups. By mid-1896 more than 
60,000 returns had poured back into the offices at Clark.59 The syllabi method generated 
reams of data, an amount that would have been otherwise impossible without the 
assistance of so many helpers on the ground. And though the project did involve 
collaboration between teachers and university researchers, the roles were clearly divided 
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and always maintained—teachers did not write the questionnaires, tabulate the students’ 
answers, or formulate conclusions from the data; after all, that was “the work of scientific 
investigation, and should be left to those who are interested in discovering some new 
general truth.”60 
 The syllabi focused on any number of themes, all of which sought to answer two 
primary questions. The first concerned the interests of children, which child studiers 
considered to be “sacred.”61 “Interest,” wrote one member of the field, “is one of the most 
significant words in our educational vocabulary,” and one of the most important goals of 
the movement was to retool the school’s curricula in ways that served the child’s 
interest—an uninteresting curriculum was thought to have no impact on the child.62 
Topical questionnaires could elucidate children’s interests and Hall recommended that 
teachers and parents pay close attention to times when those interests were manifest. 
Indeed, in one syllabus issued by Hall, he requested that parents and teachers simply 
record moments of curiosity and interest, as determined by the kinds of questions 
children asked: “Perhaps nothing gives a clearer view of the activity of the child’s mind, 
and its varied interests, than a list of miscellaneous questions selected on no other basis 
than that they show thought and observation.”63 Once collected and analyzed, the 
information gained from the studies would inform classroom practice by determining 
what interests were predominant during the different stages of childhood, suggesting to 
practitioners what content should be reflected in the school’s curriculum. On the practical 
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application of interest-based studies, Hall wrote, “it will be the best and surest norm for 
ascertaining when all such matter can be taught with greatest economy and with most 
effectiveness, and will also shed great light upon methods of instruction.”64 
 More ambitious was the second aim of child study: to derive from topical syllabi a 
genetic picture of the evolutionary development of childhood and the race. For Hall and 
others, the manifestation of interest always spoke to a deeper truth, and the tabulation of 
those interests contributed to the formation of a genetic history of mankind by 
highlighting atavistic tendencies inherited from the race. “The child is first of all a bunch 
of keys,” Hall wrote, “capable of unlocking most of the secrets of the entire history of 
life.”65 As syllabi captured children’s responses to certain questions, they revealed 
countless “phylogenetic analogies”—or instances when a child’s behavior reflected the 
behavior of past civilizations.66 As interested as Hall was in reforming educational 
practice, he was more interested in developing a psychological system that analyzed 
individual behavior from a historical, or genetic, point of view—without genetic 
psychology, he thought, proper educational reform would be an impossible dream.67 For 
Hall, the study of children was equally a study of human history. It was this theory, the 
“general psychonomic law,” that gave rise to Hall’s recapitulatory conclusions. 
 The idea that children’s actions and thoughts were manifestations of atavistic 
impulses was one Hall took from Edward B. Tylor, the anthropologist who most 
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influenced Hall’s work. Tylor’s theory of the progressive development of human 
civilization was based largely on his theory of survivals, which held that evolving 
cultures or societies retained characteristics of their evolutionary predecessors. It was a 
theory that smacked of recapitulation and thus found a welcome place in Hall’s work—in 
Tylor’s words, survivals 
are processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by 
force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had 
their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older 
condition of culture out of which a newer has been evolved.68 
 
For Tylor, the customs or traditions of any group, no matter how absurd, irrational, or 
pointless they may have seemed, could be explained by locating their historical 
precedents—the theory of survivals was, in fact, an overarching theory of psychological 
causation that explained human behavior historically. And, in Tylor’s words, it 
“remov[es] from our view of human thought and action the ideas of chance and arbitrary 
invention, and in substituting for them a theory of development by the co-operation of 
individual men.”69 
 Accordingly, “illogical” behaviors were believed to be remnants of archaic 
practices that had once served important social purposes. Superstitions, the practice of 
occult science, the belief in magic, the lure of games of chance, nonsensical sayings, 
proverbs and riddles, and a whole host of customary rites were all thought to be survivals. 
For Tylor, their study demonstrated “how direct and close the connexion may be between 
modern culture and the condition of the rudest savage.”70 As seen in previous chapters, 
the retention of atavistic tendencies or behaviors was often found among “abnormal” 
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groups such as lunatics or criminals. Tylor agreed with the premise, and took great 
interest in studying contemporary peoples who were not fully in step with the rest of 
society. The spiritualist movements that were sweeping Europe and America at the time, 
which could count among its disciples “tens of thousands,” were in reality “a direct 
revival from the regions of savage philosophy and peasant folk-lore.”71 Tylor thought that 
the rise of witchcraft in medieval Europe and during the American colonial period was 
also evidence of an ancient survival: witchcraft “had been chronic among the lower races 
for how many ages we cannot tell. Witchcraft is part and parcel of savage life.”72 And, 
finally, the sometimes-baffling behaviors of children could be explained by atavistic 
inheritances and savage reversions: 
Children’s sports, popular sayings, absurd customs, may be practically 
unimportant, but are not philosophically insignificant, bearing as they do on 
some of the most instructive phases of early culture. Ugly and cruel superstitions 
may prove to be relics of primitive barbarism.73 
 
Thus, the behavior of children could always be “examined with an eye to ethnological 
lessons to be gained from them.”74 An analysis of games commonly played by children, 
for instance, was instructive: “As games thus keep up the record of primitive warlike arts, 
so they reproduce, in what are at once sports and little children’s lessons, early stages in 
the history of child-like tribes of mankind.”75 Tylor’s theory of survivals influenced other 
anthropologists as well, and the idea commonly appeared in field’s literature. Discussing 
its influence on the field of folklore, for instance, J.W. Powell wrote, 
Remember it [folklore] is the science of superstitions, and the science must deal 
with the fundamental errors of mankind (as the phenomena of nature have been 
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interpreted by savage and barbaric peoples), and how these errors as vestigial 
phenomena have remained over in civilization and are still entertained.76 
 
The theory of survivals proved extremely influential in Hall’s studies of children, both in 
the Seminary and in Adolescence.  
 The syllabi studies published in the Pedagogical Seminary always sought to 
answer the phylogenetic question prompted by Tylor and other recapitulatory thinkers, 
and the behavior of children was analyzed historically through the lenses of evolution and 
recapitulation. The Seminary studies, then, always addressed two issues:  first, what 
children were most interested in at different stages of their development, with the aim of 
modifying school curricula to ensure that those interests were taught to; and, second, how 
those interests elucidated the developmental history of humankind. Unfortunately, the 
studies’ results were rarely organized by the evolutionary framework that Hall held so 
dear—the data gathered from children of all different ages were mixed into one bag of 
conclusions, and, consequently, adolescence was not frequently separated from other 
stages of childhood. Instead, children were lumped into a monolithic category, all 
resembling savage and primitive types, but not precisely correlated with specific races or 
groups. It was a major flaw in the method, though one Hall tried to correct in 
Adolescence. As Dorothy Ross had written, 
Often [Hall] suggested that a child’s impulse was a hereditary survival from a 
much earlier age and that it had features in common with certain characteristics 
of primitive cultures, but he was never able to show that the timetable of 
evolution indicated to what age of childhood the impulse belonged.77  
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The Seminary studies were quite formulaic, and all followed the same rubric—an 
examination of several reveals the common pattern that they followed, and provides a 
deeper understanding of the ideas that fueled the movement as a whole.  
 In 1904 Hall co-authored a study titled “How Children Think and Feel About 
Clouds,” an attempt to measure children’s interests in clouds while, at the same time, 
determining the role that cloud-based lore or superstition had played throughout the 
course of human history. The study, like all others, began with a set of questions asked to 
children: What are bright clouds on a sunny day made of, and what are they for? What 
have you fancied you saw in the clouds? How did the prettiest and brightest ones you 
ever saw make you feel? The questionnaire generated 461 returns, composed of material 
that was “heterogeneous and from different places; gathered on different methods, from 
different ages.”78 Hall and his colleague sorted the data thematically. For instance, the 
study yielded a number of responses concerning cloud representations, 373 animate, 226 
inanimate, which, in turn, were organized into more specific categories. Hall was 
astounded by the richness of the data: 
One is again struck by the variousness of the appeal made by the clouds, or the 
responses to them. They can arouse impulses that run the entire gamut of feeling; 
that touch every chord of sentiment, from the smooth and gentle to the loud and 
terrible. The strongest feelings appear to be those of fear, longing, joy or delight, 
reverence and awe. The appeal is both aesthetic and ethical.79 
  
 Children’s responses were compared to cloud references found in works of 
anthropology and mythology in an attempt to trace their ideas about clouds to primitive 
survivals. The Seminary studies almost always cited anthropological and mythical 
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literature, the primary source material from which evidence of survivals was drawn. Hall 
assumed that similarities between the feelings that children harbored toward clouds and 
references made about clouds in a particular culture’s myths provided important 
historical insight—similarities were never regarded as coincidence, but as pieces of 
evidence that supported the theory of recapitulation. Referencing the work of 
anthropologists demonstrated what ideas and behaviors were learned and which were 
truly atavistic; any response that found precedent in the anthropological record was 
thought to indicate a proven instance of atavism. Sounding very much like Tylor himself, 
Hall wrote, 
Thus a very large proportion [of children’s ideas] may be traced to suggestions 
derived from external nature, to tales or stories read or heard and to the nursery 
yarns of old grannies. How many are due to reversions, or ancestral 
adumbrations, as automatically operative without any external prompting?80 
 
When correlations between children’s responses and the beliefs of primitive peoples were 
found, Hall assumed that he had found a “phylogenetic analogy”: an instance of universal 
racial interest that existed within the core of human experience. The fear of dark clouds, 
for instance, was present in both children and in the lore of primitive peoples, suggesting 
that   
The idea of the dark or thunder clouds as bringing harm is common in the 
individual history of the child and the history of the race. In the former, the basis 
of experience is far too slight to account for the intensity of the emotions 
aroused, and for its explanation we must turn from the history of the individual to 
the history of the race.81 
 
 
 The value of the cloud study, Hall concluded, was that it revealed a universal 
interest, shared by all children and all peoples throughout the course of history—the 
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child’s interest in clouds was an atavistic inheritance—and though the subject may have 
seemed to some trivial, if not mundane, Hall regarded it as another piece of evidence in 
his phylogenetic puzzle. Furthermore, he suggested that universal interests, once 
discovered, should be embraced by the school’s curriculum; the cloud study, like all of 
Hall’s syllabi studies, concluded with a piece of practical advice directed to school 
officials: 
A half-hour twice, or even once a week, systematically devoted as a regular part 
of the school exercises, to watching the colors, motion changes and positions of 
clouds, would have a practical value in relieving the overstrain of the eyes from 
close application. The subsequent writing down of all impressions would furnish 
an exercise in language study and the mental life of the child would be enriched 
and broadened.82 
 
 No less interesting was Hall’s “A Study of Dolls,” published in 1896. The doll 
syllabus was composed of eleven questions and was submitted to eight hundred teachers; 
results were also gathered from letters written by reminiscing adults, observations of 
mothers, and compositions written by high school- and normal school students. (It was 
common practice to generate conclusions from mixed sets of data.) Hall was particularly 
interested in anthropomorphic themes—many primitives attributed human characteristics 
to objects and phenomena in the natural world—and he focused much of the study on the 
ways in which children treated their dolls as they would real people: the psychic qualities 
attributed to them, the way they were cared for, or how they were named, for instance. 
Unsurprisingly, Hall found that the child’s relationship with dolls had an atavistic 
precedent: doll interest was a recapitulation of idol worship from “the low pagan stage,” a 
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conclusion supported by comparing children’s doll play with the religious rites of the 
Japanese, Javanese, the Mokis, Pueblo, and Kiowas tribes, and the ancient Egyptians.83 
 Like Hall’s study of children’s interest in clouds, the doll study seemed to open 
up innumerable opportunities for child studiers interested in understanding the needs and 
interests of children. In doll play, wrote Hall, much was revealed: “we see things which 
the childish instinct often tends to keep secret, fully revealed”; “The doll is taught those 
things learned best or in which the child has the most interest”; “the individuality of 
children is more clearly revealed in the characters they give their dolls than in their 
traits.”84 Close examination of the treatment of dolls revealed how children understood 
complex concepts: ideas about justice were divulged when dolls were “punished”; a 
child’s knowledge of death and the afterlife were made evident when a doll “died”; and a 
young girl’s understanding of the duties of motherhood was made clear by the way she 
cared for her own dolls. Indeed, the importance of the subject could not be overestimated: 
a doll microcosm opens up a world of relationships so large, and simplifies things 
so complex as to be otherwise closed to the infant mind. If we take a large view 
of the doll problem it thus comprises most of the important questions of 
education.85 
 
A theme of such importance could not be ignored by the school curriculum and, as was 
his custom, Hall concluded the study by issuing a piece of advice to educators. 
 
The educational value of dolls is enormous, and the protest of this paper is 
against longer neglect of it. It educates the heart and will, even more than the 
intellect, and to learn how to control and apply it, will be to discover a new 
instrument in education of the very highest potency. Every parent and every 
teacher…should study the doll habits of each child.86 
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 The Seminary studies discovered that nearly all relationships that children had 
with objects in the world involved some degree of anthropomorphication. Hall’s “A 
Study of Children’s Interests in Flowers,” for instance, found that children frequently 
transferred human characteristics on to flowers—433 returns showed that children 
regarded flowers as sentient beings: a third thought that flowers spoke, while many 
thought flowers were capable of suffering, feeling pain and sadness when picked and 
taken away from their “friends.” The “language of flowers” was also an anthropomorphic 
atavism: “Forget-me-not,” “Cuddle-me-to-you,” and “Jump-up-and-kiss-me” were 
survivals from a primitive period when cultures had assigned human characteristics to 
flowers. The practice was common among ancient or primitive peoples. The Malays 
cared for rice as if it were a person, and the Fijians believed that plants had souls—Hall’s 
research revealed numerous instances of plant worship in “the history of primitive belief” 
where plants were thought to have had special and magical powers.87  
 The tendency shared by children and primitives to endow inanimate objects with 
human or magical powers was easily accounted for by evolutionary thinkers such as 
Tylor and Hall. The belief in magic, wrote Tylor, “belongs in its main principle to the 
lowest known stages of civilization, and the lower races, who have not partaken largely 
of the education of the world.”88 Susceptibility to magical explanations resulted from an 
inability to understand the principle of causation—a theme explored in the previous 
chapter—and the mistaking of “an ideal for a real connexion.” Tylor considered magic to 
be  “one of the most pernicious delusions that ever vexed mankind,” one that children 
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needed to grow out of, lest it develop into a pathological disorder, such as lunacy.89 It 
was also considered common among “lower” races, such as those of African decent who 
was sometimes considered insane: “Even in their most enlightened circles, [Negroes] 
have never gotten rid of that lowest order of superstition common to the race since the 
birth of their most ancient forefathers, which is a firm belief in and practice of what has 
been called voudooism.”90 If children retained such beliefs into adulthood they might 
suffer from arrested development, and Tylor thought it essential that survivals be 
eradicated: 
The nobler tendency of advancing culture, and above all of scientific culture, is 
to honour the dead without groveling before them, to profit by the past without 
sacrificing the present to it. Yet even the modern civilized world has but half 
learnt this lesson, and an unprejudiced survey may lead us to judge how many of 
our ideas and customs exist rather by being old than by being good.91 
 
 Hall’s attitude toward survivals was more tempered—rather than suppress them, 
he thought that educators should embrace them. A curriculum informed by child study 
did not seek to stamp out the similarities that children shared with savages but, instead, 
used those commonalities as a guide. Hall thought that knowledge had to be presented to 
children in the order of its historical development; in the school, the curriculum should 
follow the course of the development of ideas as they had evolved from low, primitive 
cultures to highly civilized societies—all subjects were to be taught as courses in the 
history of ideas. It made sense, especially in light of the fact that children and savages 
shared the same capacities to comprehend the world, just as they possessed the same 
impulses and desires—primitive world views made sense to children, while modern 
explanations based on science and logic did not. Thus, it would make little sense to 
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present the scientific aspects of natural phenomena without first teaching children 
primitives’ mythical or religious explanations for how the cosmos worked—neither 
savage nor child could be expected to understand the principles of planetary rotation, 
knowledge that had been developed late in the history of the race. Just as the individual 
recapitulated the history of the whole, the curriculum would have to recapitulate the 
whole history of knowledge, presenting all information in the order of evolutionary 
development. In discussing how science should be taught, Hall wrote that curricula 
designed for adolescents should 
normally approach any and every branch of science over the same road which the 
race traversed in a prescientific age. There should be a humanistic propaedeutic 
because youth is in the humanist stage. Nature is sentiment before it becomes 
idea or formula or utility. The chief among many reasons why all branches of 
science are so disappointing to their promoters in high school and college is, that 
in the exact logical, technical way they are taught, they violate the basal law of 
psychic growth, ignore the deep springs of natural interest, and attempt to force a 
precocity against which the instincts of the young, so much wiser and truer and 
older than their consciousness, happily revolt.92 
 
 Hall wanted all of the school’s subjects to be approached historically—an 
individual’s acquisition of knowledge had to recapitulate the same processes experienced 
by the race as a whole, and the curriculum was to be informed by anthropological study: 
“Science itself arose by working over and over to ever more refined forms old nature 
myths, and to some extent, in a true pedagogy, youth must repeat the process.”93 The 
pedagogical creed found in Adolescence was based on this logic, and throughout the book 
Hall incorporated the results from syllabi studies originally published in the Seminary 
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while outlining a developmentally based curricula for all manner of subjects. Curricular 
proposals were always based on the logic of recapitulation: 
The practical and scientific outcome here again is that, if it is well that the child 
should reproduce ancient industries, by the same token he should, if his 
development is to be complete, here also revive the ancient sentiments and view-
points of the race, more or less as the tadpole must develop a tail only to be 
absorbed by the growing legs, the development of which it was necessary both to 
stimulate and to feed.94 
 
 Signs of survivals and recapitulatory reversions were everywhere, providing 
educators with important lessons concerning the scientific development of curriculum. In 
Hall’s “The Cat and the Child,” published in 1904, he wrote,   
The cat, anthropomorphized along much the same lines which we have followed 
in the child, has made and left an indelible impression on the consciousness of 
the race is well attested by its prevalence in myth and legend, as well as a large 
body of proverbs, witticisms, popular sayings, etc., many of which are still 
current. With the child these anthropomorphications are passing impressions of a 
short period; in the race their influence is long dominant. With the child they are 
plastic and varying to the fancy; in the race, stiffened into myth, legend, and 
proverb, they are factors in the serious business of life.95 
 
 
Basing his educational philosophy on recapitulatory theory, Hall incorporated the 
suggestions found in the cat study to the study of zoology in general: “This stratum is one 
of the very richest layers in paleopsychic development, and its outcrops in the many 
varied zoolatries of savage life, which show its strength, constitute one of the most 
interesting illustrations of the way in which the stages of a child’s development repeat 
those through which the race has passed.”96 And, “man’s development would have been 
very different without animals, and the fishing, hunting, and pastoral stages, so childhood 
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is maimed if long robbed of its due measure of influences from this comprehensive 
arsenal of educational material.”97 
 When teachers collected data for Hall’s syllabi studies they were participating in 
the creation of a new educational philosophy based on the principles of recapitulation. It 
was important work, even though the studies themselves may have been scientifically 
untenable. As Dorothy Ross has written, “The best of the work produced was useful or 
suggestive, but the bulk of it was scientifically shoddy and practically worthless.”98 And 
Herbert Kliebard concluded that Hall’s ideas were derived not from scientifically sound 
research, but from “metaphysical, even mystical, assumptions about the alleged 
relationship between the stages in individual development and the history of the human 
race.”99 Both historians are correct—Hall’s studies were frequently composed of 
scientific nonsense and unsubstantiated claims. But even nonsense can be influential. The 
aim of this chapter has not been to disprove the scientific validity of Hall’s work—the 
mere presentation of his ideas should cause considerable skepticism. Instead, the purpose 
has been to demonstrate that his ideas, while problematic, were influential—they fit the 
ideological climate of the day and found an institutional context that developed and 
spread them. Child study was a powerful movement and Hall did revolutionize 
understandings of childhood by allying children with savage and primitive groups. 
Furthermore, he designed and commanded an institutional apparatus that broadcast those 
ideas across the entire educational spectrum. The ideas championed in Adolescence did 
not fall of deaf ears; any person who participated in the child study movement would 
have been familiar with them.  
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 Stephen Jay Gould has reminded us that G. Stanley Hall was “not a crackpot, but 
America’s premier psychologist.”100 And though modern scholars have debunked 
recapitulatory science, few have demonstrated its historical significance. Even fewer have 
asked what survivals of recapitulation live with us today. Might Tylor’s theory be useful 
in investigating modern attitudes toward adolescents? And might Hall’s recapitulatory 
model be instructive when applied to the history of childhood itself? If Hall could find 
the basis for understanding civilized man through the study of primitive peoples, one 
wonders if scholars in the twenty-first century might find an understanding of modern 
attitudes toward adolescents by reexamining their roots in Hall’s work. At the very least, 
it is a project that Hall himself would have endorsed. After all, it was his belief that the 
understanding of any subject required an investigation of the myths of the past. 
 
 
III. Child Study’s Colonial Rationale: Possibilities and Dangers 
“The child and the race are each keys to the other,” wrote G. Stanley Hall, who found in 
primitive ideas and customs phyletic explanations for nearly everything.101 As seen in the 
previous sections, the child study movement fused anthropological studies with 
observations of children to create a developmental map that ordered behaviors and ideas 
in relation to their perceived evolutionary appearance. Children exhibited primitive 
tendencies in their moral and intellectual development, were often spurred to action by 
“savage” instincts and impulses, shared a physiological resemblance with the lower races, 
and suffered from the same faults and diseases as did many of the world’s less evolved 
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peoples. Indeed, much of Adolescence’s thirteen hundred pages sought to demonstrate 
“the immense importance of further coordinating childhood and youth with the 
development of the race.”102 Children and savages shared numerous similarities and, 
from a recapitulatory point of view, the study of one group always shed light on the 
other—the two were thought to inhabit identical evolutionary moments, a hypothesis 
proven by the elucidation of developmental commonalities and shared interests. But 
adolescents and primitives shared more than this. Hall thought that the modern world 
treated each unjustly—“most savages in most respects are children,” he wrote, but that 
did not merit the full scale subjection of primitive groups; and though the adolescent 
“resembles the savage,” that did not justify treating him in the same harsh, oppressive 
ways that savages were dealt with in the colonial realm.103 Adolescents and savages, 
thought to be synonymous in so many respects, were, in Hall’s opinion, both under 
attack. Young people were being warred upon in the schools, while primitive groups 
were being enslaved in the colonies, each forced to live lives that ran counter to their 
natures. The point is not an exaggeration. Hall devoted the final hundred pages of 
Adolescence—the book’s climax—to a condemnation of colonial practices, and he 
considered the study of the savage’s colonial experience to be illustrative of the struggles 
faced by adolescents back home: 
No study of adolescence can be complete without some study of nearly one-third 
of the human race, occupying two-fifths of the land surface of the globe, now 
included in the one hundred and thirty-six colonies and dependencies of the 
world, that are in a relation of greater or less subjection to a few civilized 
nations.104 
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 Though a committed Darwinian, Hall did not consider it just to think of the 
colonial project as a struggle between competing groups where the “fittest” would 
prevail. And while Darwin thought that the extinction of entire races to be a natural result 
of the competition for limited resources, Hall found it to be a terrible crime. “Man is the 
only known creature that has destroyed his own pedigree,” he wrote, noting with alarm 
that racial extermination was becoming more frequent in modern times: 
Never, perhaps, were lower races being extirpated as weeds in the human garden, 
both by conscious and organic processes, so rapidly as to-day. In many minds 
this is inevitable and not without justification. Pity and sympathy, says Nietzsche, 
are now a disease, and we are summoned to rise above morals and clear the 
world’s stage for the survival of those who are fittest because strongest.105 
 
But the arguments made by Nietzsche and others made little sense to Hall—to him, it 
would have been equally outrageous to justify the extermination of children simply 
because they were weak and easily conquered. “Primitive peoples have the same right to 
linger in the paradise of childhood. To war upon them is to war upon children. To 
commercialize and oppress them with work is child labor on a large scale.”106 Hall’s 
chronicle of the mistreatment of savage groups showed modern man’s conduct in the 
colonies to be savage and barbaric—the natives of Newfoundland were “shot like beasts 
by ruthless huntsmen”; convicts and adventurers had “misused” Tasmanian women and 
given them venereal diseases; the inhabitants of Oceania, thought one anthropologist, 
“have no future but in heaven”; and the indigenous Hawaiian population was declining 
rapidly.107  
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 Hall made the provocative claim that “if [savages] are bad, we are responsible and 
we should have them on our conscience and feel accountable for their future.”108 The 
American Indian had originally welcomed European settlers, but after a period 
discovered that the visitors were “insatiably greedy of gold and slaves, malignantly cruel, 
and their gift of fire-water…was perhaps the most important agent in the downfall of the 
aborigines”— “first welcomed as gods, the whites were soon regarded as devils,” and 
only after numerous instances of treachery and cruelty did the Indian become “savage” 
toward Europeans.109 Indeed, Hall sometimes wondered who, exactly, was civilized and 
who was savage—all too often colonization brought out the worst in the Europeans, 
leading Hall to suggest that the “work of missionaries is often needed much more among 
the conquering soldiers and the prospectors, brandy traders, and adventures that follow in 
their wake than among the unsophisticated barbarians.” 110 The examples of colonial 
violence and genocide were numerous, and Hall catalogued each case with outrage and 
sadness, sometimes letting his pen get the best of him: 
To read the outrages, butcheries, nameless crimes and torturings which are 
compiled from official records makes the mouth grow dry, the eyes wet, the heart 
throb, the teeth and fists clinch, and the soul to cry out whether there is no justice 
in heaven or on earth.111 
 
 Not all colonial projects resulted in racial extermination, of course—that would 
have been poor policy for an economy that depended on the labor of native populations. 
But the loss of indigenous culture, which often did not improve productivity, frequently 
attended colonization, a problem that also dismayed Hall and one that he considered to be 
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unnecessary. The chronicle of cultural violence recorded in Adolescence was equally 
alarming. The indigenous populations of Mexico, Hall wrote, “have lost a well-developed 
civilization and literature, and that many of their languages have become primitive and 
others died out, and that since the Spanish conquest they have fallen into a semi-
barbarous state.”112 On boarding schools that attempted to remake the children of 
American Indians into the “image” of white men, Hall wrote: “To educate by teaching 
children not to honor but to abhor their parents is monstrous and unchristian.”113 And he 
considered efforts to completely eradicate Hindu religious practices in the quest to spread 
Christianity “psycho-pedagogic barbarism and brutality.”114 
 There is no question that Hall’s concerns were genuine; he was a humanitarian 
and was saddened by the eradication of indigenous cultures—the conquest of Mexico was 
a “deplorable calamity,” his readings on the exploitation of Africans in the rubber trade 
were “heart-rending” and “painful,” and the destruction of temples by missionaries in 
Hawaii was deplorable.115 Hall’s account of injustices meted out to primitive peoples by 
European colonizers offended his moral and religious sense, but another concern was 
equally apparent in the final pages of Adolescence: the disappearance of primitive culture 
was a historical loss for Europeans; with each indigenous group, cultural practice, or 
religious rite that became extinct, the further Western man got from ever truly knowing 
himself. “Ours is an unhistoric land,” wrote Hall, and reflecting upon the decline of 
indigenous culture in Mexico, he noted: 
No historian or philosopher can ever estimate the loss to the world by this 
wreckage of an ancient and highly developed civilization, so completely 
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exterminated that we can never know very definitely what it was, containing for 
us perhaps priceless scientific and practical lessons which might do us as much 
good in dealing with this race as what they got from us did them harm. Race 
pedagogy has irretrievably lost we know not what arts of irrigation, taxation, high 
tribal organization, native agriculture, industries, new solutions of family, social, 
and ethical relations…The new solutions of so many of our own problems, dimly 
seen here, should suggest how many more things than our philosophy dreams of 
or our history records have been in and vanished from the world, and wring our 
hearts with pity not only for vanished races but for ourselves.116 
 
 Civilization could only be understood in relation to savagery, for it was the latter 
that demonstrated the historical development of the former. “The customs, institutions, 
and beliefs of primitive peoples are related to ours somewhat as instinct is related to 
reason.”117 European colonizers, thought Hall, were overly focused on economic 
concerns, too narrow in their educational aims, and unnecessarily aggressive in their 
efforts to supplant indigenous religions with Christianity. Their fixity of purpose and 
myopic cultural vision prevented them from understanding the value that primitive and 
savage groups had in developing among Westerners a deeper knowledge of themselves—
anthropological study “corrects undue self-complacency, broadens religious prejudice, 
and deepens the sense of universal brotherhood.”118 But contact with primitive races in 
the colonial theater presented Westerners with opportunities they all too often ignored. 
ethnological and genetic problems, which give a vastly deepened background and 
an enlarged horizon to history, all of which is but news of the day compared with 
the past ages through which heredity had been doing its silent work. All this 
summons us to larger views, and marks the present and near future as by far the 
greatest of all the historic periods and opens the most magnificent opportunities 
ever presented to education and to a new constructive statesmanship. Ideally the 
two are one and inseparable.119 
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 Failure to learn those lessons ensured that economic conquest would give way to 
cultural imperialism. Hall thought that racial understanding could be developed from the 
recapitulatory realization that all races shared “cosmic relations,” historical connectivity, 
and interdependence. Ignoring this fact would result in racial insensitivity that might lead 
to cultural hegemony and programs of “unwilling assimilation”—“what a few overgrown 
races call civilization seems likely to be forced upon the entire world.”120 Hall regretted 
that the trend was toward greater cultural homogeneity: “It will be a dreary and 
monotonous world if the dreams of the jingoes of modern culture and uniformity are 
realized.”121 Western colonizers suffered from an exaggerated sense of their of own 
superiority, which led them to dismiss primitive cultures as irrelevant and worthless. Too 
many colonizers sought to wipe out indigenous cultures, failing to understand that it was 
possible to interact with primitive groups while, at the same time, respecting their 
customs and beliefs. “No race ideal has ever been more narrow, provincial, or banausic,” 
wrote Hall. “It is a colossal assumption that what we call civilization is the end of man, or 
the best thing in the world.”122 
 One of the primary mistakes committed by educators and missionaries in the 
colonies was their tendency to rush primitives into a civilization for which they were 
unprepared—as we have seen, Hall thought that in so doing the worst elements of savage 
life were brought to the surface, resulting in behaviors that were immoral, criminal or 
insane. Precocious development was dangerous: 
It is not pessimistic to realize that our civilization is not only a doom and disease 
when forced precociously upon lower races, but that it has created scores of 
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diseases, made cities biological furnaces where life is consumed, and in general 
has a dark as well as a bright side.123 
 
Neither the educational system nor the colonial world was comfortable with embracing 
the individual’s nature, and Western pedagogues and policy makers were too aggressive 
in their attempts to “civilize” children and indigenous peoples. Just as primitive were 
often forced to take up the civilized ways of their conquerors, young people in America’s 
schools were unnecessarily rushed from childhood to adulthood: 
Instead of entering upon the full, rich life of the race which is our heritage, which 
is the only meaning of the grand old ideal of a humanistic and truly liberal 
education, and lingering as long as possible in the paradise of unfallen man, that 
the individual may enlarge itself as far as possible toward the dimensions of his 
species, there is a veritable rage for prematurity, for precociously assuming adult 
burdens, airs, indocilities, and callousness.124 
 
 Educational regimens that sought to develop precocious youth rendered a great 
disservice—schools that failed to embrace childhood’s true nature and forced children 
into the molds of adults “mutilated” young people. A boy out of touch with his atavistic 
inheritance was “under-vitalized and anemic” and precocious development resulted in a 
“repressed, overtrained, conventionalized manikin.”125 Hall found in this educational 
problem a metaphor for understanding the problems faced by primitive peoples in the 
colonies: “As we are gradually putting the child-world into schools of the latest type, so 
the primitive men and women of the world are coaxed or constrained to take up the 
burden of the white man’s civilization, and those who can not or will not are following to 
extinction the larger wild animals about them that resist domestication.”126 In the end, 
Hall’s view of children informed his ideas about colonial policy. If savages were the 
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evolutionary equivalents of children, then they had a claim to the same rights and 
privileges that Western children should be granted. It was a view that held primitives in 
rather low esteem, to be sure, but at the same time it was an effective critique of colonial 
practices that deserved condemnation. Hall’s attitude was paternalistic and imperialistic, 
but the conflation of children and savages led him to make conclusions about the 
treatment of colonized peoples that were somewhat progressive: 
Their [savages’] faults and their virtues are those of childhood and youth. They 
need the same careful and painstaking study, lavish care, and adjustment to their 
nature and needs. The inexorable laws of forcing, precocity, severity, and 
overwork, produce similar results for both.127 
    
 Hall expected child study to reform the educational world, bringing pedagogy and 
curriculum into harmony with the needs and interests of children. He wanted the 
discipline to have the same impact on colonial policy makers, and he offered child study 
as a model for creating sound educational strategies for natives: “Every argument for 
child study at home as the basis of educational methods and matter is greatly reenforced 
for children and adults of an alien race.”128 Speaking directly to American interests in the 
Philippines, Hall wrote: 
But genetic psychology, which is at root only common sense at the same time 
simplified, magnified, and reenforced by examples here as everywhere, has only 
the plain precept, study and adapt, to develop the best that is indigenous, be 
patient, adopting a long-ranged policy that does not forget that a century with a 
race is no more than a year with the individual.129 
 
Hall’s stance on colonial education was progressive. In dealing with the Pilipino natives, 
he urged American educators to develop indigenous languages rather than “force out the 
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native tongue and teach only English in the lower grades.”130 He thought teachers should 
teach the culture’s own traditions and myths, teach native industries so that they may be 
improved, “teach them respect for their own heroes and patriots,” and “incubate not only 
self-respect but pride rather than shame of their own race.”131 Whenever possible, the 
child should be taught by native teachers. To adapt colonial pedagogy to meet the needs 
of indigenous peoples required a program that looked very much like child study, and 
instead of entering the colonial domain and ravishing primitive culture, “we should first 
of all study the native customs, traditions, sentiments, and ideas, and utilize everything 
possible, fulfil [sic] and not destroy, as becomes a race professing Christianity.”132 
 Too often, however, colonizers and missionaries did the opposite. Racial and 
cultural destruction were legitimized by a conviction that the savage was a depraved and 
degenerate beast.  But such conclusions, thought Hall, were drawn unfairly: notions of 
inferiority resulted from the unfair imposition of rules and restrictions that primitives 
found alien and impossible to live by—forcing “civilization” upon a population that had 
no chance of succeeding to live by its dictates, or interest in doing so, led to violent 
cultural conflicts. “The friction points between higher and lower races are many,” wrote 
Hall: missionaries attempted to obliterate primitive sexual customs such as child 
marriage, and the imposition of “European modes of marriage” injured primitive social 
organizations and destabilized their societies; the concept of private property had been 
forced on tribal communities, often depriving them of their own land; the system of wage 
labor was imposed on people who had previously worked only to meet their basic needs, 
and primitives “abhor our regular daily system”; and attempts to Christianize natives 
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made little sense in relation to their previous customs.133 These problems caused great 
conflict, were based upon a misunderstanding of primitive culture, and resulted from 
unfair and unrealistic expectations that primitive peoples adapt the ways of the 
conquerors. Civilizing forces knew little of the people they were conquering. 
Commenting on the English in India, Hall wrote, “the English do not understand the 
people they govern so well.”134 Misunderstanding resulted in uninformed policies, but 
was also manifested in a sense that primitives were inferior and depraved, and that 
colonial governance required harsh and strict controls, sometimes leading to violence or 
programs of cultural assimilation. 
 Native American boarding schools have been mentioned already, and when 
examining the history of American efforts to civilize the Indian, Hall offered another 
child-savage metaphor that was particularly instructive: “Our opinion of Indians is too 
analogous to that of Calvinists concerning the depravity of infants.”135 The quotation 
begs a question: Savages may have been regarded as children, but what kind of children? 
And while Hall’s position may seem offensive to modern readers, at least it was not 
hypocritical—he advocated that primitives and Western children be treated in the same 
way. In the end, his educational prescriptions were ones that any person could appreciate: 
“every vigorous race, however rude and undeveloped, is, like childhood, worthy of the 
maximum reverence and care and study.”136 It was a pedagogical position that offered 
great possibilities. But, at the same time, the idea that savages were children, and children 
savages, could be an exceedingly poisonous one, especially if separated from Hall’s 
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educational philosophy. Hall’s child-savage was to be embraced and cared for—others, 
however, thought that the savage should be stamped out of the child, and the child should 
be beaten from the savage. In both cases, these alternative educational prescriptions were 
violent, oppressive, and unnatural. Adolescence was a good effort, but one gets the 
impression that it wasn’t as closely read as Hall would have wished. Sadly, his legacy 
may have been in devaluing both groups by allying each with a group Westerners thought 
inferior. The theory of recapitulation certainly had that potential, and could be an 
extremely dangerous weapon if it fell into the wrong hands.137 
 
 
Conclusion 
To Hall, Western man represented the highest evolutionary stage that existed in the 
modern world, but that was not to say that the honor would forever remain his. And while 
savage and primitive groups could never be expected to evolve into copies of Westerners, 
that did not mean that they were incapable of evolving or unworthy of respect. If savages 
were truly children, then they always had within them the potential to grow, and it was 
not certain that Western supremacy would forever remain unchallenged. Indeed, no one 
knew which group would develop into the next highest incarnation of man: 
Our type of civilization may be better in most, as it certainly is in some, respects 
than any other, but it is at best only a certain group of excellences, and although 
we are the bearers of the world-consciousness at present, it by no means follows 
that the highest human perfectibility is along the lines that we have thus far 
followed.138 
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It was not impossible that groups once regarded as primitive and savage could one day 
contribute to civilization in ways that nobody could imagine—at the very least, the 
possibility demanded that primitive cultures be preserved. And Hall sought to encourage 
development in ways that would allow primitives to find their full potential. Again, the 
logic applied to the races was applied to children: if their potential was harnessed and 
developed, they too might develop into something greater. 
While adolescence is the great revealer of the past of the race, its earlier stages 
must be ever surer and safer and the later possibilities ever greater and more 
prolonged, for it, and not maturity as now defined, is the only point of departure 
for the superanthropoid that man is to become. This can be only by an ever 
higher adolescence lifting him to a plane related to his present maturity as that is 
to the well-adjusted stage of boyhood where our puberty now begins its 
regenerating metamorphosis.139 
 
In savages and children Hall found the past, but each also contained the future. But 
whether or not they would be allowed to flourish and evolve was not a choice that was in 
their power to make—educators and colonial policy makers decided how each was 
treated and determined what they wanted to make of them. Such efforts were often 
harmful, as we have seen. The chapter demonstrates that the ideas of child study were 
spread, but were the implications those of studies acted upon? Did anybody listen to 
Hall? Or were only the negative messages from Adolescence, of which there were plenty, 
influential? The extent to which Hall’s work affected the education of the adolescent is 
the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Five 
 
The Junior High School and the Betrayal of G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescent 
 
 
 
 
The world goes to school. This has become the method of 
colonization and completes the work of conquest by armies. 
G. Stanley Hall (1904)1 
 
 
 
I. G. Stanley Hall and the Problem of Junior High School Historiography 
Thus far, the focus of this dissertation has been on the development of adolescence as an 
idea and how that idea was spread from the academy to the educational world at large. 
The next logical step is to discern what, if any, influence Hall’s notion of adolescence 
had on efforts to reform the educational institutions and practices that served adolescents. 
A decade after the publication of Hall’s work, school districts across the country 
reorganized their systems in an attempt to meet the unique challenges of educating an 
expanding adolescent population—and in so doing, those reformers had a clear idea of 
who adolescents were and what they needed. To what extent, then, did G. Stanley Hall’s 
work on adolescent development play in those institutional and curricular reforms? 
Looking to the junior high school for evidence of Hall’s influence is a natural move, but 
it is one filled with surprises. Influential as Hall’s gang of child studiers was, in the 
decades after Adolescence the ideas that had fueled the movement held little appeal for 
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public school reformers. Consequently, Hall’s contribution to the junior high school 
movement was limited by the fact that school administrators had become allied with a 
new set of ideas that bore little resemblance to those found in Adolescence. Hall may 
have brought the debate to the fore, but his voice was soon drowned out by a host of 
other groups who had their own ideas as to who adolescents were and what they needed. 
 In the 1910s and 1920s educational reformers carved the junior high school out of 
the existing educational landscape, removing the ninth grade from high schools and the 
seventh and eighth grades from elementary schools.2 In doing so they invented an entirely 
new institution, one that sought to harmonize the school with the distinct developmental 
needs of the adolescent. The junior high school movement was inspired, in part, by 
Adolescence and child study, and its champions frequently echoed G. Stanley Hall:  
Distinguished psychologists and educators agree that this is the age at which 
secondary education should begin—at the beginning of adolescence. This 
division of time under the Junior High School plan corresponds to the changes in 
the life of the child. The age at which the pupil enters the Junior High School is 
the critical moment of his life, when the mental, moral, physical and spiritual life 
of the child undergoes marvelous changes. At the age of twelve the impulses of 
adolescence are driving the child to new interests, ambitions, and activities. This 
is the time when “individuality begins to assert itself.”3 
 
Leonard V. Koos, an influential junior high school advocate from the University of 
Minnesota, noted that the reorganization of schools should be guided by an awareness of 
the “particular phases of child nature” and that the school’s curriculum should be 
congruent with “the nature of the child.”4 In Cleveland, Ohio, the superintendent of 
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schools wrote, “New life and new and enlarged capacities mark the awakening period of 
transition from childhood to youth,” hoping that his system’s vigorous program of 
reorganization would help ease adolescents through that difficult transition.5 By the 1918-
19 school year, 9,500 Cleveland adolescents were enrolled in junior high schools; 5,500 
students remained in the upper grammar grades, but the “work of the pupils still 
remaining in the seventh and eighth grades is being organized so far as possible in 
harmony with that of the Junior High Schools.”6  
 The rhetorical element of the junior high school movement, with its emphasis on 
discovering the adolescent’s nature and catering to his interests, was, however, only 
vaguely Hallian. Junior high school reformers took from Adolescence a general 
framework from which the problem of adolescent education could be analyzed, but it 
would be a mistake to credit Hall’s work as being central to the reorganization of the 
middle grades. In fact, some historians have suggested quite the opposite: “the junior 
high school emerged in early twentieth century America not as a result of the new child 
study movement as some have argued, but primarily as a result of the progressive reform 
forces that honored the values of efficiency and economy.”7 Those two values were not 
particularly important to Hall, who advocated the prolongation of adolescence and urged 
the school to indulge the adolescent’s every whimsy—efficient and economical Hall’s 
curriculum was not. Historian of education Herbert Kliebard found that the junior high 
school was spawned by the mixing of two opposing schools of curricular thought—
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developmentalism and social efficiency—with one focusing on adjusting the school to 
the child’s psychological and emotional needs, while the other sought to prepare students 
for their future social and economic duties. Hall rejected the social efficiency rationale as 
coarse and anti-intellectual, and there was much about the junior high school that 
contradicted many of his most fundamental educational precepts. At best, the institution 
represented an odd concoction of Hallian ideas and the utilitarian aims of social 
efficiency educators. “The large-scale incorporation of the junior high school into the 
American educational ladder,” wrote Kliebard, “is one more instance where the success 
of an important innovation benefited by the fact that the ideas of two or more powerful 
interest groups intersected at that point.”8  
 Nor was Hall’s work solely responsible for initiating debate on the reorganization 
of education for adolescents. As one historian has written, much of the impetus for junior 
high school reform came in the decade prior to Adolescence:  
It is always true with regard to historical causation that there is 
no place or “point in time” that a movement begins; one can be 
identified as the effect of some previous cause. Thus the origin 
of the Junior High School can be traced back through many 
events, almost ad infinitum.9 
 
Just how far back the junior high’s historical roots extend is not clear, but the movement 
to reorganize the upper-primary grades was well under way by the time Hall published 
his opus. Most reformers began their historical sketches of the movement with the 
National Education Associations’s “Report of the Committee of Ten on Secondary 
                                                
8 Herbert Kliebard, The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958 (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
108. 
9 Carole S. Ford, “The Origins of the Junior High School,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Teachers College,1982), 64. 
 216 
School Studies” (1893), the first major plan for school reorganization issued at a national 
level. According to the Committee, 
It is impossible to make a satisfactory secondary school programme, limited to a 
period of four years, and founded on the present elementary school subjects and 
methods. In the opinion of the Committee, several subjects now reserved for high 
schools—such as algebra, geometry, natural sciences, and foreign languages—
should be begun earlier than now, and therefore within the schools classified as 
elementary; or, as an alternative, the secondary school period should be made to 
begin two years earlier than at present, leaving six years instead of eight for the 
elementary school period.10 
 
Hall opposed the Committee of Ten’s report for a number of reasons, but what he found 
most distasteful was its failure to take into consideration the developmental aspects of 
curricular reform. The Committee, he thought, was overly concerned with efficient 
preparation for college and their recommendations sought to introduce into the middle 
grades subjects that its students were not yet mature enough to pursue—most adolescents 
were not developmentally ready for advanced studies, nor were they by nature interested 
in those subjects. The Report, wrote Hall, “ignores the fact that the average youth of high 
school age, and especially in the early teens, has not so far reached the age of reason that 
logical methods can be made supreme.”11 
 Also influential in the movement to reorganize the schools was the NEA’s 
Committee on College-Entrance Requirements (1899) which also acknowledged the 
importance of the adolescent period: “the seventh grade, rather than the ninth, is the 
natural turning point in the child’s life, as the age of adolescence demands new methods 
and wiser direction.”12 Like the Committee of Ten, the Committee on College-Entrance 
Requirements sought to provide adolescents with a college-preparatory curriculum that 
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would ease the transition from secondary schools to institutions of higher learning. The 
idea did not appeal to Hall: “To fit for present entrance examinations involves an at least 
temporary unfitting for life. It is too sedentary, clerical, bookish, and noetic, and…may 
fail to appeal to the best powers of youth.”13 
 “It was probably inevitable,” writes a historian of the junior high school, “once 
the upper elementary grades were marked for curricular and organizational changes, 
suggestions would be made for separating them entirely from the elementary schools.”14 
But the logic of separation sometimes ran counter to Hall’s recommendations. Thus, Hall 
contributed to an ongoing debate concerning the educational needs of adolescents, but he 
did not define the terms of that conversation. In fact, he was sometimes left out of it 
completely: “concern for the psyche of the adolescent was not the most significant factor 
in the initial establishment of the junior high school.”15 It would be a mistake to 
exaggerate the role that Hall played in the creation of the junior high; sometimes the only 
thing that Hall and the junior high school reformers had in common was a concern for 
adolescence. But each understood adolescent needs differently, and frequently their 
recommendations were diametrically opposed.  
 At the same time, however, Hall was an influential figure. And even though some 
historians have minimized the impact that his work had on the reformation of adolescent 
education, those efforts cannot be totally dismissed. As Edward Krug has written, “it was 
Hall who gained the reputation as a liberal who forced the secondary school to consider 
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the nature and needs of the adolescent.”16 Hall’s urging that schools focus on adolescent 
needs and interests clearly had some impact, even though schoolmen in the decades 
immediately following Adolescence understood those needs differently than Hall had. 
Krug also noted that it was “the child study movement in particular that placed upon the 
high school the burden of proving that it was not falling behind in the onward march of 
educational progress.”17 Again, it was a matter of interpretation—child study demanded 
that schools conform to children’s interest, but defining what those interests were 
depended on the agenda of the observer. Recapitulatory theorists would find that 
adolescents were interested in a liberal arts curriculum that was organized historically, 
while social efficiency educators were more likely to discover that young people were 
interested in getting a start on their future careers. “Interest” was far too nebulous a term 
to remain distinctly Hallian, and adolescents were too important to too many people to 
ensure that their educational futures would be determined by a single reform group. 
Indeed, as Kliebard suggests, the adolescent curriculum was a battleground on which 
reformers of many different strands fought to gain supremacy. In this context, it becomes 
clear that Hall’s legacy, while present, was not the strongest force. 
 By the early 1920s, though still in its formative stage, it seemed as if the junior 
high school had found a permanent home in the American educational system. As one 
educator put it, “So strongly has the…idea taken hold that not only school men but of the 
public in general that no school system is now considered complete without its junior 
high school organization. Practically every city that does not have such an organization is 
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planning to have it.”18 On the whole, however, the junior high school has received little 
attention from educational historians. And despite the fact that it was the first major effort 
to reform the education of adolescents, its history remains elusive. David Tyack and 
Larry Cuban regard it as a rather minor movement: “In 1920, 94 percent of secondary 
schools still followed the traditional pattern of four years on top of eight years of 
elementary school, only 0.4 percent were free-standing junior high schools, and the rest 
were combined junior-senior high schools.”19 Regardless of those unimpressive numbers, 
however, they represent the beginning of an important educational movement; the fact 
remains that the junior high school would eventually become the standard model for 
adolescent education.  
 A closer examination of junior high statistics demonstrates that the institution’s 
growth was, in fact, quite dramatic: one national survey revealed that only sixty-eight 
junior high schools existed in 1915, but ten years later there were 2,268.20 Enrollment 
leapt from 37,331 in 1920 to 383,417 only four years later—an increase of 927 percent—
and the number of junior high teachers tripled between 1918 and 1924, from about 7,000 
to roughly 21,000.21 The junior high school movement, in the words of one educator, 
“was sweeping the country.” In an address to the National Education Association in 1916 
he noted that, even though the movement had only begun, the NEA had already 
made it first a field of investigation, then a propaganda and slogan, now a 
constructive program for development. The Department of Superintendence has 
embodied it in its resolutions. The United States Bureau stands committed to it. 
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Many state departments are making it state wide. Large cities are adopting it 
wholesale…Local city politics find it useful, popular…University departments of 
education and normal schools…are finding new aspects of professional 
preparation for this type of teaching…Textbook houses, with expected enterprise, 
are announcing a new junior high school series of textbooks…There is a 
literature, a terminology, a lingo, a cult…22 
 
  
 Historians of education have not shared the widespread interest that school 
reformers had for junior high schools, and their neglect constitutes a significant gap in 
educational historiography. The oversight is particularly surprising given the field’s focus 
on the history of urban school reform, which began in the 1960s—a great number of 
metropolitan districts were experimenting with the junior high school by 1920, a trend 
which could not have gone unnoticed by historians. The omission is most pronounced in 
works where junior high school history would have been most relevant. It is curious, for 
instance, that Ellwood Cubberley reduced his treatment of the junior high to a single 
page, even though he was writing at the height of the junior high frenzy and in a state that 
was leading the way in implementing the reform.23 Lawrence Cremin did not include the 
junior high school in his treatment of progressive education, even though it was a major 
progressive reform; David Tyack hardly mentioned it in his history of urban education, 
despite that the junior high was in many ways a response to problems unique to the urban 
environment; and Herbert Kliebard ignored it in his recent history of vocational 
education, a startling omission given the fact that the junior high played a significant role 
in the development of the manual and industrial arts.24 David Angus and Jeffrey Mirel 
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barely made reference to the junior high school in their work on Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
despite the fact that the city was a leader in the movement.25 Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, was Joseph F. Kett’s failure to include it in his history of adolescence.26  
 Part of the problem is that the junior high school movement does not provide 
historians with a cohesive historical narrative, making it difficult for them to examine the 
“movement” as a whole. As Larry Cuban has written, “No coherent, consistent mission 
for the junior high school…could be stitched together from the diversity of dreams for the 
junior high school.”27 To write the history of an institution that had no center is not an 
easy task. Indeed, if “the junior high school does not exist, anyway, except in name,” can 
its history even be written?28 At the same time, however, junior high school reform is an 
important chapter in the history of adolescence and, consequently, should not be ignored. 
Its purposes and rationales may have been diffuse and unorganized, but that was merely a 
reflection of the ambiguous stance that adults held toward adolescents. A junior high 
school, in whatever form it assumed in any given district, indicated how adults thought 
about adolescents—that the institutionalization and implementation of the reform took so 
many different shapes is evidence that adolescence, still a new concept, meant many 
things to many people. Historian of childhood LeRoy Ashby offers an instructive piece of 
advice for those interested in understanding reform movements that targeted children: 
“Adults spoke for [children], of course, but historically with many voices and changing 
agendas. Those responses invariably told far more about adult needs, expectations, 
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anxieties, status, and ideologies than about the children themselves.”29 The junior high 
school was clearly a deviation from Hall’s child study movement—its core values were 
primarily business-oriented and its history and reveals more about the economic concerns 
of adults than anything else. And though junior high school reformers sought to define 
the “nature” of adolescence, as Hall had, their visions were limited by their utilitarian and 
materialistic aims.  
 Joesph Kett suggests that the history of adolescence is, in some respects, the 
history of competing visions of childhood. Groups interested in reforming the adolescent 
experience approached the problem for different reasons, and with varying degrees of 
success:   
G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescence, published in 1904, was the seminal book, but 
direct radiations from Hall’s work formed just one element in the process. All 
sorts of individuals—earnest humanitarian reformers, boys-workers, nervous 
parents, school bureaucrats, and academicians—stumbled onto the study of 
adolescence after 1900, sometimes drawing inspiration from Hall, sometimes 
not.30 
 
The junior high school sometimes found inspiration in Hall; at other times it ignored him 
completely. Still, even though the two were often at odds with one another, a historical 
understanding of adolescence requires an examination of both Hall and the junior high 
schoolers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 LeRoy Ashby, Endangered Children: Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse in American History (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1997), 1-2. 
30 Kett, Rites of Passage, 216-217. 
 223 
II. A “Condition Approaching Chaos”: The Early History of Junior High School 
Reform, 1915-1925 
 
During the Progressive Era, enrollment in the nation’s high schools skyrocketed. 
According to Tyack, the number of secondary enrollees rose from 202,963 in 1890 to 
1,645,171 in 1918, an increase of 711 percent.31 The junior high school was, in many 
respects, a response to this growth in secondary schooling—educational reformers were 
concerned that the primary school offered poor preparation for high school studies, 
leaving freshmen bewildered when they began their work. More problematic was that the 
curriculum traditionally received by seventh and eighth graders did not speak to the 
interests and needs of adolescents. The purpose of elementary education, it was 
frequently written, was to provide students with basic tools for learning. But junior high 
school advocates considered six years to be adequate time to accomplish the goal, leading 
to the frequent charge that the upper elementary grades were wasteful, uninspiring, and 
repetitive. Adolescents, who had outgrown the elementary school’s curriculum and 
method of instruction, were left to languish for two years’ time, prompting many to quit 
school altogether. Hall was aware of the problem: “It is possible for most children in this 
country to leave the school forever at fourteen…Most do leave at this age never to return, 
and many of them are never again interested in educational pursuits.”32  
 The problem was that the elementary school had never been designed to prepare 
students for high school—the evolution of the common school occurred in the mid-
nineteenth century, independent from the development of public schooling at the 
secondary level, which, as a mass institution, did not occur until the turn of the twentieth 
century: “The high school and the elementary school developed separately in this 
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country, and there has always been a sharp break between them which has led many 
pupils to leave school at the end of the eighth grades.”33 And the high school, for its part, 
had never been conceived of as an institution of mass schooling; rather, it was an 
opportunity that had been open to only a small minority of the population. As historian 
William Reese has written, “the selective pattern of high school recruitment—drawing 
upon many grammar schools but especially a few dominated by the native middle 
classes—meant that the ‘people’s college’ largely served the more advantaged citizens. 
Most high school pupils by mid-century came from the relatively privileged native 
born.”34 Reese’s findings echo statements made by early twentieth-century schoolmen, 
who considered America’s first high schools to be elitist and undemocratic. 
The eight-and-four plan of American schools was not the product of a struggle 
for democracy. Everyone who belongs to the generation of present-day adults 
knows that in 1880 the high school was not a democratic institution…The 
American high school was at its inception the home of the professional class.35 
 
 “Undemocratic,” perhaps, but high school attendance was not an opportunity that 
was sorely missed by many: “In a time when few employers required their employees to 
be high school graduates, and when entry positions were abundant for youth with meager 
schooling, the great majority of the population acted as if the high school was 
superfluous.”36 But bountiful employment opportunities did not continue into the 
twentieth century, and enrollment in secondary schools increased as the number of jobs 
available to young people decreased. As Viviana A. Zelizer has demonstrated, the 
reasons for this decline were numerous and complicated: industrialization and 
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mechanization, higher family incomes, more effective compulsory education laws, 
campaigns to outlaw child labor, and a profound moral and cultural shift that redefined 
the child “exclusively as an object of sentiment and not as an agent of production,” all 
contributed to the decline in the number of jobs available to adolescents.37 With fewer 
children going to work, more turned to the high school to occupy their time and to 
improve their prospects for future employment. 
 This marked increase in enrollment was accompanied by a change in the mission 
of the public high school—as Thomas Briggs of Columbia University’s Teachers College 
observed: “Then the secondary school was considered to a large extent a sifter, to 
preserve only those with most ability to do abstract thinking; today it is considered rather 
a sorter, to classify those with similar abilities and needs, of whatever kind, so that they 
can be most adequately satisfied.”38 A diversified student body required a diversified 
curriculum, and it was clear that the uniform course of academic study proposed by the 
Committee of Ten would not satisfy the needs of the majority of the high school’s new 
students; increasingly, the institution focused more and more on practical subjects, 
manual arts, domestic science, and on preparing students for careers after graduation. As 
Kliebard has written, the reorganization of the secondary school curriculum along 
practical lines left virtually no aspect of the high school’s mission untouched: 
“Preparation for a particular occupational role, including attending college as a form of 
occupation, has permeated the justifications for virtually all school subjects.”39 
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 As more children transitioned from the elementary to the secondary grades, 
reformers became increasingly concerned that their system lacked a coherent and 
articulated plan for promotion—the jump from one level to the next, they often lamented, 
was too jarring: “The most serious indictment against the 8-4 organization was the 
abruptness of transition between the 8-year elementary school and the 4-year secondary 
school.”40 The junior high school was an attempt to ease that transition and its “chief 
contribution to any school system must be the realization of its purpose to weld together 
the units making up that system.”41 For the first time, then, reformers sought to create a 
fully articulated, cohesive educational system. As the superintended of Detroit wrote, 
when considering the role that the junior high school was to play in unifying the primary 
and secondary levels of schooling, the aim was to develop “a unified instructional policy 
from Grades 1-12.”42 
 Reformers considered the traditional elementary school to have been 
unresponsive and irrelevant to adolescent needs, and this problem became more 
pronounced when an increasing number of adolescents remained in school for longer 
periods of time. The concern was that a relevant and meaningful curriculum was not 
offered until the beginning of high school; meanwhile, adolescents remained stranded in 
the elementary school until the age of fourteen, receiving an uninspired and redundant 
education. The schools, in their failure to recognize the true starting point of adolescence, 
were wasting valuable time: “When he is fourteen or fifteen he will be half through the 
critical period of adolescence. If you want to influence an adolescent in a large way, you 
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must begin at twelve, not fourteen.”43 A school system in tune with the needs of 
adolescents would begin to offer an improved education earlier in the child’s educational 
career. As one writer noted, 
For many years the assumption that relatively sudden and abrupt changes take 
place in the individual at the age of approximately fourteen years has been made 
the justification of our present division between elementary and secondary 
education. More recent studies of the phenomena of adolescence have been 
interpreted to indicate that the adolescent period usually begins at an earlier 
period than at the age of fourteen, probably nearer the age of twelve. As a result 
the assertion is now made that the high school should begin at this age.44 
 
 The junior high school, in jettisoning the traditional curriculum that had served 
the seventh and eighth grades, allied itself with the social efficiency rationale that had 
overtaken the high school. And in so doing, it incorporated many of the practical and 
vocational aims that characterized the new, “comprehensive” high school. As Edward 
Krug has written, “Prominently put forward as advantageous features of the new 
institution were the advancement of practical subjects, the provision for early 
differentiation, and the fostering of socialized aims.”45 Reformers were bold in their aims, 
requiring that the junior high school offer its students “a program of studies differing 
from the course of study to be found in the like numbered grades of the traditional school 
in America.”46 To accomplish that goal would entail a complete overhaul of the 
intermediate grades, and the number of proposed changes were many: new and separate 
buildings, a specially trained staff of teachers, a reorganization of teaching 
responsibilities along departmental lines, the development of multiple curricular tracks to 
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meet the diverse needs of the student body, the implementation of guidance programs, 
widespread opportunities for elective courses, and, most importantly, the redefinition of 
the school’s entire mission so that it would be “in accordance with the needs of early 
adolescence.”47 
 Unfortunately, the reform was easier to envision that it was to implement, and the 
ambitious plans of the junior high school reformers frequently came to naught. Reformers 
and administrators were often dismayed by the very real fact that often junior high 
schools were nothing more than truncated upper elementary schools—students had been 
moved to new buildings, but regularly without the many changes that junior high school 
reformers had recommended. The movement embraced the idea that adolescence was a 
distinct stage of life, one that required a revitalized curriculum, but it was difficult to 
implement concrete curricular reforms. As Charles Judd put it in 1915: “Too often the 
school system which adopts the new plan does not make a sufficiently radical 
reorganization. The first years of the junior high school perpetuate the unprogressive, 
uneconomical traditions of the seventh and eighth grades.”48 
Qualifications of this sort abound in the reports of superintendents who were 
reorganizing the schools in their districts. “The Junior High,” wrote Columbus, Ohio’s, 
superintendent, “is not an elementary school…If it has any justification for its existence it 
is that it is intended to do more for the pupils of the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades than 
was done under the old organization.”49 L.C. Ward, superintendent at Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, complained that his district had not incorporated any of the fundamental changes 
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that characterized a “real” junior high school. As a result, Fort Wayne’s first junior high 
did not sufficiently distance itself from its elementary and secondary cousins; rather than 
developing into an autonomous and unique institution, it simply reproduced traditional 
administrative, curricular, and pedagogical practices. The establishment of this “so-
called” junior high was insufficient, wrote Ward, for it brought “no changes in principals, 
no change in teachers… [and] inconsiderable changes in equipment or building 
arrangement.”50 Fort Wayne’s junior high school segregated adolescents, but did not 
offer them distinct educational opportunities.  
Too often, reformers complained, junior high schools were established simply as 
“administrative devises”51 which sought to relieve congestion at overcrowded elementary 
and secondary schools, a rationale reflected in school board reports time and time again: 
“In order to relieve the crowded condition at North High and ultimately other high 
schools,” wrote Columbus’ superintendent, “and to meet the increasing demands upon 
the upper elementary grades, the Board has declared itself in favor of the Junior High 
School System.”52 Reformers, who thought that junior high school building programs 
should be guided by sophisticated philosophical justifications, and not by spatial or 
architectural emergencies, scorned such utilitarian motives for reorganization.   
The mission for junior high school reformers was to carve out a new niche in their 
educational systems, not to alleviate cramped conditions. Wrote the superintendent for 
Topeka, Kansas, on his system’s newest addition: 
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If this school is to face its responsibility definitely and in an untrammeled way, 
both teachers and school administrators must see clearly that this type of school is 
neither an elementary school or a high school. It is an intermediate school and 
must adopt itself, from the standpoint of subject-matter opportunities, and 
organization of student interests and needs and teaching techniques, to the 
promotion of such development in children as is normal at this stage of the school 
progress.53 
 
 
Failure to reorganize schooling sufficiently for adolescents would simply perpetuate the 
very problems that reformers were trying to eradicate in the first place: an undemocratic 
curriculum not in harmony with the individual’s needs; duplication of materials 
previously covered in the elementary school course; an education disconnected from 
social realities; lack of articulation between the branches of schooling; and the inability 
of traditional programs to improve retention rates. Worse, the establishment of 
intermediate schools without system-wide reconceptualizations could actually harm 
students, throwing them into a “condition approaching chaos” where teachers and 
administrators had not adopted the necessary progressive techniques required if the 
reform was to be worthwhile.54 Fort Wayne’s junior high school, which the district 
abandoned as a failure, demonstrated that ill-conceived junior high school plans could 
hinder student development: 
All departments reported a loss in ability of entering pupils to concentrate upon 
the subject at hand, a loss in ability to work, a looseness of morale, and a failure 
in reasonable discipline which we had not heretofore known. And those failures 
increased progressively from year to year.55 
 
 
Fort Wayne provided reformers with a cautionary tale: it was preferable to hold off on 
the development of junior high schools until a district had carefully studied the problems 
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and planned accordingly. Those warnings were intended by reformers to be taken 
seriously, although in the frenzy to open up new schools they often seem to have gone 
unheeded. 
If the junior high school’s educational program was to be guided by pedagogical 
and curricular rationales distinct from its elementary and secondary counterparts, then it 
followed that junior high school teachers also needed to undergo a thorough “remaking” 
if the institution was to have its intended effect. One of the greatest failures of Fort 
Wayne’s experiment, noted the superintendent, was that its teaching corps had been 
ineffective: “The teachers in those schools were for the most part middle-aged women 
who had been transferred from the elementary grades without any particular preparation 
for special work.”56 Again, warnings were sounded: a junior high school without 
qualified teachers would be a junior high in name only. 
If qualified teachers cannot be found, the feasible thing for a community to do is 
to delay the organization of a Junior High School until such teachers are 
obtained. One reason why some school superintendents have been slow to 
introduce the Junior High School is because they realize that it would be a failure 
without teachers who know its aims and methods.57 
 
The danger that intermediate schools would become mere replicas of the schools on 
either side of the educational divide was a very real one, especially when teachers had not 
received adequate preparation for their new roles:  
The general attitude seems to be that the immediate transfer from grades to junior 
high school is but an emergency expedient. Just as the junior high school 
buildings were at first usually reconstructed grade buildings, so the junior high 
school teachers were often reconstructed grade teachers; and often the 
reconstruction in both cases was too hasty for the good of the institution.58 
                                                
56 Ibid., 647. 
57 W.S. Deffenbaugh, “Secondary Education in 1921 and 1922,” Bulletin 12, U.S. Bureau of Education 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), 337. 
58 Herbert H. Foster, “Student-Teaching and the Training of the Junior High School Teacher,” Educational 
Administration and Supervision 8 (September 1922), 351. 
 232 
 
Unfortunately, for the junior high school and its sponsors, there was no confederation of 
trained or experienced intermediate teachers waiting in the wings. Nor were teacher 
training programs focused on the problem: “The colleges have yet begun to graduate 
many persons who have made a study of the aims and methods of the Junior High 
School.”59 During the formative period of development the only source of teachers was 
from elementary or high schools; hiring teachers other than “reconstructed” ones was not 
a viable option. Thomas W. Gosling, founding principal of the Lafayette Bloom Junior 
High School in Cincinnati, which opened in 1915, knew well the problems of selecting 
teachers for the junior high school. Gosling noted that securing excellent teachers was 
“the most difficult problem” facing the junior high school 
because [it] is a new institution with a new program of studies and with a new 
social purpose. If the teaching in this new institution is to be done by teachers 
who follow the old traditions and who fail to catch the vision of a new method 
and a new opportunity, it is not likely that the junior high school will be able to 
accomplish the purpose for which it was intended.60 
 
To ask the central question—Who were to become junior high school teachers?—was 
more or less to ask whether those new posts were to be filled by elementary or secondary 
teachers.  
Junior high school principals across the Midwest responded to this question in 
different ways. Some relied on elementary school teachers, while others sought 
(generally without success) secondary teachers; some administrators placed experience at 
a premium, while others favored well-educated and progressive novices. Several factors 
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determined the source of new teaching corps, but the most important seemed to be a 
particular school’s organizational format. Combined junior-senior high schools, in which 
the elementary and secondary grades were divided on the 6-6 plan, where an autonomous 
junior high school “department” existed within an already established high school, had a 
teaching corps that was mixed—roughly half of the teachers in such buildings had 
elementary school experience, with the remainder having taught at the secondary level. 
At six-six schools, elementary transfers taught in the seventh and eighth grades, while 
high school teachers retained their duties instructing freshman.61 Junior departments did 
not typically undergo radical reorganizations, at least not to the degree that reformers 
desired. Schools operating on the six-six plan often seemed to have been little more than 
overburdened high schools, and their teachers were at times criticized for focusing on 
academic subjects while neglecting other aspects of the junior high’s mission. According 
to one principal from Grand Rapids, the academic subjects should be “a secondary 
matter.”62 As David Tyack and Larry Cuban have written, it was common for junior high 
school departments following the six-six organizational format to be little more than 
replicas of the high schools to which they were attached. “It is easier to copy another 
institution than it is to invent one from the ground up,” they write. “Would-be innovative 
schools often come to traditional ones.”63 
Schools of the 6-3-3 type, the arrangement preferred by reformers, were generally 
staffed by elementary school teachers, which accounted for a different kind of 
lopsidedness: the neglect of serious academic or vocational pursuits and the perpetuation 
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of irrelevant or repetitive lessons lacking in value for adolescents. One must remain 
sensitive to the range of local variation found in this history, but at the same time some 
generalizations can be made: junior high school teachers tended to teach the grades they 
taught prior to reorganization. Furthermore, junior high schools tended to model the level 
of schooling from which its teachers had been drawn: 
In one case we have a junior high school building in which the teaching and 
methods are the same as the elementary school. In another case we a have a 
junior high school building where teaching and methods are the same as the old 
four-year high school. In neither case do we have a real junior high school that 
meets the needs of junior high school boys and girls who are different from 
elementary pupils and still different from senior high school students.64 
 
 
Reformers excoriated this practice, guided as it was by convenience and tradition, and not 
by well-formulated junior high school logic. But without a trained corps of specialized 
teachers at the ready, reassignment proved to be the only practical solution to the 
problem. 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, opened three new junior high schools between 1923 and 
1926, but none of the new teachers were from high schools.65 Minneapolis’ first junior 
high school, which opened in 1916, had no high school transfers, and women who had 
previously been in charge of grades seven and eight taught all the school’s academic 
subjects.66 Hannibal, Missouri’s, two junior high schools, both of which opened in 1915, 
had teaching corps comprising exclusively teachers from the elementary schools, ranging 
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from grades one through eight.67 The same can be said of Bloom School in Cincinnati, 
where all members of the founding corps were from the elementary schools that sent 
students to the new school.68 The composition of the teaching corps at these schools 
followed the national trend:  
The majority of junior high school teachers have had their experience in the 
elementary grades, 29 per cent only having had experience in the senior high 
school. About two-thirds of the teachers now working in the junior high school 
have had experience in that type of school before this year The median length of 
experience in the junior high school itself it about one and one-half years.69 
 
 
Reassignment from the upper elementary grades to the junior high school did not 
sufficiently guarantee that a new educational model would be instituted, and experience 
within the seventh and eighth grades did not ensure that teachers would be committed to 
or even familiar with the rationale for this great experiment. As one principal put it,  
It is scarcely worthwhile to undertake the task of organizing the Junior High 
School, with all of its complex problems, unless the teachers who are to be 
selected for the work show some promise of grasping the meaning of their new 
responsibilities.70 
 
But it was not always clear to teachers what they were getting into. Reassignment was an 
arbitrary process. According to Philip W. L. Cox, founding principal of Ben Blewett 
Junior High School in St. Louis, which opened its doors in 1917, “fully a third of the staff 
was transferred to the junior high school without having been consulted and contrary to 
their personal preferences.” Worse, “several of the teachers had never heard of such an 
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institution as a junior high school.”71 Junior high schools were organized rather 
haphazardly, and it was clear that in such an environment many teachers would not have 
“grasped the meaning” of their new jobs. 
 Junior high school teachers were expected to combine attributes of both 
elementary and secondary teachers into a new and progressive teaching style. 
Departmental teaching, which assigned a teacher to one or two branches of study, 
required specialized knowledge of the sort secondary teachers possessed. At the same 
time, teachers were also to have “natural” dispositions such as sympathy and caring that 
were usually regarded as traits belonging to successful elementary school teachers. Wrote 
N.C. Hieronimous, of the junior high school at Richmond, Indiana: “No training can 
make a really successful junior high school teacher unless the individual to be trained has 
certain very natural qualifications, both physical and mental.”72 C.F. Switzer, of Grand 
Rapids, considered “a genuine sympathetic and helpful disposition” to be as important as 
experience and breadth of scholarship.73 The goal of the junior high school in Rochester, 
New York, was to develop a teaching corps “so thoroughly acquainted with every 
member of the student body that each one will be assured a real opportunity to develop in 
health, mental and manual power, personality, and character.”74 And, finally, the school 
board of Flint, Michigan, required that its junior high school teachers take a philosophical 
approach adolescent education: 
The teacher must have a good knowledge of adolescent characteristics and really 
enjoy working with young people. She must have extra patience, extra sympathy, 
and a saving sense of humor. Because of the exploratory and guiding functions of 
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the junior-high-school this teacher must have a keen sense of the deeper 
meanings of life and life’s relations and definite training in educational diagnosis, 
prognosis, and guidance.75 
 
 
It is difficult to determine whether or not intermediate teachers possessed the sort 
of dispositions described above, but the literature suggests that they generally failed to 
radically alter their teaching strategies when reassigned to the junior high school. A 
primary problem was that most junior high teachers had been culled from the elementary 
ranks—their experience and level of training, different from their high school 
counterparts’, greatly influenced the new institution which, all too often, felt more like an 
elementary school than anything else: 
The teachers in the elementary schools have received their training in the normal 
schools while the high school teachers are college graduates. Those who receive 
their training in normal schools emphasize methods and the pupil; the college 
graduates received very little professional training while the subject matter has 
been emphasized. This causes a distinctly different type of teaching in the high 
school from that of the elementary school. The methods of discipline also differ 
very widely in the elementary school and the high school.76 
 
In an era when elementary school teachers generally had less formal education 
than high school teachers, junior high teachers—previously elementary teachers—also 
had lower levels of educational attainment than secondary teachers. Time and time again, 
junior high school teachers—despite pleas and regulations—fell behind high school 
teachers in educational qualifications. In Lawrence, Kansas, 51 percent of the 
intermediate teachers held four-year degrees compared to 88 percent of the high school 
teachers in that district.77 In Anderson, Indiana, only five of the junior high’s twenty-
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three teachers held college degrees,78 while in Superior, Wisconsin, only twenty-nine out 
of sixty-four teachers had the “desired level of education.”79 Minneapolis’ hiring policy 
was followed almost universally by the schools investigated in this study: college 
educated teachers were preferred, but “in the origin and early development of the junior 
high schools,” exceptions would be made.80 The goal reformers had for their staffs was 
clear: “The teachers of a junior high school should be college graduates of the same 
standard demanded of the senior high school and should be on the same salary 
schedule.”81 But the goal proved unrealistic and never in its formative stage did the junior 
high school attract teachers who measured up to the educational standards set by 
reformers. 
 The success of this new institution, according to many, hinged upon its teachers. 
And though the “junior high school idea” was spreading across the country at dizzying 
speeds, reformers urged school boards to temper their desires to implement the new 
schools, at least until its staffing problems faced had been resolved: “Unless [the 
principal] can find promising, even if untrained material in this group, he most likely will 
do well to postpone the institution of his plan to a more favorable time.”82 
Such warnings advised local reformers to plan their reorganizational efforts 
carefully, lest the junior high school movement “become a mere mushroom affair.”83 But 
the warnings may have come too late. Junior high school teachers—little more than 
relocated elementary or secondary school teachers—were caught in this chaos. They were 
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required to adapt to new demands placed on them by reconstituted workplaces that often 
originated without sufficient forethought or planning. Developing a new professional 
ethos, that of the “junior high school teacher,” while simultaneously attempting to 
navigate through a reform that was both complex and confusing, challenged junior high 
school teachers in every way—the junior high school idea quite literally sought to 
redefine every aspect of their profession, but history demonstrates that the reformers’ 
goals rarely became established practice. 
 In the formative stage of junior high school development, reformers agreed that 
certain aspects of the junior high school’s mission should be standardized, but those 
standards generally focused on organizational matters, such as departmentalization, the 
recruitment of an experienced teaching corps, and providing differentiated courses of 
study. There were, however, relatively few efforts to define precisely what constituted a 
“real” junior high school curriculum. Reformers were not eager to establish curricular 
standards, which sometimes made it difficult to distinguish junior highs from elementary- 
or secondary schools. At a 1926 meeting of “progressive thinking” junior high school 
experts at the National Education Association’s headquarters, it was resolved that “every 
state, county and large city must develop its own course of study.”84 The North Central 
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools agreed: “It is evident that the junior high 
school movement is of too recent origin to secure marked agreement as to the best way 
for such a standardized agency as the North Central Association to exercise its directive 
influence.”85 It was decided that local junior high school authorities should determine 
which curricular policies best fit their school’s needs. A similar conclusion was reached 
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by the NEA’s Department of Superintendence after conducting a thorough study of junior 
high schools across the nation: “It is not the function of this Committee to advocate any 
particular plan,” the report stated and, instead, simply offered ideas and suggestions 
without being prescriptive.86 Local schools, then, were left largely to their own devices 
and had to work out the nuances of their reforms without the benefit of strong, national 
leadership. As one superintendent noted, the junior high school was a reform with “no 
great committee report to guide it.”87 Likewise, there were no leading figures—the junior 
high school lacked a Charles Eliot or a Clarence Kingsley. As a result, the schools varied 
according to context, sometimes assuming widely different forms within the same 
district. As Larry Cuban has written, the junior high school “was established to achieve a 
potpourri of goals” and, as a result, had a rather “blurred mission.”88 
 The history of junior high school development between 1910 and 1925 was a 
period of experimentation and discovery, a time when local reformers hashed out plans 
and attempted to institutionalize a fuzzy and somewhat puzzling vision commonly 
referred to as “the junior high school idea.” It was a trial run, and schoolmen were aware 
that curricular standardization, before the lessons of experimentation could be learned, 
could be detrimental to the health of the burgeoning institution. In Detroit the 
superintendent acknowledged that much work remained to be done and that the schools 
were still in their infancy: “The course of study for these schools,” he wrote, “is being 
worked out gradually…[and] it hardly seems the proper time at this stage to have these 
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courses of study printed.”89 R.G. Kinkead, Columbus, Ohio’s, Assistant Superintendent, 
called the junior high school an “experiment”; in Chicago it was noted that early junior 
high schools were undergoing a “trial”; and the first plan for Duluth, Minnesota’s, new 
schools was called a “tentative scheme,” likely to be revised at a later date.90 
 For some, this openness and fluidity in design appeared to have been too much. 
The superintendent at Evansville, Indiana, thought the degree of variegation too high 
within his very own district: 
Up to this time every building was, in many respects, a law unto itself. The work 
of the schools progressed according to the ideas of the teaching force of that 
particular building. It was not an uncommon occurrence that by the third month 
of school there was such a difference in the scope of the work that children 
transferred from one building to another frequently failed to make their 
promotion.91 
 
 
In Grand Rapids, Paul Stetson, principal of the South High School (which contained a 
junior high department), complained that the system’s administrative mechanisms had 
not kept pace with the new institutional developments: “The principal’s day school 
summary gives no indication that such a thing as the junior high school is known in 
Grand Rapids.”92 And five years after the establishment of the first junior high school in 
Grand Rapids it was apparent that the intermediate curriculum had still not been 
sufficiently reorganized. A survey of that system’s schools, published in 1916, noted that 
the project was far from complete: 
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many old-time traditional forms and practices (some of which are educationally 
questionable, others of which are educationally obsolete) are holding tenaciously 
in administrative procedure. What is distinctively needed, therefore, in the junior 
high-school work in Grand Rapids, is an effort to carry through to completion 
the reforms that have already been so well begun.93 
 
The junior high school movement contained a contradiction: one the one hand, 
reformers complained that reorganization rarely measured up to the rigorous standards on 
which “junior high school idea” was built. But, at the same time, they resisted efforts that 
would have standardized the institution. The problem was caused by the fact that 
reformers held allegiance to two different groups: adolescents and local business 
interests. If the primary goal of the junior high had been to organize schools in ways that 
catered to the distinct “nature” and “needs” of adolescence, then curricular 
standardization would have been uncontroversial. Adolescence, in Hall’s view at least, 
was a definite developmental stage that all young people experienced similarly—the 
adolescent condition did not vary from place to place because recapitulation was not 
dependent on geographic location. And even though recapitulatory thinking did not 
influence junior high school reformers, its collapse did not necessarily lead to the demise 
of the idea that adolescence was a distinct developmental stage requiring a special kind of 
education. But junior high school reformers ignored developmental and psychological 
theories altogether. Adolescent “interest” was not determined by an adolescent state of 
mind, but by the surrounding social and economic concerns of the community at large. 
And because those concerns varied with the locale, the adolescent curriculum could not 
be standardized. 
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Throughout the country, then, the junior high was tied directly to the needs of a 
particular region, and not to adolescent developmental needs. This motive ensured that 
junior high schools would be as diverse as the communities they served. Lafayette Bloom 
in Cincinnati was a terminal, highly vocationalized K-10 institution that catered to a 
working class neighborhood and was modeled after German industrial schools. “The fact 
that this is an industrial center,” wrote Thomas Briggs, “and that about eighty percent of 
these pupils take either industrial arts or household arts shouws [sic] the practical 
adaptation of the curriculum to the local environment.” It was an “institution with a 
single aim.” 94 In contrast to Bloom, St. Louis’ Ben Blewett Intermediate School was an 
independent three-year junior high (grades 7-9) that focused on academic work and 
anticipated that its students would matriculate at the neighboring high school. Blewett’s 
students, predictably, were “mainly from well-to-do families, only 15 per cent of them of 
foreign born parents.”95 Bloom and Blewett could not have been more different, even 
though both were founded on the idea that junior high schools should be based on the 
nature, needs, and interests of adolescents. But, again, education for adolescents was to 
be determined by community needs, not by psychological theories. According to the 
theory of recapitulation, adolescent “interests” were determined by racial history, but the 
conclusions reached by junior high reformers were no less scripted: adolescent interest 
was dependent on the interests of the community. In neither case were individuals’ 
interests and aspirations truly taken into consideration. 
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One of the reasons that national agencies were unprepared to recommend a 
standardized curriculum, then, had to do with the nature of the new institution, which 
sought to meet the varying social and economic needs of neighborhoods and school 
districts. Institutional flexibility allowed the junior high to adapt to those needs and, 
rather than having a single blueprint to guide their work, junior high school reformers 
had access to a dizzying array of models. As one writer put it, “Each Junior High school, 
so far, has been developed largely out of the needs of the locality, rather than of 
conformity to a state or national standard, with the result that each school has developed 
some feature or other which could be of use or enlightenment to others throughout the 
nation.”96 Such a rationale, combining utilitarianism and localism, was not easily 
standardized. Consequently, “the” junior high school did not come into being in the first 
two decades of its existence, and it did not adhere to any ideal form. Curricula, 
administrative procedures, building plans, organizational schemes, and teaching corps 
differed widely from city to city.  About the only commonality shared by all junior high 
schools was an understanding of adolescence that tied the young person’s needs and 
interests to those of his immediate surroundings: 
The seventh grade is the natural turning point in the child’s school life, since at 
the age of adolescence he is eager to explore and discover those personal 
interests and limitations which point toward specific types of training and life 
work. The discipline, mode of instruction, and even the theory of class 
administration—as well as the traditional activities and studies of the old type 
school—failed to meet the mental, emotional, and vocational demands of the 
adolescent. The junior high school is the new school designed to meet these 
demands.97 
 
                                                
96 S. O. Rorem, “Measuring East Junior High School of Sioux City, Iowa,” School Review 27 (January 
1919), 44. 
97 NEA, “Creating a Curriculum for Adolescent Youth,” 5. 
 245 
As we shall see, it was an understanding of adolescence that Hall would have considered 
to be misguided and shortsighted.  
 
 
III. Adolescence Reversed 
As already suggested, the incorporation of the junior high school into school districts in 
the 1910s and 1920s was closely tied to the economic interests of business-oriented 
reformers. The junior high school, writes one historian, “was one of the first parts of the 
academic ladder to succumb to the onslaught of the practical, progressive, business 
dominated reformer.”98 Thus, its curriculum was developed not with theories of 
adolescent development in mind, but with the aim of preparing distinct types of workers. 
As one reformer wrote, the junior high school’s curriculum should mirror the economic 
needs of the communities it served: 
An important factor to be reckoned with in the differentiation of the course of 
study is the type of the community. It should be reflected in it. If it is an 
agricultural community, the vocational work should be agricultural. If it is a 
commercial community, commercial subjects and vocational work in keeping 
with the activities of the community should be included. If it is a residential 
community of old-line families where almost all of the children go to college, the 
languages and algebra should be introduced in either the seventh or the eighth 
year.99 
 
Detroit’s first junior high schools “greatly emphasized manual and industrial training in 
the upper grades,” enabling “all of our upper grade children who desire industrial or pre-
vocational training to secure such training at the public expense at centers not too distant 
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from their homes.”100 The reorganization of Detroit’s schools placed a premium on 
developing a curriculum that would fit its graduates for the roles that they would 
eventually play in the city’s economy: 
We should not be satisfied with the school organization of Detroit until it is 
possible to offer all of our children the training that their probable future activity 
seems to demand. This will involve not merely the extension of junior technical 
high schools, as they may be called, but similar schools for those who are going 
into commercial or clerical pursuits. It is not sufficient to offer the specialized 
training merely to pupils in the high schools. Our industrial and commercial 
ranks are continually being recruited from those who are unable to take 
advantage of the educational opportunities afforded by our high schools.101 
 
 It was not infrequent for reformers to envision the junior high school as a terminal 
institution, and though the ideal was to guide the majority of its students on to the high 
school, educators knew that many youth would choose instead to enter the trades. In 
Columbus, Ohio, the president of the school board observed that Indianola Junior High 
School would be the final stop for many of the city’s students: “The fact that so many 
leave school should be recognized as an existing fact and a stopping place fixed there, a 
definite school course created that would end at that natural point, closing their school 
life with a diploma that certifies that they have completed a school course and honorably 
attained a definite educational aim.”102 Junior high schoolers in Kansas City, Kansas, 
were also aware that a number of their students would leave school upon the completion 
of the ninth grade and, consequently, sought to design practical curricular tracks to 
prepare those students for future employment: 
Many of the girls who must drop out of school at the age of sixteen elect 
typewriting throughout the eighth and ninth grades and specialize during the 
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ninth grade in stenography and office practice. For both boys and girls are 
offered survey courses in the seventh grade, gradually increasing specialization 
in the eighth grade, and a full year of work in one or two special lines during the 
ninth grade.103 
 
 
 The school system of Duluth, Minnesota, also designed its junior high school 
curriculum with the city’s economic interests in mind, and shaped the schools’ offerings 
around the vocational opportunities that students could expect to find upon completion of 
the intermediate grades. In Duluth, 42 percent of students leaving school joined the city’s 
manufactures, 21 percent embarked upon clerical careers, 16 percent found work in 
transportation, 7 percent in agriculture, 6 percent in domestic work, with only about 3 
percent gaining employment in the professional occupations. Having outlined the 
opportunities that Duluth students were likely to encounter, the junior high school 
tailored its curriculum to provide training for those fields: “While it is not true that all the 
occupations can find a place in the school curriculum, the figures indicate to some extent 
what should be taught in the public schools in order that children can have some 
experience as a basis for determining the proper occupation for them to enter when they 
leave school.”104 
 These local districts seem to have followed the advice coming from national 
educational organizations. The NEA, in its 1923 publication, “Creating A Curriculum for 
Adolescent Youth,” was firm in its recommendation that the junior high school 
curriculum should be informed by the employment needs of local businesses. The report 
suggested that school systems conduct a “community survey of the economic, social, and 
industrial conditions to determine what courses in industrial arts should be given.” Also 
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recommended was the formation of a “local advisory committee to work with the school 
people in formulating courses in industrial arts.”105 The report also made suggestions 
concerning the education of adolescent girls, noting that programs of domestic science 
should vary according to local needs. Rural girls were more likely to make their own 
clothing than were urban girls; they also cooked more and played a greater role in caring 
for their family’s children. Thus, in the junior high school, efforts should be made “to 
meet individual and community needs through home economics courses.”106 
 The junior high school curriculum, while heavily focused on the future 
occupational pursuits of its students, was not vocational in the strictest sense. And though 
some students were offered highly specialized terminal courses, the junior high was 
conceived as “essentially an exploratory, try-out, and information school.”107 The 
intermediate grades were to be a period of “exploration” and “guidance,” where students 
were provided with opportunities to “try out” as many different vocational subjects as 
possible. Once students gained familiarity with the many career choices available to 
them, and had the chance to find what line of work most suited their own talents, they 
would be able to make informed decisions when they entered high school and were 
compelled to choose a specialized curricular track.  
 Reformers were always careful to note that the junior high school “offers general 
rather than specific vocational education, it tests out aptitudes and looks to different 
futures for different children.”108 It was sometimes a disingenuous claim, but the 
discovery of individual differences became one of the official primary aims of the junior 
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high school. A survey conducted by Leonard V. Koos in 1919-20 found that the majority 
of junior high school workers considered “recognizing individual differences” to be the 
most important function of the institution.109 In uncovering the differences of its students, 
the junior high school sought to tailor the course of instruction according to the student’s 
“interests” or “needs.” Those interests and differences, however, were generally limited 
to ideas about one’s future occupation. According to one observer, the junior high school 
should offer 
differentiated courses of study for pupils according to their interests, capacities 
and probable future careers. The junior high school will be organized for two 
general groups of pupils, namely, those who are going to continue their school 
training for some time, and those who are likely to discontinue their school work 
at an early age. Those who are to continue their school work through the high 
school will be prepared in the junior high school to do that. Those who are to 
leave school early will be better prepared to take up some gainful occupation 
than are most pupils who now leave the upper grades or the early years of the 
high school.110 
 
Reformers were convinced that curricular differentiation based on a student’s likely 
professional role introduced into the modern school system a highly democratic practice. 
In their opinion, nothing was more undemocratic than providing students of differing 
interests and abilities with a uniform curriculum. Disagreeing with the Committee of Ten, 
junior high school reformers thought that forcing all students into academic classes was 
inequitable—the school should instead adapt itself the specific needs of each of its 
students. The superintendent of Grand Rapids, Michigan, explained that sorting students 
based on abilities and “interests” was a noble example of democracy in action: 
The ideal of our public school educational system should be to furnish every boy 
and girl in Grand Rapids with the opportunity to become a good, useful, patriotic, 
and self-supporting citizen, to develop the greatest possible extent their natural 
powers and capabilities. This cannot be done by assuming that all men are 
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created equal. All men are not created equal in powers and capabilities. Children 
differ in mental alertness, in moral responsibility, in mental aptitudes, tastes and 
tendencies, in environment, in vocational aims, in intellectual endowments, in 
physical development…No one who knows the modern trend of thought tries any 
longer to put all the children in the public schools through the same mill.111 
 
 A “democratic education,” as conceived by junior high school reformers and 
influenced by the logic of social efficiency, lay not in providing all adolescents with a 
common educational experience, but in giving them the opportunity to discover their own 
talents and interests and by allowing them to pursue a course of instruction that best fit 
their own, individual needs. “We must explore the interests, the aptitudes, and the 
capacities of the pupil,” wrote Thomas Briggs. “We must at the same time reveal to him 
the possibilities in various fields of education, so that, even while profiting by the 
thoroughly worth while material presented to him, he may intelligently determine his 
future training.”112  
 Junior high school reformers were not informed by psychological theories 
concerning adolescent development, and they were certainly not influenced by Hall’s 
complicated recapitulatory arguments. There was a clear disconnect between Hall’s era, 
when the child study movement was at its height and when the theory of recapitulation 
was commonly accepted, and the junior high school period, when social efficiency 
concerns dominated educational discussions and when the focus of adolescent 
development was almost entirely vocational. The junior high schoolers conceived of 
adolescence in simple terms, understanding it as a period in life when one’s individuality 
emerged. Whereas elementary school children did not vary widely in interests and 
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abilities, adolescence was a period when differences became more marked. It was, 
therefore, appropriate for the primary grades to offer its students a common curriculum, 
ensuring that all learned the same basic set of skills. At adolescence the educational needs 
of the student changed; as one reformer noted, “Up to a certain age, pupils may very 
satisfactorily be grouped together and given the same general work. But when the boys 
and girls reach the age of adolescence, their individuality begins to assert itself; faintly, 
perhaps, and sometimes under our rigid systems in ways hardly apparent, but real, 
nevertheless.”113 Leonard V. Koos observed that there was an “expanding range of 
variation as we proceed from grade to grade.”114 Reformers linked the onset of 
adolescence, and the assertion of individuality that accompanied it, with specific 
educational needs: 
The Junior High School takes these vital changes of the adolescent into 
consideration, by its differentiation and selection of courses which appeal to the 
adolescent youth. It takes account of the “nature and upheaval at the dawn of the 
teens which makes the pubescent ferment.” The vocational subjects, commercial 
subjects, agricultural subjects and the like, offered by the curriculum of the 
Junior High School cater to this transformation period through which the 
adolescent is passing. 115 
 
 G. Stanley Hall proposed many of the curricular changes advocated by junior high 
school reformers—he embraced the idea of curricular differentiation, wanted secondary 
schools to cater to the adolescent’s interests, and was highly critical of the 
recommendations made by Eliot’s Committee of Ten. The report, a “masterpiece of 
college policy,” was based on a flawed premise, one that both the child study- and junior 
high school movements sought to undermine: “every subject which is taught at all in a 
secondary school should be taught in the same way and to the same extent to every pupil 
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so long as he pursues it, no matter what the probable destination of the pupil may be or at 
what point his education is to cease.”116 The Committee’s logic was, to Hall, 
undemocratic and based on faulty psychology. Laying the groundwork for an argument 
that would fuel the building of junior high schools, Hall noted, “To refuse this concession 
to the wide range of individual differences is a specious delusion, which in a democracy 
may be perfectly honest.”117 Hall chided the Committee for ignoring “the fact that there 
are as great differences in natural ability as those artificially created in any aristocracy, 
and that the very life of a republic depends on bringing these out.”118 And, again 
foreshadowing the arguments made by junior high school reformers, Hall noted that 
adolescence was the period of life when individual differences became most 
pronounced—during puberty, “individual differences of all kinds are now suddenly 
augmented. The interval between the strong and weak, the dull and bright, beautiful and 
ugly, becomes far greater than it was before.”119 If the needs of the modern school’s 
heterogeneous population were to be met, it would have to offer numerous curricular 
tracks, allowing students to follow courses of study that appealed to individual interest 
that took into consideration varying degrees of ability: “Progress is now in 
differentiation,” wrote Hall. “The more parallel courses, electives, groups and institutions 
the better, provided only they are good and thorough, and really distinct and 
individual.”120 
 As Joseph Kett has shown, Adolescence contained many contradictions, and 
nowhere are Hall’s inconsistencies more pronounced than when he dealt with the issue of 
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reforming adolescent education. At times he seemed comfortable with the aims of social 
efficiency and offered future junior high school reformers arguments that would have 
supported their vocational mission: 
Agriculture, manufacture, and commerce are the bases of national prosperity, and 
on them all professions, institutions, and even culture, are more and more 
dependent, while the old ideals of mere study and brain-work are fast becoming 
obsolete…Those who leave school at any age should be best fitted to take up 
their life work instead of leaving unfitted for it, aimless and discouraged.121 
 
 
Manual training programs were capable of meeting “the growing demand of the country 
for a more practical education,” and Hall considered it a great “pedagogic problem” to 
provide some form of training for the several hundred vocational opportunities available 
to young people, more than half of which involved “manual work.”122 At the same time, 
however, Hall wrote that “the high school should primarily fit for nothing, but should 
exploit and develop to the uttermost all the powers, for this alone is a liberal 
education.”123 Vocational curricula were oftentimes narrow in scope and limited the 
student’s aspirations: “Academic enervation and anemia is seen when youth desire 
simply to fit for ready-made positions instead of striking out new ones.”124 An education 
that fit students only for present occupational opportunities was shortsighted: “Nor 
should [education] be content to fit for the present, which will all too soon be an emeritus 
deity.”125 
 Hall was clearly conflicted, but the problem of vocational education was not a 
central concern in Adolescence. Nor did junior high school reformers cite Hall as an 
                                                
121 Hall, Adolescence, Vol. 1, 173. 
122 Ibid., 174-175. 
123 Hall, Adolescence, Vol. 2, 525. 
124 Ibid., 513. 
125 Ibid., 514. 
 254 
authority who lent support to their argument for vocational education—in fact, Hall 
would have detested many of their proposals. Educational historian Herbert Kliebard, in 
his history of vocational education, demonstrates that the vocational rationale was 
diametrically opposed to the educational program set forth in Adolescence. 
Besides vocationalism, however, the new industrial order gave rise to another 
powerful ideology, social efficiency. At certain significant points, social 
efficiency and vocationalism obviously converge. Both doctrines, for example, 
accept at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, the notion that education is 
above all a process of getting ready for adulthood.126 
 
Junior high schools modeled the adult world and sought, above all else, to prepare 
children for entrance into the workforce. The student who completed the junior high 
school course, wrote one reformer, “will have attained at least sufficient training from the 
course pursued with which to enter the ranks of the industrial, commercial or agricultural 
world, and will have a pretty good idea of what will be expected of him in life.”127 
Clearly, the “interests” reflected in the junior high school curriculum were not necessarily 
those of its students but, rather, the interests of adults and, particularly, business-oriented 
adults whose livelihood depended on a reliable supply of trained employees. And though 
the mantra of individual interest invoked by junior high school reformers sounded 
Hallian, it was little more than an attempt to render the efforts of commercial and 
industrial interests to appear consistent with liberal and democratic values. 
 For Hall, adolescents developmentally predated the modern, industrial world. 
Thus, from a recapitulatory perspective, it would have been impossible for adolescents to 
find much interest in it. Furthermore, since all adolescents occupied the same 
evolutionary moment, it made little sense to link the intermediate curriculum to a 
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particular community’s economic exigencies. A “junior high school in the heart of an 
industrial district will need a curriculum somewhat different from the curriculum of a 
school in a district exclusively residential,” wrote one reformer.128 In so thinking, junior 
high school reformers ignored one of the primary lessons of Adolescence: modern 
adolescents, like primitives in the colonies, were mentally and emotionally unequipped to 
deal with the modern world and, thus, needed to be sheltered from it. Hall’s ideal school 
was a refuge, but the junior high school was hardly a sanctuary. Hall’s educational vision 
required schools to embrace childhood without rushing them towards adulthood, so “the 
child can enter upon his full heritage, live out each stage of his life to the fullest, and 
realize in himself all its manifold tendencies.”129 But modern schools, which placed an 
undue amount of importance on the student’s future occupational role, forced “young 
people [to] leap rather than grow into maturity.”130 As Hall noted, in the bustle of 
modern, civilized life, young people were being left behind: 
 
We are conquering nature, achieving a magnificent material civilization, leading 
the world in the applications though not in the creation of science, coming to lead 
in energy and intense industrial and other activities; our vast and complex 
business organization that has long since outgrown the comprehension of 
professional economists, absorbs ever more and earlier the best talent and muscle 
of youth and now dominates health, time, society, politics, and law-giving, and 
sets new and ever more pervading fashions in manners, morals, education, and 
religion; but we are progressively forgetting that for the complete apprenticeship 
to life, youth needs repose, leisure, art, legends, romance, idealization, and in a 
word humanism, if it is to enter the kingdom of man well equipped for man’s 
highest work in the world.131 
 
 The junior high school’s curriculum was not nearly as broad as Hall would have 
liked—he would have found its focus on occupational interests to be extremely narrow 
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and unnatural, which was the most egregious offence an educator could commit. In Hall’s 
mind, the “educational ideal is now to develop capacities in as many directions as 
possible, to indulge caprice and velleity a little, to delay consistency for a time, and let 
the diverse prepotencies struggle with each other.”132 The ideal of the junior high school 
that eventually emerged, however, was antithetical to the educational plan found in 
Adolescence, and vocational training took precedence over the developmentally based 
curriculum outlined by Hall. In the early years of the junior high school movement, only 
traces of Hall remained, appearing in the reformer’s “interest”-based rhetoric. In reality, 
however, vocational subjects dominated the curriculum: in 1918, manual training and 
domestic science could be “found in approximately three-fourths of the schools.”133  
“Interest” was linked to the needs of local businesses; the curriculum was crafted without 
a clear picture of adolescence; and a teaching corps that had received no training on the 
special nature of their students delivered the content. Sadly, Hall’s goal of protecting 
modern youth from the narrowly conceived concerns of the modern world had gone 
unrealized. And though the child study movement had demonstrated great promise in 
getting the school to adapt itself to the needs of students, in the end, students were forced 
to adapt to the needs to the school. Hall’s program had been reversed.   
 
 
Conclusion 
Toward the end of Adolescence, when considering the problem of race pedagogy, G. 
Stanley Hall wrote, “The Indian has been sympathetically studied far longer than has 
                                                
132 Hall, Adolescence, Vol. 2, 89. 
133 C.O. Davis, “Junior High Schools in the North Central Association Territory,” School Review 26 (April 
1918), 333. 
 257 
childhood and youth, but this rich body of knowledge remains unused.”134 The same was 
true of educational schemes developed for adolescents—lessons learned from decades of 
child study had been forgotten by reformers who sought to redefine the mission of 
schools. The disconnect between anthropological study and Indian educational policy had 
resulted in “special schools” for Indian youth that were “very inadequate and sometimes 
as wrong as they are well meant.”135 Too much stress was placed on fitting the Indian for 
the modern world—“The present Superintendent of Indian Schools advocates 
compulsory education of all Indian children, especially industrially.”136 The same 
happened with the junior high school: a disconnect between theory and practice resulted 
in schools that focused solely on preparing the adolescent for his or her place in the 
modern world. Forcing the white man’s civilization upon Native Americans had proven 
extremely detrimental, especially when they were compelled to take up his vocations: “It 
is somber and pitiful to isolate a Sioux tribesman to the lonely life of a poor Western 
rancher,” which was precisely what America’s reservation policy was doing. And Indian 
educational policies, rather than trying to educate natives in ways that appealed to their 
own nature and culture, were attempting to remake the Indian child into something that 
he was not. “We have robbed the Indians, but never so wrongly as forcing their children 
from their homes without parental consent to imprison them in a remote school, which 
should be brought to them and not they to it.”137 In linking adolescents with primitive 
groups, the experiences of both could be understood in like terms: schools were weapons, 
used to create subservient and pliable workers for the modern economy. Hall argued that 
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the practice of doing so in the colonial world was injurious to native populations, but the 
warnings were unheeded, and the junior high school, though not informed by colonial 
policy, did conceive of education in equally narrow terms. As Hall noted, “The world 
goes to school. This has become the method of colonization and completes the work of 
conquest by armies.”138 
 Education was too important to be left to the caprice of policy makers, and in the 
case of the schooling of Indians, Hall had this to say: 
At root the “Indian question” can not be solved by Congress, the army, the 
clergy, or the pedagogue. It lies mostly beyond the ken of the historian. The only 
real authority in the field is the ethnologist who has lived with the Indian as he 
lives, won his confidence and taken his point of view and read the literature 
about him.139 
 
The same argument was made for the education of Western children: adolescents were 
far too valuable to leave their fate in the hands of myopic efficiency educators and self-
interested business leaders. It was preferable for highly educated experts to be in charge 
of setting educational policy and, like Hall, they should regard adolescence as “the most 
fascinating of all themes, more worthy, perhaps, than anything else in the world of 
reverence, most inviting study, and in most crying need of a service we do not yet 
understand how to render aright.”140 But rarely were sentiments like those expressed in 
the junior high school literature and, sadly, the new educational programs for adolescents, 
like those designed for Indian children, had just about everything backwards:  
In education our very kindergartens, which outnumber those of any other land, by 
dogma and hyper-sophistication tend to exterminate the naïve that is the glory of 
childhood. Everywhere the mechanical and formal triumph over content and 
substance, the letter over the spirit, the intellect over morals, lesson setting and 
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hearing over real teaching, the technical over the essential, information over 
education, marks over edification, and method over matter.141 
 
 Did Hall’s conflation of adolescence and savagery have unintended 
consequences? Were adolescents, in the end, “colonized” and treated like “savages,” 
valued only for their potential economic contributions? It is difficult to say—the evidence 
of a direct connection between Hall’s adolescent-as-savage thesis and the junior high 
school’s campaign to segregate and vocationalize young people is lacking. But troubling 
similarities abound, and if we are to use Hall’s ideas in our analysis then the parallels are 
clearly present.  
 Joseph Kett has observed that founding ideas and institutional practices are 
sometimes separated over the course of time, leaving institutional arrangements in place 
that are detached from the ideas that initially created them: 
But no sooner had [reformers] all converged than they parted company, going off 
in separate directions and to new interests. They left young people holding the 
bag, so to speak, for the institutions created in the early 20th century survived to 
become an enduring form of custody for youth, long after the ideas and impulses 
which created them were laid to rest.142 
 
 
Kett’s comment is valuable, but not original. Edward B. Tylor and Herbert Spencer made 
the same point: man is the product of his ancestors and, even if that legacy has been 
forgotten, their practices often remain with us. Rediscovering that heritage, which had 
been lost over the ages, had been the aim of many nineteenth-century thinkers, including 
John Fiske, John Lubbock, Ernst Haeckel, Thomas H. Huxley, Cesare Lombroso, 
Havelock Ellis, Henry Maudsley, and, of course, G. Stanley Hall. It has also been the aim 
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of this work, influenced by the very book that it set out to understand. The great lesson to 
be learned, sought by evolutionists and recapitulationists alike, was stated innumerable 
times in the pages of Adolescence, and sometimes quite beautifully: “we are influenced in 
our deeper, more temperamental dispositions by the life-habits and codes of conduct of 
we know not what unnumbered hosts of ancestors, which like a cloud of witnesses are 
present throughout our lives, and that our souls are echo-chambers in which their 
whispers reverberate.”143 G. Stanley Hall had noble aims but, in the end, his work was 
built atop a problematic science. In conflating adolescents and savages, Hall had intended 
to liberate both, but Adolescence was never able to emerge from the context in which it 
was written and, as a result, the child-as-savage metaphor became derogatory, 
demeaning, and, perhaps, embedded in our culture’s understanding of children. 
Historians of childhood and education may have forgotten that adolescence was built 
upon the foundations of racism, imperialism, and conquest, but that is not to say that the 
legacy does not linger.
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